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Abstract
Microeconomic equilibrium problems are intimately related to game theory, but the current
state of knowledge for several types of microeconomic problems is limited. This dissertation
rigorously addresses several of these problems from the standpoint of variational inequality
theory. In addition to proving theoretical results about problem properties, important
microeconomic implications are discussed when applicable. The individual chapters of this
work focus on:
• equilibrium existence for perfectly competitive capacity expansion problems with risk-
averse players;
• a comprehensive analysis of the application of Lemke’s method to affine generalized Nash
equilibrium problems;
• the formulation and study of a unified power market model encompassing different mi-
croeconomic behavioral assumptions, capacity markets, emission permit auctions, and con-
sumer surplus maximization;
• an investigation of differential Nash games with mixed state-control constraints.
Although the presented results are applicable to a broad class of games that satisfy cer-
tain structural properties, electricity markets represent a key application area underlying
several of the chapters and are specifically addressed in Chapter 4. As a whole, this dis-
ii
sertation should clearly illustrate how variational inequality theory can be used to analyze
these applications and should provide the basis for the development of effective solution
methodologies. It should also provide deeper insights into complex microeconomic games
that cannot be described solely with demand and supply curves. Suggestions for additional
research are provided at the end of each chapter to motivate future work in the respective
domains.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In the years since its introduction by von Neumann and Morgenstern [169] in 1944, game
theory has proven to be useful in the analysis of a wide variety of problems, including
those arising in microeconomics, engineering, political science, and psychology. In each of
these problems, individual entities, known as “players,” interact and make decisions that
affect each other. These interactions may change either the ordering of player outcome
preferences or the set of feasible actions available to a player. It should be apparent that
an optimization problem trivially corresponds to a game consisting of only one player.
Games are typically classified according to several distinctions, the most important of which
are arguably the following:
• Cooperative or non-cooperative
Each player in a non-cooperative game acts independently to achieve its best individ-
ual outcome while players in a cooperative game make decisions jointly to achieve a
mutually desirable outcome. Since this dissertation focuses on microeconomic games,
which are usually modeled as non-cooperative due to regulations restricting producer
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collusion, cooperative game theory will not be discussed. The interested reader may
refer to [96, 97, 103, 120, 162, 207] for a brief overview of research on cooperative
games.
• Zero-sum or nonzero-sum
Zero-sum games and nonzero-sum games differ in how player payoffs are allocated.
For zero-sum games, the aggregate payoff across players is, by definition, zero so the
cumulative positive payoff must equal the cumulative negative payoff. This concept
can colloquially be stated as “if I win [blank], you lose [blank],” the idea behind many
athletic competitions. On the other hand, a nonzero-sum game can have a nonzero
net payoff, meaning that while some players may lose and other players may win, the
aggregate result of the game can be a “win” or a “loss” across all players. Economic
transactions are typical examples of “winning” nonzero-sum games because both
parties should be better off after the exchange. This dissertation addresses nonzero-
sum games; refer to [25, 51, 168, 194] for some of the only theoretical research on
zero-sum games since their introduction in [169].
• Perfect information or imperfect information
The information available to players can greatly affect their decisions. In a game
with perfect information, all players have the exact same knowledge about current
conditions. Games with imperfect information do not possess this property and
therefore must be analyzed in a different manner. A large amount of research has
been conducted on both of these game forms (e.g., [17, 98, 117, 191, 198, 205, 217]),
but only games characterized by perfect information are addressed here.
• Open-loop or closed-loop
The concepts of open-loop and closed-loop games are related to the effect of feed-
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back on player decisions, a principle that is associated with the passage of time.
In an open-loop game, feedback is not present; the opposite is true for closed-
loop games. Because of the relationship between feedback and time, this game
distinction is traditionally only applicable to differential Nash games (see Chap-
ter 5). The relationship between these two problem forms has been studied in detail
(e.g., [82, 84, 193, 203, 215]), and it has been proven that every open-loop Nash
equilibrium strategy is a closed-loop Nash equilibrium strategy. The converse impli-
cation does not hold. Only open-loop linear-quadratic differential Nash games are
discussed in this dissertation, but the interested reader can refer to [14, 72, 185] for
a general discussion of open-loop and closed-loop properties for the problem studied
in Chapter 5.
• Discrete strategy space or continuous strategy space
Many simple games involve players choosing actions from discrete, finite strategy
spaces. Examples of such games include the prisoner’s dilemma and the coordina-
tion game presented in Examples 1 and 2 of Section 1.2. Games with continuous
strategy spaces cannot be expressed via a payoff matrix but are more applicable to
microeconomic games and are therefore examined here.
• Cournot or Bertrand [in microeconomic games]
Cournot and Bertrand competition are two fundamental forms of strategic competi-
tion in microeconomics. By definition, Cournot players compete in quantity knowing
that their production affects price whereas Bertrand players compete in price. De-
scriptions, assumptions, and properties of these modeling methods can be found in
any undergraduate-level microeconomics textbook. All of the strategic games studied
in this dissertation follow the quantity competition framework of Cournot models.
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1.1 Solution concepts
To formalize the concept of a non-cooperative game, it is important to understand how
players make decisions and evaluate outcomes. Naturally, each player must have some
method of judging possible outcomes in terms of preference. For a game with {1, · · · ,F}
being the finite set of players, let Ki ⊆ Rni denote the set of feasible decisions for player i
and K−i ,
∏
j 6= i
Kj denote the concatenated feasible space of all players other than player i.
For player i to order all possible outcomes in terms of preference of decisions x , (xi, x−i)
where xi ∈ Ki and x−i ∈ K−i, there must exist some objective function fi :
F∏
i= 1
Ki → R
that ranks player i’s outcome preferences either ordinally or cardinally. For microeconomic
games, fi is usually profit or a monotonic transformation thereof.
In a non-cooperative setting, player i has no direct influence over rivals’ decisions so x−i
should be treated exogenously by player i. In the setting of a minimization problem, player
i wants to solve
minimize
xi∈Ki
fi(xi;x−i) (1.1)
with x−i exogenous in (1.1) but endogenous to the game as a whole. As introduced by
John Nash [163, 165], one possible solution to the game in which each player i solves (1.1)
is a tuple of feasible decisions x∗ , (x∗i )Fi= 1 such that no player can improve its objective
function by unilaterally changing its decision. This type of game and the associated so-
lution concept are known as a Nash game/Nash equilibrium problem (NEP) and a Nash
equilibrium (NE), respectively. Mathematically, a feasible decision vector x∗ is a Nash
equilibrium if and only if, for each player i = 1, · · · ,F ,
fi(x
∗
i ;x
∗
−i) ≤ fi(xi;x∗−i) for all xi ∈ Ki. (1.2)
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The above development of player i’s optimization problem assumes that the feasible region
Ki is independent of others’ decisions x−i. Although this is a common phenomenon for some
problems, it may happen that players’ decisions can be restricted by their rivals’ decisions.
For example, the availability of a fixed number of emission permits links producers’ feasible
regions together because the total number of permits purchased by or allocated to the
producers cannot exceed the permit supply. In these problems, player i’s feasible region is
defined by the set Ki(x−i) where x−i is a feasible tuple of rivals’ decisions. This extended
problem is known as a generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP) [73, 128, 133, 135,
179]. Although the definition of a generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) is identical to that
of a Nash equilibrium except with Ki(x
∗
−i) replacing Ki, the identification of a GNEP
equilibrium is significantly more difficult than for a standard NEP for a number of reasons.
For instance, a GNE x∗ must satisfy the condition x∗ ∈ K(x∗) ,
F∏
i= 1
Ki(x
∗
−i) which
by itself demands that the point-to-set map K has a fixed point. Due to the inherent
difficulty of solving GNEPs, considerable research into tractable GNE restrictions has been
conducted (e.g., [73, 85, 197]).
The aforementioned NEPs have only dealt with static (i.e., discrete-time) games in which
players make decisions by solving optimization problems in finite dimensions. The concept
of a Nash equilibrium is not limited to this discrete-time case and can also be applied to
differential games in which players choose continuous-time decision trajectories to solve
optimal control problems. In their simplest form, optimal control problems deal with two
classes of decision variables as determined by a set of ordinary differential equations and
constrained by algebraic inequalities: “control” variables are not governed by ordinary dif-
ferential equations while “state” variables are differential. Although the extension of Nash
equilibria to this differential game may not seem difficult, the incorporation of optimal
control problems makes equilibria much more difficult to find. Indeed, current deriva-
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tions of necessary optimality conditions for a certain class of optimal control problems are
incomplete at best (see e.g. [99]).
1.2 Simple examples
Because the Nash equilibrium concept is fundamental to this research, three simple and
well-known example games are presented. These problems, as well as many others, can
easily be found in introductory game theory textbooks.
Example 1 (Prisoner’s dilemma). Two suspects are arrested on suspicion of robbing a
bank. They are questioned separately by the police and cannot communicate. If neither
suspect testifies against the other, both suspects receive one year in prison on a minor
charge. If only one suspect testifies against the other, the silent suspect will receive five
years in prison while the other goes free. If both suspects testify against each other,
they both receive three years in prison. Given that the suspects want to minimize their
personal prison terms (maximize their time outside of prison), the game’s payoff matrix
is provided with Player 1 choosing the row, Player 2 choosing the column, and the pair
(a,b) corresponding to (Player 1 payoff, Player 2 payoff). The Nash equilibrium strategy
is indicated by NE in the upper left corner of the appropriate block.
Figure 1.1: Payoff matrix of the Prisoner’s dilemma game
-3 , -3 0 , -5
-1 , -1-5 , 0
NE
Talk Silent
Talk
Silent
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The unique Nash equilibrium of this game is for both prisoners to testify. 
Example 2 (Coordination game). A handshake is required to finalize a business deal. It
is only possible for two people to shake hands if the same hand is offered by each person
and there is only one chance to shake. The handshake will result in a $5 million profit for
each party.
Figure 1.2: Payoff matrix of the Coordination game
5 , 5 0 , 0
5 , 50 , 0
NE
Left Right
Left
Right
NE
There are two Nash equilibria for this game, thus demonstrating that Nash equilbria are
not necessarily unique. 
Example 3 (Emission game). Two polluters have the choice of emitting either “Low”
or “High” levels of pollution. However, regulatory limits on pollution quantity are set so
that it is not possible for both polluters to emit at a “High” level. Because of pollution
mitigation costs, polluter 1 loses $5 million if emitting at “Low” and loses $3 million at
“High.” Polluter 2 loses $6 million at “Low” and $2 million at “High.” The payoff matrix is
provided and labeled with GNE instead of NE because the polluters “share” the regulatory
constraint regarding their combined emissions; the crossed-out space indicates an infeasible
strategy pair due to this shared regulatory limit.
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Figure 1.3: Payoff matrix of the Emission game
-5 , -6 -5 , -2
-3 , -6
GNE
Low High
Low
High
GNE
Both generalized Nash equilibria for this game result in the same total emission level. 
The simplistic nature of these examples should not be construed to indicate that game the-
oretic problems are trivial [otherwise there would no reason for this dissertation]. Instead,
these examples were presented to motivate the application of game theory to significantly
more complicated problems for which conclusions cannot be drawn from such an elementary
analysis.
1.3 Basic variational inequality theory
At a mathematical level, game theory is intimately related to the field of variational in-
equality (VI) problems. Therefore, this section aims to provide the reader with a basic
understanding of this mathematical framework and will be crucial to most of the theoret-
ical results of this dissertation. Only a brief review of finite-dimensional VI problems is
presented here; the interested reader is referred to [75] for a comprehensive discussion of
VI theory.
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1.3.1 Problem definition and equivalent formulations
Before addressing the relationship between game theory and VI problems, the definition
of a VI is needed. With K ⊆ Rn and mapping F : K → Rn, the variational inequality
VI(K,F ) attempts to identify a vector x ∈ K such that
(y − x)TF (x) ≥ 0 for all y ∈ K. (1.3)
Associated with VI(K,F ) is a [possibly empty] solution set denoted by SOL(K,F ). In the
special case when K , Rn+, VI(K,F ) can be expressed as a nonlinear complementarity
problem NCP(F ) which attempts to identify a vector x ∈ Rn+ such that
0 ≤ x ⊥ F (x) ≥ 0, or equivalently,

xj ≥ 0
(F (x))j ≥ 0
xj(F (x))j = 0

n
j= 1
.
Finally, if F is an affine map given by q + Mx for some vector q ∈ Rn and some matrix
M ∈ Rn×n, the NCP(F ) becomes a linear complementarity problem LCP(q,M).
In addition to these variational inequality specializations, it is important to realize that
problems can be posed in either primal or primal-dual form. Assume that
K , {x ∈ Rn | Ax ≥ b, Cx = d}, (1.4)
where A ∈ Rm×n, C ∈ R`×n, b ∈ Rm, and d ∈ R`. Using only primal variables, VI(K,F )
can be formulated as (1.3); this can viewed as the primal variational inequality associated
with the problem. If dual multipliers are introduced for each constraint, an equivalent
primal-dual variational inequality can be defined. The following well-known proposition
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guarantees that the primal and the primal-dual variational inequalities solve the same
problem.
Proposition 1.1 (Proposition 1.2.1, [75]). With K defined by (1.4), a vector x solves
VI(K,F ) if and only if there exist vectors λ ∈ Rm and µ ∈ R` that solve the primal-dual
variational inequality:
0 = F (x) + CTµ−ATλ
0 = d− Cx
0 ≤ λ ⊥ Ax− b ≥ 0. 
Remark 1.1. Technically, the primal-dual VI of Proposition 1.1 is a VI specialization
known as a mixed complementarity problem (MiCP). 
If K is further restricted to {x ∈ Rn+ | Ax ≥ b}, it is simple to see that the primal-
dual variational inequality given in Proposition 1.1 can be expressed as NCP
(
F̂
)
in the
variables (x, λ) with
F̂ (x, λ) ,
 F (x)−ATλ
Ax− b
 .
If F is an affine map, NCP
(
F̂
)
is a linear complementarity problem. This correspondence
between primal and primal-dual variational inequalities is leveraged at many points in
this research because the different formulations can greatly simplify the proofs of certain
problem properties.
To make the connection between optimization problems, Nash equilibria, and variational
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inequalities explicit, consider the optimization problem
minimize
x∈K
f(x) (1.5)
where K ⊆ Rn is a closed convex set and the function f : U → R is continuously dif-
ferentiable on U , an open superset of K. A necessary optimality condition for (1.5) is
x∗ ∈ SOL(K,∇f). If the function f is convex, x∗ ∈ SOL(K,∇f) is also sufficient for op-
timality and (1.5) is equivalent to VI(K,∇f). In the opposite direction, a VI(K,F ) with
mapping F : U → Rn being continuously differentiable on U , an open convex superset of
the closed convex set K, is associated with an optimization problem when JF (x) is sym-
metric for all x ∈ U . This symmetry requirement is analogous to the Hessian of a scalar
function being symmetric and proves that F is a gradient map.
When K is defined by (1.4), the cited relationship between (1.5) and VI(K,∇f) provides
a direct equivalence between the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions of
optimization problem (1.5) and the primal-dual VI of Proposition 1.1. Recall the definition
of KKT optimality conditions provided in Theorem 1.1.
Theorem 1.1 (First-order necessary and sufficient KKT conditions). Let f be a continu-
ously differentiable convex function and feasible region K be defined by (1.4). The vector
x is a solution of (1.5) if and only if there exist vectors λ ∈ Rm and µ ∈ R` such that
0 = ∇f(x) + CTµ−ATλ
0 = d− Cx
0 ≤ λ ⊥ Ax− b ≥ 0. 
Definition 1.1 (Linear independence constraint qualification (LICQ)). If the set of active
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constraint gradients is linearly independent for vector x, then the linear independence
constraint qualification (LICQ) holds at x. 
It is well known that the vectors λ and µ in Theorem 1.1 are unique if LICQ holds. It is
easy to see that the KKT conditions of Theorem 1.1 are equivalent to the primal-dual VI of
VI(K,∇f), hence the terminology KKT system of the VI for a primal-dual VI. Although
not stated here, both Proposition 1.1 and Theorem 1.1 can be generalized for problems in
which the feasible region K is not polyhedral as long as a suitable constraint qualification
holds at solution x.
Returning to the definition of a Nash equilibrium provided in Section 1.1, assume that
each player i has a closed convex feasible region Ki ⊆ Rni and an objective function
fi :
F∏
i= 1
Ki → R that is convex and continuously differentiable in xi on an open superset of
Ki. By definition, a Nash equilibrium solves
(
minimize
xi∈Ki
fi(xi;x−i)
)F
i= 1
and an equivalent VI(K,F) can be formulated with
K ,
F∏
i= 1
Ki and F(x) , (∇xifi(x))Fi= 1 . (1.6)
For the associated primal-dual VI, let each Ki be defined by an i-specialization of (1.4)
(i.e., {x ∈ Rni | Aix ≥ bi, Cix ≥ di}). The point x is a Nash equilibrium if and only if
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there exist vectors λ , (λi)Fi= 1 and µ , (µi)
F
i= 1 such that

0 = ∇xifi(xi, x−i) + CTi µi −ATi λi
0 = di − Cixi
0 ≤ λi ⊥ Aixi − bi ≥ 0

F
i= 1
. (1.7)
The conditions of (1.7) obviously correspond to the concatenated set of KKT conditions
for each player. Therefore, a Nash equilibrium can be expressed as a solution of either
VI(K,F) defined by (1.6) or a concatenation of player KKT conditions (1.7).
To establish a similar variational inequality equivalence for a GNEP, the concept of a
quasi-variational inequality (QVI) [179] must be introduced because player feasible regions
are no longer fixed sets. After defining QVI(K,F ) analogous to VI(K,F ) except with K
replaced by K(x), it is simple to see that a GNEP is equivalent to QVI(K,F) where F(x)
is as defined in (1.6) and K(x) ,
F∏
i= 1
Ki(x−i).
1.3.2 Solution existence and uniqueness
Natural questions that arise when studying variational inequalities relate to solution exis-
tence and uniqueness. Namely, what properties of the VI(K,F ) guarantee solution exis-
tence (i.e., SOL(K,F ) 6= ∅) and when does uniqueness hold (i.e., SOL(K,F ) is a singleton)?
In convex optimization, recall that a nonempty compact feasible region guarantees the ex-
istence of an optimal solution and uniqueness follows from strict convexity of the objective
function. As may be expected, similar results hold for VIs. However, the more general
character of variational inequalities allows for broader existence and uniqueness results.
Proposition 1.2 (Proposition 2.2.3, [75]). Let K ⊆ Rn be a closed convex set and mapping
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F : K → Rn be continuous. If there exists a vector xref ∈ K such that the set
L< , {x ∈ K | (x− xref)TF (x) < 0}
is bounded (possibly empty), then VI(K,F ) has a solution. 
From the form of L<, it is apparent that x
ref of Proposition 1.2 corresponds to a specific y ∈
K of (1.3). Furthermore, x∗ ∈ SOL(K,F ) has F (x∗) = 0 if x∗ is in the topological interior
of K. Therefore, L< cannot contain any interior solutions of VI(K,F ). Unfortunately, no
further geometric characterization of L< is readily available. For a related existence result,
consider the set
L≤ , {x ∈ K | (x− xref)TF (x) ≤ 0} (1.8)
which is obviously a nonempty superset of L<. Given the existence of an appropriate
xref ∈ K, boundedness of L≤ guarantees that SOL(K,F ) is a nonempty compact subset of
L≤. It follows that the compactness of K itself gives solution existence.
Corollary 1.1 (Corollary 2.2.5, [75]). Let K ⊆ Rn be a compact convex set and mapping
F : K → Rn be continuous. The set SOL(K,F ) is nonempty and compact. 
Simple proofs of Corollary 1.1 are available via the classical fixed-point theorems of Brouwer
(for single-valued maps) and Kakutani (for set-valued maps).
Theorem 1.2 (Brouwer Fixed-Point Theorem). Let K ⊂ Rn be a nonempty, convex,
compact set. Every continuous function F : K → K has a fixed point in K. 
Theorem 1.3 (Kakutani Fixed-Point Theorem). Let K ⊂ Rn be a nonempty, convex,
compact set. Let F : K → K be a set-valued map such that for each x ∈ K, F (x) is a
nonempty, closed, convex subset of K. If F is closed on K, then F has a fixed point. 
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For Nash equilibrium problems, existence can commonly be proven with one of these fixed-
point theorems through an examination of players’ best response maps, the solution sets
of the players’ optimization problems parameterized by the rivals’ decision variables [163,
164, 165].
Although Corollary 1.1, Theorem 1.2, and Theorem 1.3 can be used to prove solution
existence for many problems, compactness of K does not always hold. Therefore, Proposi-
tion 1.2, which may be applied whenK is unbounded, along with the related Proposition 1.3
are applicable to a wider variety of variational inequalities.
Proposition 1.3 (Proposition 2.2.7, [75]). Let K ⊆ Rn be a closed convex set and mapping
F : K → Rn be continuous. If there exist a vector xref ∈ K and a scalar ζ ≥ 0 such that
lim inf
x∈K
‖x‖→∞
(x− xref)TF (x)
‖x‖ζ > 0,
then SOL(K,F ) is nonempty and compact. 
The concept of monotonicity is intimately related to the uniqueness of variational inequality
solutions. Akin to how the strict convexity of an objective function guarantees that there
is at most one solution to an optimization problem, strict monotonicity provides the same
property for variational inequalities.
Definition 1.2. A mapping F : K ⊆ Rn → Rn is
(a) monotone on K if (x− y)T (F (x)− F (y)) ≥ 0 for all x, y ∈ K;
(b) strictly monotone on K if (x− y)T (F (x)− F (y)) > 0 for all x, y ∈ K with
x 6= y. 
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Definition 1.3. A mapping F (x) , Mx is
(a) a P matrix if all principal minors of M are positive;
(b) a P0 matrix if all principal minors of M are nonnegative. 
Establishing the monotonicity of F by definition is usually difficult. Luckily, more tractable
conditions can be verified when F is continuously differentiable.
Proposition 1.4 (Proposition 2.3.2, [75]). Let mapping F : U ⊆ Rn → Rn be continuously
differentiable on the open convex set U . The map F is
(a) monotone on U if and only if JF (x) is positive semidefinite for all x ∈ U ;
(b) strictly monotone on U if JF (x) is positive definite for all x ∈ U . 
In many variational inequalities, monotonicity can be established on K through Proposi-
tion 1.4 when U is taken to be an open convex superset of K. However, an important termi-
nology clarification is in order. Traditionally, positive definite/semidefinite matrices are de-
fined with an assumption of matrix symmetry. This symmetry requirement is by no means
necessary because, for any matrix A ∈ Rn×n and vector x ∈ Rn, xTAx = xT
(
A+AT
2
)
x.
Therefore, an asymmetric matrix A is positive definite if A+A
T
2 is positive definite. This
definition of positive definite/semidefinite matrices is particularly important for variational
inequalities because not every F is a gradient map as was discussed previously. Indeed,
many of the F maps derived in this dissertation have asymmetric Jacobians due to their
origin in Nash equilibrium problems. With the definition of monotonicity, the desired
solution uniqueness result is available.
Theorem 1.4 (Theorem 2.3.3, [75]). Let K ⊆ Rn be a closed convex set and mapping
F : K → Rn. If F is strictly monotone on K, VI(K,F ) has at most one solution. 
16
It follows from Theorem 1.4 that a strictly monotone F paired with solution existence
established by results such as Propositions 1.2, 1.3, or Corollary 1.1 guarantees a unique
solution.
A weaker form of uniqueness deals with the map F evaluated for the set of VI solutions.
Definition 1.4. The solution set SOL(K,F ) is F -unique if F (SOL(K,F )) is at most a
singleton.
It is obvious that solution uniqueness implies F -uniqueness but that the converse does
not hold. Theoretically, F -uniqueness allows for a concise description of all elements
in SOL(K,F ) (refer to [75, Proposition 2.3.12]) and can be established by a variety of
monotone-type properties.
Corollary 1.2 (Corollary 2.3.7, [75]). Let K ⊆ Rn be a closed convex set and mapping
F : U ⊃ K → Rn be continuously differentiable on the open set U . If JF (x) is symmetric
for all x ∈ K and F is monotone on K, then F (SOL(K,F )) is a singleton.
1.3.3 Specialization to partitioned variational inequalities
For many variational inequalities, especially those arising from Nash equilibrium prob-
lems (1.6), the feasible region K of the primal VI (1.3) can be represented as the Cartesian
product
F∏
i= 1
Ki. (1.9)
This special VI representation, known as a partitioned VI, allows for the weakening of the
existence and uniqueness conditions detailed for general variational inequalities. While the
existence conditions for the Cartesian K will not be presented (refer to [75, Proposition
3.5.1]), the properties required for solution uniqueness when K is a Cartesian product
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will be used in Chapter 4 and are therefore presented. Basically, the concept of F being
monotone (strictly monotone) can be relaxed to F being a P0 (P ) function; the term
relaxation is accurate because monotonicity (strict monotonicity) implies a P0 (P ) function
but the converse is not true.
Definition 1.5. Let K be given by (1.9). A mapping F : K → Rn is
(a) a P function on K if for all pairs of distinct vectors x and y in K,
maximize
1≤ i≤F
(xi − yi)T (Fi(x)− Fi(y)) > 0;
(b) a P0 function on K if for all pairs of distinct vectors x and y in K, there exists an
i ∈ {1, · · · ,F} such that
xi 6= yi and (xi − yi)T (Fi(x)− Fi(y)) ≥ 0. 
It is again difficult to verify Definition 1.5 directly. Fortunately, a more tractible condi-
tion similar to Proposition 1.4 can be verified with the additional requirement that K is
rectangular (i.e., the Cartesian product of one-dimensional intervals), an assumption that
must be treated carefully.
Proposition 1.5 (Proposition 3.5.9, [75]). Let mapping F : U → Rn be continuously
differentiable on the open set U containing the rectangular set K. The following two
statements hold.
(a) If JF (x) is a P matrix for all x ∈ U , then F is a P function on U .
(b) If JF (x) is a P0 matrix for all x ∈ U , then F is a P0 function on U . 
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Proposition 1.6 (Proposition 3.5.10, [75]). Let K be given by (1.9). If F is a continuous
P0 function on K, then VI(K,F + I) has a unique solution for every  > 0. Furthermore,
if F is a P function on K, then VI(K,F ) has at most one solution. 
Many of the results of this dissertation can be derived using the basic variational inequality
theory of this section. Any additional required results are presented as needed.
1.4 Research summary
This dissertation addresses four different types of games arising from microeconomic prob-
lems incorporating factors such as player risk aversion, shared constraints, and continuous-
time dynamics. Each of the specialized problems poses a unique challenge to characterizing
game properties and identifying relevant solution methods via VI theory. In this light, the
dissertation aims to present and rigorously resolve each difficulty. Unique contributions
of the research include the proof of equilibrium existence for a competitive capacity ex-
pansion game, the in-depth analysis of the application of Lemke’s method to games with
shared constraints, the development of a detailed and unifying power market model, and
the examination of differential Nash games with mixed state-control constraints.
The dissertation is divided into four chapters with the first three chapters dealing with
static Nash games and the final chapter dealing with differential Nash games. Each chapter
contributes in a variety of ways to the existing literature for its respective problem. For
the reader’s convenience, a brief summary of each chapter is provided here.
Chapter 21: Competitive capacity expansion models, especially those analyzing responses
1This research direction was motivated by a problem posed by Benjamin Hobbs (The Johns Hopkins
University).
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to potential emission regulation scenarios (e.g., [78, 245]), may provide valuable insights
into the effects that the perceived likelihood of certain regulatory policies have on markets.
Because of the probabilistic nature of outcomes, individual players solve two-stage stochas-
tic optimization problems. When the associated Nash equilibrium problem is formulated as
a variational inequality, the unbounded feasible region makes the proof of solution existence
nontrivial. Therefore, this chapter proves existence for a broad class of these competitive
capacity expansion models by utilizing a very general existence result. As a consequence,
it can be claimed that every such game, regardless of the probabilities assigned to possible
uncertainty realizations by each player, has a solution. The main contributions of this
research include:
• the incorporation of nonlinear utility functions as player objectives;
• the establishment of a relationship between the given utility function problems and
mean-risk models;
• the proof of solution existence for multi-market problems under three different as-
sumptions on how competitive prices are determined.
Chapter 3: Shared constraints arise in many real-world problems as was mentioned in
the development of the generalized Nash equilibrium concept in Section 1.1. When these
constraints are included in a GNEP where each player solves a convex quadratic optimiza-
tion problem, the necessary and sufficient solution optimality conditions take the form
of a linear complementarity problem as described by Proposition 1.1. The behavior of
Lemke’s method [47, 138, 178], a well-known method for solving linear complementarity
problems, becomes unpredictable in the presence of shared constraints, a feature not pre-
viously noted in the literature. Furthermore, every possible solution obtained via Lemke’s
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method is characterized by a special Lagrange multiplier property, thereby restricting the
types of solutions that can be identified to a very specific subset of all solutions. This
work rigorously studies the given GNEP and proposes methods to alleviate the problems
it induces in Lemke’s method. The primary contributions of this research include:
• the rigorous characterization of solutions that can be obtained via Lemke’s method;
• the formulation of a modified Lemke’s method that is guaranteed to terminate at a
solution under suitable conditions;
• the development of a problem reformulation technique and an associated solution
method that can find solutions not previously identifiable via Lemke’s method.
Chapter 4: Since the deregulation of the electricity industries in many countries in the
1990s, microeconomic electricity market models have been a subject of considerable re-
search with common research subfields including market power identification (e.g., [32])
and regulatory policy analysis (e.g., [245]). Given the broad range of questions and models
associated with electricity markets, several review papers have been authored [86, 106, 222],
but none of these reviews unifies the vast array of existing models, a necessary undertaking
in order to better represent the complexities inherent in the market. This research for-
mulates a comprehensive market framework by creating an overarching model that can be
specialized to more common market models. For this unified market model, the chapter
provides:
• a detailed treatment of equilibrium solution and uniqueness;
• proofs that certain numerical methods will successfully identify an equilibrium under
suitable conditions;
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• extensions of existence and uniqueness results to market models with consumer sur-
plus maximization, capacity markets, and emission permits.
Chapter 52: The possibility of electricity price spikes in deregulated markets became a
regulatory concern after two separate incidents in 1998 [1] and 1999 [37]. Important char-
acteristics of these spikes is their brief temporal nature. To study this behavior over time
using game theory, it is necessary to model the problem with a sufficiently fine time dis-
cretization. In the limit, a differential Nash game is obtained where players can be modeled
as individually solving optimal control problems. Unfortunately, no solution method for
identifying a differential Nash equilibrium of the game is immediately available if any
player’s optimal control problem includes mixed state-control constraints. Therefore, this
work provides two different approaches for identifying differential Nash equilibria when
mixed state-control constraints are present. These approaches are based on the following
ideas:
• the equivalence of a differential Nash game to a single optimal control problem under
suitable conditions;
• a Jacobi-type algorithm that converges to a solution of the differential Nash game.
Although the chapters of this dissertation are independent in the sense that each can be
read separately without any loss of understanding, the Nash equilibrium and variational
inequality concepts of Sections 1.1 and 1.3 are fundamental to all of the research. The
dissertation concludes in Chapter 6.
2This research direction was motivated by work with Victor Zavala during a summer internship at
Argonne National Laboratory.
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Chapter 2
Solution existence in perfectly
competitive capacity expansion
models3
2.1 Introduction
In microeconomics, non-cooperative players competing in production can be modeled as
either strategic or “price-taking” with respect to commodity prices; players satisfying the
latter assumption are hereafter referred to as competitive players to emphasize the idea
that such an assumption is associated with perfectly competitive markets (i.e., markets in
which no player has sufficient market power to affect the commodity price). Whereas a
strategic player knows that its production can affect price and accounts for this property
when choosing production quantities to maximize profit, a competitive player assumes that
prices are exogenously determined. Based on these assumptions about player behavior,
3This chapter has been adapted from a manuscript submitted for review at Operations Research,
Manuscript ID OPRE-2013-05-245 (Co-authors: Benjamin Hobbs and Jong-Shi Pang).
23
a large range of market outcomes that are commonly characterized by Nash equilibria
(see (1.2)) may be possible. Although a large amount of research has been conducted on
Nash equilibrium problems with strategic players (e.g., [76, 105, 109, 110, 123, 151, 184,
230, 238]), theoretical results for the existence of Nash equilibria for perfectly competitive
market models have remained largely unchanged since the classical works [7, 56, 149, 225].
This research develops new Nash equilibrium existence results for perfectly competitive
market games in which players make capacity investments under uncertainty followed by
production decisions. In the capacity expansion models studied in this chapter, traditional
existence results based on fixed-point theorems (e.g., [56, 149, 163, 165, 197]) are not
applicable due to the unboundedness of the players’ feasible regions and the lack of explicit
bounds on the price variables.
Although this research focuses on a general formulation of a capacity expansion game,
the electricity industry serves as an important source of topical examples and associated
regulatory questions for this problem. In this economic sector, emission regulations and
incentives for new capacity investment are becoming increasingly prevalent as illustrated
recently by the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme [42] and the creation of markets
for generation capacity in several U.S. regions. Methods proposed for reducing greenhouse
gas emissions and other air pollutants are commonly related to cap-and-trade schemes
and Pigovian taxes, but the implementation of these ideas may unintentionally create
disincentives to invest in certain types of new capacity or technology. An example of such
unintended consequences can be found in [41] where it is demonstrated that the imposition
of a carbon emissions trading program in California may only lead to a marginal decrease
in total emissions due to the shifting of production and contracts. As another example,
water pollution rules in California may lead to shutting down a substantial fraction of that
state’s fossil-fueled capacity, which in turn is anticipated to lead to shortages in flexible
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generation needed to meet reliability standards given the large amounts of wind power
being built [31].
In addition to undesirable outcomes that may arise after certain regulations are imple-
mented, prolonged uncertainty about the timing and nature of possible regulations may
be equally problematic in that it can cause companies to make suboptimal decisions in
anticipation of possible regulation details. For instance, it has been found that regula-
tory uncertainty for carbon emission regulations can lead to capacity investment choices in
highly polluting technology if grandfathering of existing capacity is seen as possible [192]. A
comparison of induced capacity investment decisions under three different carbon allowance
allocation schemes can be found in [245].
Finally, the presence of risk aversion in electricity generator behavior may aggravate un-
desirable outcomes. There has been an ongoing debate in the power industry about the
desirability of separate mechanisms to procure generation capacity in addition to energy
commodity resources (e.g., [107]); some regulators fear that risk aversion and energy price
caps will discourage needed investment. This concept has been demonstrated in several
modeling studies. Using conditional value-at-risk as a risk measure, it was found in [68]
that risk aversion decreases capacity investment in markets with low electricity price caps,
shifting capacity investment toward generation technologies that are not capital-intensive.
These results reinforce the findings from [167] which explored the interrelationships be-
tween risk aversion, capacity investment, and demand uncertainty. In [167], it was found
that socially efficient capacity investment choices occur only when long-term bilateral con-
tracts between generators and consumers are available. With respect to market mechanism
design, [221] proposes a reliability contract market to encourage risk-averse firms to invest
in new capacity.
25
The inspiration for the current work lies in capacity expansion models in the electricity
power sector [78, 157, 176, 235, 245] that model price-taking producers making capac-
ity expansion decisions prior to uncertainty realization and a set of production decisions,
one for each potential uncertainty realization, to maximize an expectation-based objective
function. The producers are modeled as maximizers of either expected profit (i.e., risk neu-
trality) or a concave function of expected profit (i.e., risk aversion) in [78], while the other
papers only deal with expected profit objective functions. When framed in terms of risk
preferences, utility functions are commonly employed to describe both of these objective
function forms; following [78], exponential utility functions are employed in this chapter.
In this research, existence results are provided for perfectly competitive capacity expansion
equilibrium problems incorporating player risk aversion and other extended considerations.
While [78, 245] have both claimed Nash equilibrium existence results for their respective
problems, the former existence proof is inconsistent with existing theory while the latter
proof may be obfuscated by the presence of emission allowance allocation schemes and is
restricted to risk-neutral objectives. In addition to providing a correct proof of the result
in [78] under certain conditions, this development extends to multi-market equilibrium
problems with different types of commodity pricing rules.
Significant strides have been made recently in the study of existence of a Nash equilibrium
for games with exogenous pricing mechanisms; see in particular the survey paper [76] and
the article [182]. While these references have analyzed games with exogenous pricing from
market clearing conditions, a major difference between the models therein and the ones
analyzed here arises in how prices enter into player objective functions. In the former
models, the prices appear in the players’ objective functions solely as Lagrange multipliers
of the side constraints (i.e., the market clearing conditions), whereas in this model, the
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prices enter into the players’ risk-averse utility functions through their profits. Thus, the
results in the cited references are not directly applicable; instead, it is necessary to resort
to a separate analysis. Furthermore, there are no readily available existence results for per-
fectly competitive games where prices are determined by general inverse demand/supply
functions. Starting from a fundamental existence theorem for a nonlinear complementar-
ity problem (NCP), a self-contained study of a perfectly competitive game under various
pricing schemes, uncertainty, and risk aversion is presented.
This chapter is divided into seven sections. A brief summary of stochastic optimization
problems is presented in Section 2.2 followed by a discussion of the general game forms in
Section 2.3. The specific capacity expansion game formulations addressed in this chapter
are presented in Section 2.4, and Section 2.5 develops and proves solution existence for
perfectly competitive market equilibrium problems when prices are determined by inverse
supply/demand functions. Section 2.6 addresses problems with prices determined by mar-
ket clearing conditions. Section 2.7 extends these results to perfectly competitive models
where demands are determined by consumers solving surplus maximization problems, and
the chapter concludes with Section 2.8.
2.2 A brief overview of stochastic optimization problems
As described in Section 2.1, the presence of uncertainty is an important complication
in the capacity expansion game studied in this chapter. In this light, it is natural to
frame each player’s problem as a stochastic optimization problem where uncertainty can
arise for a variety of reasons (e.g., wind speed variation, imposition of competing federal
regulations) and is assumed to be captured by a probabilistic framework. Using the given
probabilistic model, a variety of questions can be posed, including which decision is optimal
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on average and how should the decision be changed after the uncertainty is resolved [if
changes are possible]. These two questions are addressed by anticipative and adaptive
stochastic optimization problems, respectively.
The concept of stochastic optimization first arose in 1955 [53] as an extension of linear
programming to problems with uncertain parameters. This stochastic problem form was
further studied in [231, 232, 233] where solution set properties and an equivalence for the
adaptive problem form were established. The general convex stochastic optimization prob-
lem was first explored in [58, 195, 196]; a survey of these and other results is provided
in [57]. In addition to having uncertainty present in the objective function, uncertainties
can also be present in the constraint set. The framing of this concept in terms of proba-
bilistic constraints was first presented in [39]. For a comprehensive discussion of stochastic
optimization problems and solution techniques, the interested reader can refer to [19, 202].
It is important to note that much of the past research on stochastic optimization problems
has been focused on the adaptive framework (e.g., [16, 18, 122, 123, 134, 141, 224, 243,
244]). This focus is commonly justified by the fact that the anticipative problem is not
theoretically different from a deterministic problem when uncertainty is only manifested in
a random vector affecting the objective function. Interestingly, a lack of objective function
linearity can cause adaptive stochastic optimization problems to superficially resemble
anticipative problems as will be seen in this chapter.
Before delving into the specifics of stochastic optimization, the basic foundation of prob-
ability theory should be formally presented [94]. A probability space is defined by the
tuple (Ω,G, P ). The term Ω respresents a nonempty set known as the sample space for
the uncertainty with ω ∈ Ω being a specific outcome. G is a set of subsets of Ω (known as
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events) that is a σ-algebra, meaning that
(a) Ω ∈ G;
(b) If W ∈ G, then (Ω\W ) ∈ G;
(c) If V,W ∈ G, then V ∪ W ∈ G. Furthermore, if W1,W2, · · · is a sequence of elements
in G, then
∞⋃
k= 1
Wk ∈ G.
Note that G has been substituted for the more standard F for notational consistency.
Additionally, there should formally exist a random vector ξ that maps outcomes ω ∈ Ω to
certain problem parameters, but, with an abuse of notation, this mapping is ignored here.
Lastly, P is a probability measure on G satisfying
(a) P (W ) ≥ 0 for all W ∈ G;
(b) If V,W ∈ G and if V and W are mutually exclusive, then P (V ∪W ) = P (V )+P (W ).
Furthermore, if W1,W2, · · · is a sequence of mutually exclusive events in G, then
P
( ∞⋃
k= 1
Wk
)
=
∞∑
k= 1
P (Wk);
(c) P (Ω) = 1.
The anticipative stochastic optimization problem attempts to identify a decision that is
optimal on average. This averaging concept is naturally associated with the calculation
of the objective function’s expectation. With f(x, ω) as the objective function associated
with decision x and outcome ω ∈ Ω, let the expectation
E[f(x, ω)] ,
∫
Ω
f(x, ω)P (dω),
which is assumed to be well-defined. Constraints on decisions are commonly expressed as
either independent of ω or dependent on ω. Therefore, a general anticipative stochastic
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optimization problem is given by
minimize
x
E[f(x, ω)]
subject to h1(x) ≥ 0
h2(x, ω) ≥ 0 (see below)
(2.1)
where h1 and h2 map x and (x, ω) to appropriately dimensioned vectors, respectively.
Traditionally, the latter group of constraints may be enforced for either all ω ∈ Ω, in
expectation (i.e., E[h2(x, ω)] ≥ 0), or in probability (i.e., P (h2(x, ω) ≥ 0) ≥ 1− α).
Unlike an anticipative optimization problem, an adaptive optimization problem involves
two [or more] decision stages: the first decision is made under uncertainty while the recourse
decision is made after the uncertainty is resolved. These two problems naturally interact in
that the first-stage decision is in effect during the second-stage recourse problem. Therefore,
the adaptive stochastic optimization problem consists of deciding a first-stage decision and
a recourse decision for each ω ∈ Ω so that the expected overall objective function is
minimized. With h1 and h2 being appropriately dimensioned mappings, the first-stage
problem is formulated as
minimize
x
f(x) + E
[
fˆ ∗(x, ω)
]
subject to h1(x) ≥ 0,
(2.2)
where fˆ ∗(x, ω) is the optimal solution of the second-stage problem
minimize
y
fˆ(y, ω)
subject to h2(x, y) ≥ 0.
(2.3)
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For problems in which Ω is finite , (2.2) and (2.3) can be combined into a single optimization
problem. With K elements in Ω, this single optimization problem is
minimize
x,y1,··· ,yK
f(x) +
K∑
k= 1
fˆ(yk, ωk)P (ωk)
subject to h1(x) ≥ 0
h2(x, yk) ≥ 0 for all k = 1, · · · ,K.
(2.4)
A similar combined problem can be obtained for more general Ω under certain condi-
tions [211]. The adaptive idea of decisions both before and after uncertainty realization
contrasts the anticipative model in which decisions are only made prior to realization of un-
certainty. This distinction will become important when classifying the capacity expansion
model of this chapter.
2.3 Different competitive game formulations
Consider a perfectly competitive problem with F non-cooperative players simultaneously
making decisions to minimize their respective objective functions while treating prices
and competitors’ decisions exogenously. In a specialization of (1.1), let player i solve the
problem
minimize
xi∈Ki
fi(xi;x−i, p), (2.5)
where the vector p ∈ RL represents L commodity prices and for each p, the mapping
fi( • ;x−i, p) : U → R is a continuously differentiable, convex function defined on some
open convex proper superset U of Ki , {x ∈ Rni+ | Aix ≥ bi} with Ai ∈ Rmi×ni and
bi ∈ Rmi for all i. From Theorem 1.1, the KKT conditions of (2.5) are both necessary and
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sufficient for optimality:
0 ≤ xi ⊥ ∇xifi(xi;x−i, p)−ATi λi ≥ 0
0 ≤ λi ⊥ Aixi − bi ≥ 0,
(2.6)
where λi is the Lagrange multiplier vector for the constraint Aixi − bi ≥ 0.
In a perfectly competitive framework, players may both buy commodities (such as re-
sources) from supply markets and sell commodities (the products) in demand markets;
their purchases and sales determine the commodity prices described by the vector p. Unlike
the classical Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium problem [7], a partial equilibrium problem
stipulates the way that prices are derived. One such stipulation is through an econometric
model wherein prices are determined by explicit inverse demand/supply functions. With
xi` denoting player i’s production for market `, an example of such a function is a linear
inverse supply function given by
p`(x) = P
0
` −
P0`
Q0`
F∑
i= 1
xi`, (2.7)
where x , (xi)Fi= 1 and the scalar P0` and the ratio
−P0`
Q0`
represent the price-intercept
and the slope of the function for commodity `, respectively. Inverse demand functions
are defined similarly. For perfectly competitive games, it is important to note that even
when (2.7) is specified, it is not substituted into the objective function of (2.5) because p
is taken to be exogenous by each player. Rather, the inverse supply function is substituted
for p in each player’s KKT optimality conditions (2.6).
A second method of determining market prices p is related to uniform-price auction mech-
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anisms; namely, p is postulated to satisfy the following market clearing condition expressed
by a complementarity condition between the price and excess demand/supply:
0 ≤ p ⊥ g(p ;x) ≥ 0, (2.8)
where g is a vector-valued, continuous excess demand/supply function. As such, g(p ;x)
simply requires supply to be greater than or equal to a given demand. The concept of
an auction arises because a non-binding market clearing constraint (i.e., supply is greater
than demand) implies a zero market price. Furthermore, each player realizes the same
commodity price if it is positive. If the function g( • ;x) is integrable such that g(p ;x) =
∇p θ(p ;x) for some scalar function θ, then (2.8) is equivalent to the first-order optimality
conditions of the optimization problem in price:
minimize
p≥ 0
θ(p ;x).
Therefore, in this (price-integrable) case, a game with prices determined by (2.8) can be
modeled as an extended game with one additional player, the price player. More generally,
if this (price-) integrability condition does not hold, then the same game is an instance
of the recently introduced class of (distributed) multi-agent optimization problems with
equilibrium constraints (MOPECs), where the complementarity condition is generalized to
a variational inequality with p as the primal variable and x as an exogenous variable (but
endogenous to the overall MOPEC). The class of MOPECs was recently introduced by
Michael Ferris without a detailed analysis. In this chapter, this framework is not explicitly
addressed but rather mentioned as a direction for further research. For related MOPEC
models, the interested reader is referred to [24] and the slides of a presentation available
at http://www.cs.wisc.edu/~ferris/talks/chicago-mar.pdf.
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When price is determined by a market clearing condition, the function g(p ;x) must in-
corporate demand for the commodity. This demanded quantity can be specified either
exogenously as in (2.8) or endogenously depending on the type of consumer behavior pos-
tulated. For the exogenous case, consumers demand a fixed amount of the commodity
regardless of price, a situation of perfect price inelasticity. The third pricing mechanism
considered here follows the formulation of (2.8) but replaces the exogenously specified de-
mand in g(p ;x) with an endogenous quantity. This modification is achieved by modeling
consumers as choosing the demanded quantity to maximize consumer surplus, which is
defined as the integral of the consumer demand function less commodity price from zero
to the quantity demanded. Since perfectly competitive equilibrium models are of interest,
commodity prices should be treated as exogenous in the consumer optimization problem.
Thus, perfectly competitive games with endogenous demand can be modeled with F + 2
players (i.e., F producers, 1 consumer, and 1 price player); for a model of this type, see
Section 2.7.
In summary, methods of price determination in a perfectly competitive market model can
be separated into three groups as shown in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Price determination categories
Price 
Inverse demand/supply function 
Market clearing condition 
Endogenous demand/supply 
Exogenous demand/supply 
Specializing the inequality (1.2), a Nash equilibrium for a perfectly competitive market
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model is a vector of decisions (x∗, p∗) such that for each producer i = 1, · · · ,F ,
fi(xi;x
∗
−i, p
∗) ≥ fi(x∗i ;x∗−i, p∗) for all xi ∈ Ki
and, for each commodity ` = 1, · · · , L, either p∗` = p`(x∗) (commodity price by inverse
demand/supply function) or
p`g`(p`; p
∗
−`, x
∗) ≥ p∗`g`(p∗, x∗) = 0 for all p` ≥ 0 (commodity price by market clearing).
Concatenating the KKT conditions of the producers’ optimization problems along with the
price stipulations, the following nonlinear complementarity formulations are obtained for
the perfectly competitive market game:
• when all market prices are determined by inverse demand/supply functions:
0 ≤ xi ⊥ ∇xifi(xi;x−i, p)
∣∣
p= p(x)
−ATi λi ≥ 0 for all i = 1, · · · ,F
0 ≤ λi ⊥ Aixi − bi ≥ 0 for all i = 1, · · · ,F ;
(2.9)
• when all market prices are determined by the market clearing complementarity condi-
tion (2.8):
0 ≤ xi ⊥ ∇xifi(xi;x−i, p)−ATi λi ≥ 0 for all i = 1, · · · ,F
0 ≤ λi ⊥ Aixi − bi ≥ 0 for all i = 1, · · · ,F
0 ≤ p ⊥ g(p ;x) ≥ 0.
(2.10)
Presumably, a mixed model can be stated wherein some prices are determined by inverse
demand/supply functions while others are determined by market clearing conditions. An
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extended analysis can be made for such a mixed model; for simplicity, only the above
two cases wherein all prices are determined by the same method are examined here. An-
other remark about the two formulations (2.9) and (2.10) is that while the same notation
fi(xi;x−i, p) is used for player i’s objective, in the case of (2.10), this function should
include some form of the constraint function g(p ;x) (see Section 2.6).
A key challenge in establishing the existence of an equilibrium pair satisfying (2.9) or (2.10)
is the lack of explicit bounds for the variables x and p. Specialized to capacity expansion
models such as those detailed in [78, 245], players choose both production levels and the
amount of production capacity to install; such production decisions are captured by the
vector x. There are constraints enforcing that production levels are bounded by installed
production capacity. In the event that this capacity has no prescribed upper bound, the
compactness assumption commonly employed to prove solution existence does not hold for
these problems. This is the primary mistake made in the existence proof of [78] where
boundedness is claimed through an appeal to objective function properties at Nash equi-
libria before the existence of such equilibria is established; such a “proof” is a circular
argument and needs to be corrected.
Instead of applying an argument based on explicit boundedness of the decision variables,
the treatment in [245] is followed by employing a fundamental NCP existence result to
analyze the problems (2.9) and (2.10). Formally, being a specialization of a variational
inequality, the NCP attempts to find a vector z such that 0 ≤ z ⊥ F (z) ≥ 0, where F is
a given continuous vector function. The following result is drawn from [75, Theorem 2.6.1].
Theorem 2.1. Let F : Rn → Rn be a continuous function. If there exists a constant
C > 0 such that all solutions of 0 ≤ z ⊥ F (z) + zτ ≥ 0 for τ > 0 satisfy ‖z‖ ≤ C,
then the NCP: 0 ≤ z ⊥ F (z) ≥ 0 has a solution. 
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Notice that boundedness is assumed in a special way in Theorem 2.1, namely, on the
solution sets of the augmented NCPs parametrized by the scalar τ . Rather than analyz-
ing (2.9) and (2.10) in their abstract formulation, a concrete application of Theorem 2.1 is
provided for the capacity expansion problem with uncertainty, extending the special cases
in [78, 245] to broader contexts. Theorem 2.1 is applied by assuming that, corresponding
to a sequence {τk} of positive scalars, an unbounded sequence
{
zk
}
exists such that for
each k, 0 ≤ zk ⊥ F (zk) + zkτk ≥ 0; a contradiction is then derived.
2.4 The capacity expansion game
To begin, the specialization of player optimization problems (2.5) to the capacity expansion
framework is presented. Consider a stochastic optimization problem in which each player
makes a capacity investment decision under uncertainty followed by production decisions
for each possible uncertainty realization. In [78, 245], uncertainty arises from the possible
implementation of different greenhouse gas emission regulations. Let Ω represent the finite
scenario space (taken to contain at least 2 elements) with ω ∈ Ω denoting a specific scenario
realization and PRiω being player i’s assumed scenario ω probability. It is required that
PRiω ∈ (0, 1) for all i = 1, · · · ,F and all ω ∈ Ω. This player-specific probability structure
is a generalization of the game in which all players assume the same probability PRω for
each ω ∈ Ω.
Remark 2.1. Although practical methods for determining PRiω values based on producer
responses are surely important, they are out of the scope of this research. Instead, this
research proves that, under certain assumptions, an equilibrium exists for an arbitrary set
of these probabilities; thus, the specific probability values and the methodology used to
obtain them have no bearing on the presented results. 
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For a capacity expansion problem in which multiple markets exist, there are two general
types of constraints that player i may face depending on production properties. Either the
player (a) must produce goods for each market in a different facility, or (b) can produce
goods for all markets in the same facility. The former case is relevant for conglomerates that
produce a wide variety of goods while the latter case may be applied when products are
based on closely related designs. A player may also be involved in both types of markets;
the analysis of such a mixed situation will not be dealt with here since it is similar to the
presented analysis. With L markets, player i is constrained in case (a) by
gi`ω ≤ xi` for all ` = 1, · · · , L and ω ∈ Ω, (2.11)
where gi`ω is the production level for market ` in scenario ω and xi` is the capacity installed
to serve market `. For case (b), player i is constrained by
L∑
`= 1
gi`ω ≤ xi for all ω ∈ Ω,
where xi is the total installed production capacity. Since the existence proofs for case (a)
and case (b) are similar, only case (a) will be discussed here. Other constraints can be
included but are omitted here for simplicity.
It is assumed that player i chooses gi`ω and xi` to maximize expected exponential utility
∑
ω∈Ω
( 1− exp {−aipiiω} ) PRiω, (2.12)
where ai > 0 and piiω is the profit earned in scenario ω. The scalar ai describes the level
of risk aversion of player i with a larger ai corresponding to more risk aversion. Note
that the function (2.12) is concave in piiω ≥ 0. An exponential utility function is chosen
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because it has the appealing characteristic of constant risk aversion [124] and involves a
minimal number of parameters (one). In principle, the analysis in the later sections can
be generalized to other utility functions with properties similar to the exponential family.
With p`ω being the price of commodity ` in scenario ω (taken as exogenous by each player),
the total revenue from player i’s sales in scenario ω is
L∑
`= 1
p`ωgi`ω. For each unit of pro-
duction of commodity `, it is assumed that player i incurs a fixed marginal cost MCi`.
When producers also need to buy commodities from perfectly competitive markets, each
unit of production entails an additional cost. Letting {1, · · · , R} denote the set of com-
modities (resources) needed by the producers, prω be the price of commodity r ∈ {1, · · · , R}
in scenario ω, and Uri` be the positive number of units of commodity r required per unit
of producer i’s production for market `, each unit of commodity ` production incurs a
cost of
R∑
r= 1
Uri` p
r
ω for a total production cost of
(
MCi` +
R∑
r= 1
Uri` p
r
ω
)
gi`ω. In [78, 245], the
commodity being purchased by producers represents emission permits required by federal
regulators. Finally, capacity installation is assumed to have a fixed marginal cost Ci` so
producer i pays Ci`xi` for installing capacity.
With profit equaling revenue minus cost, producer i’s profit in scenario ω is
piiω ,
L∑
`= 1
[(
p`ω −MCi` −
R∑
r= 1
Uri` p
r
ω
)
gi`ω − Ci`xi`
]
.
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Thus, player i’s optimization problem is
maximize
gi, xi
∑
ω∈Ω
(
1−
exp
{
−ai
L∑
`= 1
[(
p`ω −MCi` −
R∑
r= 1
Uri` p
r
ω
)
gi`ω − Ci`xi`
]} )
PRiω
subject to xi` − gi`ω ≥ 0 (λi`ω) for all ` = 1, · · · , L and ω ∈ Ω
gi`ω, xi` ≥ 0 for all ` = 1, · · · , L and ω ∈ Ω,
(2.13)
where λi`ω is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the production capacity constraint.
Notice that the objective function of (2.13) is separable in the scenarios; the production
variables {gi`ω}ω∈Ω are linked through the capacity constraints (2.11) with the (unknown)
capacities xi` being variables determined by the overall model.
As formulated, certain elements of (2.13) resemble an anticipative optimization problem
while other elements are commonly found in adaptive problems: the objective function
minimizes an expectation, but a single decision is made under uncertainty and recourse
decisions are made for each uncertainty realization. Therefore, although the problem struc-
ture superficially resembles (2.1), it is contended that this problem is better categorized as
an adaptive optimization problem. Indeed, if a linear utility function is used instead of an
exponential utility function, (2.4) is obtained immediately.
2.5 Inverse demand/supply function models
Let the market prices be determined by continuous inverse demand and inverse supply
functions p`ω , θ`ω
( F∑
i= 1
gi`ω
)
for all pairs (`, ω) and prω , θrω
( F∑
i= 1
L∑
`= 1
Uri`gi`ω
)
for all
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pairs (ω, r), respectively. To simplify notation, denote
F∑
i= 1
gi`ω by G`ω and
F∑
i= 1
L∑
`= 1
Uri`gi`ω
by Srω.
Theorem 2.2. The perfectly competitive Nash equilibrium problem defined by (2.13)
for all producers i = 1, · · · ,F , the continuous functions θ`ω(G`ω) for all (`, ω), and the
continuous functions θrω(S
r
ω) for all (ω, r) has a solution if the following conditions hold:
(a) there exists a positive integer M such that |θ`ω(G`ω)| ≤ M for all (`, ω) when
G`ω ≥ 0;
(b) lim sup
G`ω→∞
θ`ω(G`ω) ≤ 0;
(c) θrω(S
r
ω) ≥ 0 when Srω ≥ 0.
Proof. By concatenating the necessary and sufficient KKT optimality conditions of (2.13)
for all players i = 1, · · · ,F to form (2.9), Theorem 2.1 requires the examination of the
solution sets of the NCP parameterized by a sequence of positive scalars {τk}:
• for all i, `, and ω,
0 ≤ gki`ω ⊥ τkgki`ω + λki`ω − PRiω ai
(
θ`ω
(
Gk`ω
)−MCi` − R∑
r= 1
Uri` θ
r
ω
(
S r,kω
))
×
exp
−ai
L∑
ˆ`= 1
[(
θˆ`ω
(
Gkˆ`ω
)
−MCiˆ`−
R∑
r= 1
Ur
iˆ`
θrω
(
S r,kω
))
gk
iˆ`ω
− Ciˆ`xkiˆ`
] ≥ 0
0 ≤ λki`ω ⊥ xki` − gki`ω + τkλki`ω ≥ 0
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• for all i and `,
0 ≤ xki` ⊥ τkxki` −
∑
ω∈Ω
λki`ω +
∑
ω∈Ω
PRiω ai Ci`×
exp
−ai
L∑
ˆ`= 1
[(
θˆ`ω
(
Gkˆ`ω
)
−MCiˆ`−
R∑
r= 1
Ur
iˆ`
θrω
(
S r,kω
))
gk
iˆ`ω
− Ciˆ`xkiˆ`
] ≥ 0,
where Gk`ω ,
F∑
i= 1
gki`ω and S
r,k
ω ,
F∑
i= 1
L∑
`= 1
Uri` g
k
i`ω. It suffices to prove that the sequence
of solution tuples {gk, xk, λk} is bounded as k → ∞. Boundedness is proven by variable:
first {gk}, then {xk}, and finally {λk}.
Boundedness of {gk}. To obtain a contradiction, assume that {gk} is unbounded so
there exists some triple (i ′, ` ′, ω ′) such that {gki ′` ′ω ′} is unbounded as k → ∞. It follows
that for some infinite index set κ ⊂ {1, 2, · · · ,∞},
lim
k(∈κ)→∞
gki ′` ′ω ′ = ∞.
Without loss of generality, assume that gki ′` ′ω ′ > 0 for all k ∈ κ. Define the following two
index sets
J1 ,
{
` ∈ {1, · · · , L} | ∃ î with lim sup
k(∈κ)→∞
gk
î`ω ′ = ∞
}
3 ` ′ and J2 , {1, · · · , L}\J1.
For every ` ∈ J1,
G k`ω ′ =
F∑
i= 1
gki`ω ′ ≥ g kî`ω ′ → ∞ as k(∈ κ)→∞.
Assume without loss of generality that {g ki`ω ′}k∈κ is bounded for every ` ∈ J2 and all i.
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Hence, for sufficiently large k ∈ κ,
∑
`∈J1
(
θ`ω ′
(
Gk`ω ′
)
−MCi ′` −
R∑
r= 1
Uri ′` θ
r
ω ′
(
S r,kω ′
))
gki ′`ω ′
≤
∑
`∈J1
(
θ`ω ′
(
Gk`ω ′
)
−MCi ′`
)
gki ′`ω ′ < 0 by condition (b),
and for some constant M1 > 0,
∑
`∈J2
(
θ`ω ′
(
Gk`ω ′
)
−MCi ′` −
R∑
r= 1
Uri ′` θ
r
ω ′
(
S r,kω ′
))
gki ′`ω ′ ≤
∑
`∈J2
M gki ′`ω ′ ≤ M1.
Hence,
exp
{
−ai ′
L∑
`= 1
[(
θ`ω′
(
Gk`ω′
)
−MCi ′` −
R∑
r= 1
Uri ′` θ
r
ω ′
(
S r,kω′
))
gki ′`ω′ − Ci ′`xki′`
]}
≥ exp (−ai′M1) .
For gki ′` ′ω ′ > 0, complementarity necessitates that
0 = τkg
k
i ′` ′ω ′ + λ
k
i ′` ′ω ′ −
Term 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
PRi ′ω ′ai ′
(
θ` ′ω ′
(
Gk` ′ω ′
)
−MCi ′` ′ −
R∑
r= 1
Uri ′` ′ θ
r
ω ′
(
S r,kω ′
))
×
exp
−ai ′
L∑
ˆ`= 1
[(
θˆ`ω ′
(
Gkˆ`ω ′
)
−MCi ′ ˆ`−
R∑
r= 1
Ur
i ′ ˆ`θ
r
ω ′
(
S r,kω ′
))
gk
i ′ ˆ`ω ′ − Ci ′ ˆ`xki ′ ˆ`
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Term 2
.
For k sufficiently large, Term 1 is nonpositive by conditions (b) and (c) and Term 2 is
positive by exp (−ai′M1) > 0. A contradiction is obtained and {gk} is therefore bounded.
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Boundedness of {xk}. For the sake of contradiction, assume that there exists some pair
(i ′, ` ′) such that for an infinite index set κ ⊂ {1, 2, · · · ,∞},
lim
k(∈κ)→∞
xki ′` ′ = ∞.
It follows that for every ω ∈ Ω, by the boundedness of {gk},
−ai ′
L∑
`= 1
[(
θ`ω
(
Gk`ω
)
−MCi ′` −
R∑
r= 1
Uri ′` θ
r
ω
(
S r,kω
))
gki ′`ω − Ci ′`xki ′`
]
≥ −ai ′
m∑
`= 1
M gki ′`ω + ai ′
m∑
`= 1
Ci ′`x
k
i ′` by conditions (a) and (c)
→ ∞ as k(∈ κ)→∞.
Since it may be assumed that xki ′` ′ > 0 for all k ∈ κ without loss of generality, by comple-
mentarity,
∑
ω∈Ω
λki ′` ′ω = τk x
k
i ′` ′ +
∑
ω∈Ω
PRi ′ω ai ′ Ci ′` ′ ×
exp
{
−ai ′
L∑
`= 1
[(
θ`ω
(
Gk`ω
)
−MCi ′` −
R∑
r= 1
Uri ′` θ
r
ω
(
S r,kω
))
gki ′`ω − Ci ′`xki′`
]}
→ ∞
as k(∈ κ)→∞. Therefore, there must exist an index ω ′ such that
lim
k(∈κ)→∞
λki ′` ′ω ′ = ∞.
Without loss of generality, assume that λki ′` ′ω ′ > 0 for all k ∈ κ. However, by complemen-
tarity,
xki ′` ′ − gki ′` ′ω ′ + τk λki ′` ′ω ′ = 0,
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a contradiction of the boundedness of {gk}. Thus, {xk} is bounded.
Boundedness of {λk}. Assume that there exists some triple (i ′, ` ′, ω ′) such that for an
infinite index set κ ⊂ {1, 2, · · · ,∞},
lim
k(∈κ)→∞
λki ′` ′ω ′ = ∞,
where λki ′` ′ω ′ > 0 for all k ∈ κ without loss of generality. From the boundedness of {xk}
and {gk}, the equality xki ′` ′ − gki ′` ′ω ′ + τkλki ′` ′ω ′ = 0 implies that {τkλki ′` ′ω ′} is bounded
for all k ∈ κ. As a consequence, it must hold that
lim
k(∈κ)→∞
τk = 0.
Since
λki ′` ′ω ′ ≤
∑
ω∈Ω
λki ′` ′ω ≤ τk xki ′` ′ +
∑
ω∈Ω
PRi ′ω ai ′ Ci ′` ′ ×
exp
{
−ai ′
L∑
`= 1
[(
θ`ω
(
Gk`ω
)
−MCi ′` −
R∑
r= 1
Uri ′` θ
r
ω
(
S r,kω
))
gki ′`ω − Ci ′`xki′`
]}
,
a contradiction is obtained because the left-hand side tends to ∞ whereas the right-hand
side remains bounded as k(∈ κ)→∞. Hence, {λk} is bounded. 
Remark 2.2. Conditions (a)–(c) of Theorem 2.2 enforce common properties of microeco-
nomic demand and supply functions. For the demand functions, condition (a) requires that
prices are bounded above for all feasible production quantities and condition (b) requires
that the market price under infinite production is nonpositive. For the supply function
markets, prices must be nonnegative for all feasible production quantities by condition (c).
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Obviously, the validity of Theorem 2.2 is not restricted to equilibrium problems with linear
demand and supply functions. 
2.6 Market clearing models
To motivate the perfectly competitive model of capacity expansion under a market clearing
condition, consider the situation where the aggregate production of all firms needs to fulfill
a demand D`ω in market ` under scenario ω; thus the demand satisfaction constraints
F∑
i= 1
gi`ω −D`ω ≥ 0 for all ` = 1, · · · , L and ω ∈ Ω (2.14)
need to be taken into consideration by the firms in their respective profit maximization
problems. One way to accomplish this is to include (2.14) in problem (2.13), which then
becomes
maximize
gi, xi
∑
ω∈Ω
(
1−
exp
{
−ai
L∑
`= 1
[(
p`ω −MCi` −
R∑
r= 1
Uri` p
r
ω
)
gi`ω − Ci`xi`
]} )
PRiω
subject to xi` − gi`ω ≥ 0 (λi`ω) for all ` = 1, · · · , L and ω ∈ Ω
gi`ω, xi` ≥ 0 for all ` = 1, · · · , L and ω ∈ Ω
F∑
i= 1
gi`ω −D`ω ≥ 0 (µi`ω) for all ` = 1, · · · , L and ω ∈ Ω,
(2.15)
where the (possibly non-unique) multiplier µi`ω of the shared constraint (2.14) may depend
on the player, thus the subscript i. Before completing the description of the overall model,
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note that the players’ optimization problems (2.15) with exogenous prices p`ω and p
r
ω lead
to a generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP) wherein the demand constraints (2.14)
are common to (i.e., shared by) all the players’ optimization problems. Since the pioneering
paper of Rosen [197], there has been extensive research on such a game; some recent papers
include [73, 85, 128, 129, 132, 133, 135, 160, 206]. The cited papers have investigated
generalized Nash equilibria of various kinds according to the stipulations of the multipliers
µi`ω (i.e., shadow prices). One of the most common stipulations leads to the concept of
a variational equilibrium wherein the shared constraints are postulated to have the same
shadow prices µ`ω (without the subscript i) for all players. Since shadow prices represent
the marginal value of constraint relaxation, it is natural to relate µ`ω (the shadow prices of
demand satisfication) to p`ω (the market prices of demanded commodities). This multiplier
specification is the uniform pricing mechanism. Other generalized equilibrium concepts are
discussed in the cited references. A variational equilibrium can be computed by the solution
of a variational inequality that is equivalent to the problem (2.10).
To derive the latter problem in this context, consider a (partial) Lagrangian formulation
of (2.15) where the common multiplier of each shared constraint is given by its market
price (i.e., postulate that µ`ω = p`ω). This results in the following problem:
maximize
gi, xi
∑
ω∈Ω
[
L∑
`= 1
p`ω gi`ω +
(
1−
exp
{
−ai
L∑
`= 1
[(
p`ω −MCi` −
R∑
r= 1
Uri` p
r
ω
)
gi`ω − Ci`xi`
]} )]
PRiω
subject to xi` − gi`ω ≥ 0 (λi`ω) for all ` = 1, · · · , L and ω ∈ Ω
gi`ω, xi` ≥ 0 for all ` = 1, · · · , L and ω ∈ Ω,
(2.16)
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where each price p`ω is subject to the exogenously imposed complementary slackness con-
dition
0 ≤ p`ω ⊥
F∑
i= 1
gi`ω −D`ω ≥ 0. (2.17)
In terms of profit maximization, the objective function in (2.16) does not have a simple
economic interpretation (it is comprised of expected revenue and expected utility from
profit). Therefore, it is slightly altered so that it depends solely on profit. Formulate
player i’s optimization problem as follows:
maximize
gi, xi
∑
ω∈Ω
[
bi
(
L∑
`= 1
(
p`ω −MCi` −
R∑
r= 1
Uri` p
r
ω
)
gi`ω − Ci`xi`
)
+
(
1− exp
{
−ai
L∑
`= 1
[(
p`ω −MCi` −
R∑
r= 1
Uri` p
r
ω
)
gi`ω − Ci`xi`
]})]
PRiω
subject to xi` − gi`ω ≥ 0 (λi`ω) for all ` = 1, · · · , L and ω ∈ Ω
gi`ω, xi` ≥ 0 for all ` = 1, · · · , L and ω ∈ Ω,
(2.18)
where bi is a nonnegative scalar. The use of such a scalar serves two purposes: (1) a
conversion factor between expected profit and expected utility, and (2) the unification of
the objective function of (2.18) with that of (2.13) when bi = 0.
The formulation of (2.18) is closely related to the concept of mean-risk stochastic optimiza-
tion. In mean-risk optimization, the objective function consists of the mean of a function of
a random variable plus some measure of the function’s risk. In the classical mean-variance
approach of Markowitz [145], the risk term is modeled by the variance. Risk measures
such as semideviation from a target, central semideviation, and conditional value-at-risk
(CVaR) are alternatives to the variance and have been studied extensively for optimiza-
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tion problems [2, 201] in recent years. In the context of games with strategic players, the
reference [123] employed CVaR as a risk measure for the analysis of supply-side risk in
uncertain power markets. The current treatment differs from the latter reference in that
presented models are for perfectly competitive games with market clearing conditions for
price.
Remark 2.3. An equivalent and possibly more standard formulation of 2.18 from a mean-
risk optimization perspective can be obtained by dividing the objective function by b2i .
This modification makes 1bi the weighting factor (typically denoted as c) used to convert
from the specified risk measure to a risk-neutral payoff but does not change the presented
equilibrium existence results. 
The description of the overall capacity expansion model under market clearing conditions
is completed with a set of complementarity conditions to be satisfied by the resource prices
prω, similar to (2.17) for the product prices. Namely, these supply prices are subject to
0 ≤ prω ⊥ R r −
F∑
i= 1
L∑
`= 1
Uri` gi`ω ≥ 0 for all ω ∈ Ω and r = 1, · · · , R, (2.19)
where R
r
is the total available quantity of commodity r. The partial Lagrangian objective
function form obtained when these supply constraints are enforced as shared constraints
with common multipliers has already been accounted for in (2.18).
In summary, the perfectly competitive capacity expansion problem with market clearing-
based prices and player risk aversion described by the exponential utility function (2.12)
is to determine a tuple {g, x, p, pr} such that
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• each perfectly competitive player i solves the optimization problem (2.18);
• prices satisfy the market clearing conditions (2.17) and (2.19).
The existence result below pertains to the case where b , (bi)Fi= 1 > 0, reflecting that all
prices are determined by market clearing conditions. It is not clear whether the result will
remain valid if some bi = 0 while market clearing conditions are in place for the prices.
Again, the challenge in the proof of the result lies in the lack of feasible region compactness.
Theorem 2.3. Let b > 0 and D`ω > 0 for all ` and ω. Assume that there exists some
vector g satisfying
R
r ≥
F∑
i= 1
L∑
`= 1
Uri` gi`ω and
F∑
i= 1
gi`ω ≥ D`ω (2.20)
for all `, ω, and r. The perfectly competitive Nash equilibrium problem defined by the
problems (2.18) and the market clearing conditions (2.17) and (2.19) has a solution.
Proof. The proof here is more complex than that of Theorem 2.2. By concatenating the
necessary and sufficient KKT optimality conditions of (2.18) for all players i = 1, · · · ,F ,
examine the solutions of the nonlinear complementarity conditions parameterized by a
sequence of positive scalars {τk}:
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• for all i, `, and ω,
0 ≤ gki`ω ⊥ τkgki`ω + λki`ω − PRiω
[
bi
(
pk`ω −MCi` −
R∑
r= 1
Uri` p
r,k
ω
)
+ ai
(
pk`ω −MCi`
−
R∑
r= 1
Uri` p
r,k
ω
)
× exp
−ai
L∑
ˆ`= 1
[(
pkˆ`ω −MCiˆ`−
R∑
r= 1
Ur
iˆ`
pr,kω
)
gk
iˆ`ω
− Ciˆ`xkiˆ`
]
]
≥ 0
0 ≤ λki`ω ⊥ xki` − gki`ω + τkλki`ω ≥ 0
• for all ` and ω,
0 ≤ pk`ω ⊥
F∑
i= 1
gki`ω −D`ω + τk pk`ω ≥ 0
• for all ω,
0 ≤ pr,kω ⊥ R r −
F∑
i= 1
L∑
`= 1
Uri` g
k
i`ω + τk p
r,k
ω ≥ 0
• for all i and `,
0 ≤ xki` ⊥ τkxki` −
∑
ω∈Ω
λki`ω +
∑
ω∈Ω
PRiω Ci`×
 bi + ai exp
−ai
L∑
ˆ`= 1
[(
pkˆ`ω −MCiˆ`−
R∑
r= 1
Ur
iˆ`
pr,kω
)
gk
iˆ`ω
− Ciˆ`xkiˆ`
]
 ≥ 0.
It suffices to prove that the sequence of solution tuples
{
gk, xk, λk, pk, pr,k
}
is bounded as
k →∞.
Boundedness of {gk}. Assume that pk` ′ω ′ > 0. By complementarity,
gki` ′ω ′ ≤
F∑
î= 1
gk
î` ′ω ′ = D` ′ω ′ − τk pk` ′ω ′ ≤ D` ′ω ′ for all i.
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On the other hand, if pk` ′ω ′ = 0, then, for all i,
λki` ′ω ′ − PRiω ′
[
bi
(
−MCi` ′ −
R∑
r= 1
Uri` ′ p
r,k
ω ′
)
+ ai
(
−MCi` ′ −
R∑
r= 1
Uri` ′ p
r
ω ′
)
×
exp
{
−ai
L∑
`= 1
[(
pk`ω ′ −MCi` −
R∑
r= 1
Uri` p
r,k
ω ′
)
gki`ω ′ − Ci` xki`
]}]
+ τkg
k
i` ′ω ′ > 0,
which implies, by complementarity, that gki` ′ω ′ = 0 for all i. The boundedness of {gk}
follows.
Boundedness of {xk}. For the sake of contradiction, assume that there exists some pair
(i ′, ` ′) such that for an infinite index set κ ⊂ {1, 2, · · · ,∞},
lim
k(∈κ)→∞
xki ′` ′ = ∞.
Without loss of generality, assume that xki ′` ′ > 0 for all k ∈ κ. For every sufficiently large
k ∈ κ, one of the following two mutually exclusive and exhaustive cases must hold:
• λki ′` ′ω ′ > 0 for some index ω ′. In this case,
xki ′` ′ = g
k
i ′` ′ω ′ − τkλki ′` ′ω ′ ≤ gki ′` ′ω ′ ≤ D` ′ω ′ ,
where the last inequality follows from the boundedness proof of {gk}. This contradicts the
assumption that {xki ′` ′} is unbounded.
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• λki ′` ′ω = 0 for all ω. In this case, since xki ′` ′ > 0 for all k ∈ κ,
τkx
k
i ′` ′ +
∑
ω∈Ω
PRi ′ω Ci ′` ′ ×
(
bi ′
+ai ′ exp
{
−ai ′
L∑
`= 1
[(
pk`ω −MCi ′` −
R∑
r= 1
Uri ′` p
r,k
ω
)
gki ′`ω − Ci ′`xki ′`
]} )
= 0,
which is also a contradiction. The boundedness of {xk} follows.
Boundedness of {λk}. Assume that there exists some triple (i ′, ` ′, ω ′) such that for an
infinite index set κ ⊂ {1, 2, · · · ,∞},
lim
k(∈κ)→∞
λki ′` ′ω ′ = ∞,
where λki ′` ′ω ′ > 0 for all k ∈ κ without loss of generality. By complementarity,
xki ′` ′ + τkλ
k
i ′` ′ω ′ = g
k
i ′` ′ω ′ ,
which implies that
τk λ
k
i ′` ′ω ′ ≤ gki ′` ′ω ′ .
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Since {gk} is bounded, it follows that {τk} → 0 as k(∈ κ)→∞.
∑
ω∈Ω
λki ′` ′ω ≤ τkxki ′` ′ +
∑
ω∈Ω
PRi ′ω Ci ′` ′×
(
bi ′ + ai ′ exp
{
−ai ′
L∑
`= 1
[(
pk`ω −MCi ′` −
R∑
r= 1
Uri ′` p
r,k
ω
)
gki ′`ω − Ci ′`xki ′`
]})
= τkx
k
i ′` ′ +
∑
ω∈Ω
PRi ′ω Ci ′` ′×
(
bi ′ + ai ′ exp
{
ai ′
L∑
`= 1
[(
−pk`ω + MCi ′` +
R∑
r= 1
Uri ′` p
r,k
ω
)
gki ′`ω + Ci ′`x
k
i ′`
]})
.
To derive a contradiction, it suffices to show that for every ` and ω,
{(
−pk`ω + MCi ′` +
R∑
r= 1
Uri ′` p
r,k
ω
)
gki ′`ω
}
k∈κ
is bounded above. Assume the contrary; without loss of generality, by working with a
proper subsequence if necessary, say that for some pair
(˜`, ω˜),
lim
k(∈κ)→∞
[(
−pk˜`ω˜ + MCi ′ ˜`+
R∑
r= 1
Ur
i ′ ˜`pr,kω˜
)
gk
i ′ ˜`ω˜
]
= ∞.
Hence, for all k ∈ κ sufficiently large,
−pk˜`ω˜ + MCi ′ ˜`+
R∑
r= 1
Ur
i ′ ˜`pr,kω˜ > 0 and gki ′ ˜`ω˜ > 0.
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Therefore,
λk
i ′ ˜`ω˜ − PRi ′ω˜
[
bi ′
(
pk˜`ω˜ −MCi ′ ˜`−
R∑
r= 1
Ur
i ′ ˜`pr,kω˜
)
+ ai ′
(
pk˜`ω˜ −MCi ′ ˜`−
R∑
r= 1
Ur
i ′ ˜`pr,kω˜
)
×
exp
{
−ai ′
L∑
`= 1
[(
pk`ω˜ −MCi ′` −
R∑
r= 1
Uri ′` p
r,k
ω˜
)
gki ′`ω˜ − Ci ′`xki ′`
]}]
+ τk g
k
i ′ ˜`ω˜ = 0,
a contradiction because the left-hand side is positive. This establishes the boundedness of
{λk}.
Boundedness of {pr,k}. Assume that there exists some pair (ω ′, r ′) such that for an
infinite index set κ ⊂ {1, 2, · · · ,∞},
lim
k(∈κ)→∞
pr
′,k
ω ′ = ∞.
As before, assume without loss of generality that pr
′,k
ω ′ > 0 for all k ∈ κ. Thus, by
complementarity,
R
r ′ −
F∑
i= 1
L∑
`= 1
Ur
′
i` g
k
i`ω′ + τk p
r ′,k
ω′ = 0.
With R
r ′
being a positive constant and {gk} being bounded, it follows that {τk} → 0 as
k(∈ κ)→∞. Consider two mutually exclusive and exhaustive cases for such a sequence of
solutions:
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• {pk`ω ′}k∈κ is bounded for some `. In this case, for all k ∈ κ sufficiently large and for all i,
λki`ω ′ − PRiω ′
[
bi
(
pk`ω ′ −MCi` −
R∑
r= 1
Uri` p
r,k
ω ′
)
+ ai
(
pk`ω ′ −MCi` −
R∑
r= 1
Uri` p
r,k
ω ′
)
×
exp
−ai
L∑
ˆ`= 1
[(
pkˆ`ω ′ −MCiˆ`−
R∑
r= 1
Ur
iˆ`
pr,kω ′
)
gk
iˆ`ω ′ − Ciˆ`xkiˆ`
]
+ τkgki`ω ′ > 0.
Hence, by complementarity, it follows that gki`ω ′ = 0 for all i. However,
0 ≤
F∑
i= 1
gki`ω ′ −D`ω ′ + τk pk`ω ′
= −D`ω ′ + τk pk`ω ′ → −D`ω ′ as k(∈ κ)→∞.
This yields a contradiction.
• {pk`ω ′}k∈κ is unbounded for all `. Without loss of generality, assume that
lim
k(∈κ)→∞
pk`ω ′ = ∞
and that pk`ω ′ > 0 for all ` and k. For all i and `,
λki`ω ′ − PRiω ′
[
bi
(
pk`ω ′ −MCi` −
R∑
r= 1
Uri` p
r,k
ω ′
)
+ ai
(
pk`ω ′ −MCi` −
R∑
r= 1
Uri` p
r,k
ω ′
)
×
exp
−ai
m∑
ˆ`= 1
[(
pkˆ`ω ′ −MCiˆ`−
R∑
r= 1
Ur
iˆ`
pr,kω ′
)
gk
iˆ`ω ′ − Ciˆ`xkiˆ`
]
+ τk gki`ω ′ ≥ 0.
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There are 2 subcases to consider, depending on whether the sequence {ê ki }k∈κ, where
ê ki , exp
{
−ai
L∑
`= 1
[(
pk`ω ′ −MCi` −
R∑
r= 1
Uri` p
r,k
ω ′
)
gki`ω ′ − Ci`xki`
]}
,
is bounded for all i or unbounded for some i. Consider the former case first. Without loss
of generality, assume that the sequence {ê ki }k∈κ converges to a limit, say ê∞i , which must
be nonnegative. Let
p̂ k`ω ′ ,
pk`ω ′
L∑
ˆ`= 1
pkˆ`ω ′ +
R∑
r= 1
pr,kω ′
and p̂ r,kω ′ ,
pr,kω ′
L∑
`= 1
pk`ω ′ +
R∑
r= 1
pr,kω ′
.
Without loss of generality, assume that the sequences {p̂ k`ω ′}k∈κ and {p̂ r,kω ′ }k∈κ converge to
the limits p̂∞`ω ′ and p̂
r,∞
ω ′ , respectively, which must be nonnegative and satisfy
L∑
`= 1
p̂∞`ω ′ +
R∑
r= 1
p̂ r,∞ω ′ = 1.
Furthermore, assume that {gki`ω ′}k∈κ converges to a limit ĝ∞i`ω ′ .
PRiω ′ [ bi + ai ê
∞
i ]
(
−p̂∞`ω ′ +
R∑
r= 1
Uri` p̂
r,∞
ω ′
)
≥ 0,
which implies −p̂∞`ω ′ +
R∑
r= 1
Uri` p̂
r,∞
ω ′ ≥ 0. Since the system (2.20) is feasible, it can be
deduced that
R∑
r= 1
R
r
p̂ r,∞ω ′ ≥
L∑
`= 1
D`ω ′ p̂
∞
`ω ′ . (2.21)
It is claimed that
F∑
i= 1
L∑
`= 1
[
p̂∞`ω ′ −
R∑
r= 1
Uri` p̂
r,∞
ω ′
]
gki`ω ′ = 0 for all k ∈ κ sufficiently
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large. Indeed, if this is false, then for an infinite subset κ′ of κ, for some i and `,[
−p̂∞`ω ′ +
R∑
r= 1
Uri` p̂
r,∞
ω ′
]
> 0 and gki`ω ′ > 0. The latter implies that
λki`ω ′ − PRiω ′
[
bi
(
pk`ω ′ −MCi` −
R∑
r= 1
Uri` p
r,k
ω ′
)
+ ai
(
pk`ω ′ −MCi` −
R∑
r= 1
Uri` p
r,k
ω ′
)]
×
exp
−ai
L∑
ˆ`= 1
[(
pkˆ`ω ′ −MCiˆ`−
R∑
r= 1
Ur
iˆ`
pr,kω ′
)
gk
iˆ`ω ′ − Ciˆ`xkiˆ`
]
+ τk gki`ω ′ = 0,
which in the limit as k(∈ κ′)→∞ yields
[
−p̂∞`ω ′ +
R∑
r= 1
Uri` p̂
r,∞
ω ′
]
= 0, which is a contra-
diction. By a similar argument, it can be deduced by (2.21) that
0 =
L∑
`= 1
p̂∞`ω ′
[ F∑
i= 1
gki`ω ′ −D`ω ′ + τk pk`ω ′
]
+
R∑
r= 1
p̂ r,∞ω ′
[
R
r −
F∑
i= 1
L∑
`= 1
Uri` g
k
i`ω ′ + τk p
r,k
ω ′
]
≥
F∑
i= 1
L∑
`= 1
[
p̂∞`ω ′ −
R∑
r= 1
Uri` p̂
r,∞
ω ′
]
gki`ω ′ + τk
[
L∑
`= 1
p̂∞`ω ′ p
k
`ω ′ +
R∑
r= 1
p̂ r,∞ω ′ p
r,k
ω ′
]
> 0,
a contradiction. Consider the second subcase where {ê ki }k∈κ is unbounded for some i.
There must exist some ` and an infinite index set κ′ ⊆ κ such that
[
−pk`ω ′ + MCi` +
R∑
r= 1
Uri` p
r,k
ω ′
]
gki`ω ′ →∞
as k(∈ κ′)→∞. Hence,
gki`ω ′
[
λki`ω ′ − PRiω ′
[
bi
(
pk`ω ′ −MCi` −
R∑
r= 1
Uri` p
r,k
ω ′
)
+ ai
(
pk`ω ′ −MCi` −
R∑
r= 1
Uri` p
r,k
ω ′
)]
× exp
−ai
L∑
ˆ`= 1
[(
pkˆ`ω ′ −MCiˆ`−
R∑
r= 1
Ur
iˆ`
pr,kω ′
)
gk
iˆ`ω ′ − Ciˆ`xkiˆ`
]
+ τk ( gki`ω ′ )2 = 0,
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which is a contradiction because the left-hand side is positive. This completes the proof of
the boundedness of {pr,k}.
Boundedness of {pk}. Assume that there exists some pair (` ′, ω ′) such that for an infinite
index set κ ⊂ {1, 2, · · · ,∞},
lim
k(∈κ)→∞
pk` ′ω ′ = ∞.
Assume without loss of generality that pk` ′ω ′ > 0 for all k ∈ κ. Thus, by complementarity,
F∑
i= 1
gki` ′ω ′ + τk p
k
` ′ω ′ = D` ′ω ′ .
Therefore, {τk} → 0 as k(∈ κ)→∞. Because
λki` ′ω ′ − PRiω ′
[
bi
(
pk` ′ω ′ −MCi` ′ −
R∑
r= 1
Uri` ′ p
r,k
ω ′
)
+ ai
(
pk` ′ω ′ −MCi` ′ −
R∑
r= 1
Uri` ′ p
r,k
ω ′
)
× exp
−ai
L∑
ˆ`= 1
[(
pkˆ`ω ′ −MCiˆ`−
R∑
r= 1
Ur
iˆ`
pr,kω ′
)
gk
iˆ`ω ′ − Ciˆ`xkiˆ`
]
+ τkgki` ′ω ′ ≥ 0,
it follows readily that
{
pk
}
must be bounded. This contradiction completes the proof of
the theorem. 
Remark 2.4. The positivity of the scalars bi is used in several places in the above proof.
Essentially, the proof reveals the possibility that if some bi = 0, the existence of an equilib-
rium solution to the perfectly competitive model could be in jeopardy if the market clearing
conditions (2.17) and (2.19) are imposed exogenously to the players’ optimization problems
and yet these conditions are not properly accounted for in the producers’ objective func-
tions. As explained in the discussion that leads to the formulation (2.18), the requirement
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that b > 0 is natural from the standpoint of Lagrangian duality in optimization. 
2.7 An extension with consumer surplus maximization
In (2.14), it was assumed that D`ω was constant, thereby implying that consumers have
zero price elasticity of demand. In real-world settings, consumers usually adjust their
purchases based on price. When there is nonzero cross-price elasticity of demand, this
type of consumer behavior is modeled as the maximization of consumer surplus (i.e., the
area under the demand curve less total cost). For this stochastic problem, the consumer is
assumed to maximize expected consumer surplus by choosing their consumption in market
` and scenario ω, with PRCω ∈ (0, 1) being the probability the consumer associates with
scenario ω. For simplicity, assume linear demand curves PC`ω −
PC`ω
QC`ω
q`ω for all pairs (`, ω),
where PC`ω and Q
C
`ω are positive constants. Since the consumer is perfectly competitive
with respect to market prices, the consumer’s optimization problem is
maximize
q≥ 0
∑
ω∈Ω
L∑
`= 1
(
PC`ω q`ω −
PC`ω
2QC`ω
q2`ω − p`ωq`ω
)
PRCω (2.22)
It should be obvious that (2.22) can be expressed as L|Ω| scalar optimization problems, one
for each market ` and each scenario ω. Letting D`ω denote the optimal solution of (2.22),
D`ω must satisfy the KKT conditions
0 ≤ D`ω ⊥
[
−PC`ω +
PC`ω
QC`ω
D`ω + p`ω
]
PRCω ≥ 0 for all ` = 1, · · · , L and ω ∈ Ω. (2.23)
Augmenting the perfectly competitive model with the above consumer conditions, the next
existence result for a perfectly competitive problem with a surplus-maximizing consumer
can be proven. This result requires no assumptions other than the positivity of b , (bi)Fi= 1.
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Theorem 2.4. Let b > 0. The perfectly competitive Nash equilibrium problem defined
by the producers’ problems (2.18), the market clearing conditions (2.17) and (2.19), and
the consumer surplus maximization condition (2.23) has a solution.
Proof. The condition (2.23) yields that for p`ω ≥ 0,
D`ω =
QC`ω
PC`ω
max
(
0,PC`ω − p`ω
) ≤ QC`ω, (2.24)
showing that the demand D`ω is a piecewise linear function of the price p`ω bounded above
by the constant QC`ω. Substituting this expression for D`ω into (2.17) reduces the game
with consumer surplus maximization to the same problem in Theorem 2.3 except that
D`ω is replaced by the variable expression
QC`ω
PC`ω
max
(
0,PC`ω − p`ω
)
. Theorem 2.1 is still
applicable to the resulting NCP.
Following the proof of Theorem 2.3, the sequences of tuples {gk}, {xk}, and {λk} are
bounded. The boundedness of the price sequences {pk, pr,k} needs to be shown.
Boundedness of {pk}. With the above expression of the demand D`ω, the price pk`ω
satisfies the complementarity condition
0 ≤ pk`ω ⊥
F∑
i= 1
gki`ω −
QC`ω
PC`ω
max
(
0,PC`ω − pk`ω
)
+ τk p
k
`ω ≥ 0.
If max
(
0,PC`ω − pk`ω
)
= 0, then the above complementarity condition becomes
0 ≤ pk`ω ⊥
F∑
i= 1
gki`ω + τk p
k
`ω ≥ 0,
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which yields pk`ω = 0, contradicting max
(
0,PC`ω − pk`ω
)
= 0. Therefore,
max
(
0,PC`ω − pk`ω
)
= PC`ω − pk`ω,
which yields pk`ω ≤ PC`ω. Thus, {pk} is bounded.
Boundedness of {pr,kω }. Assume that there exists some pair (ω ′, r ′) such that for an
infinite index set κ ⊂ {1, 2, · · · ,∞},
lim
k(∈κ)→∞
pr
′,k
ω ′ = ∞. (2.25)
As before, assume without loss of generality that pr
′,k
ω ′ > 0 for all k ∈ κ. Thus, by
complementarity,
R
r ′ −
F∑
i= 1
L∑
`= 1
Ur
′
i` g
k
i`ω ′ + τk p
r ′,k
ω ′ = 0, (2.26)
implying that {τk} → 0 as k(∈ κ) → ∞. By (2.25), for all k ∈ κ sufficiently large, all i,
and all `,
λki`ω ′ − PRiω ′
[
bi
(
pk`ω ′ −MCi` −
R∑
r= 1
Uri` p
r,k
ω ′
)
+ ai
(
pk`ω ′ −MCi` −
R∑
r= 1
Uri` p
r,k
ω ′
)
×
exp
−ai
L∑
ˆ`= 1
[(
pkˆ`ω ′ −MCiˆ`−
R∑
r= 1
Ur
iˆ`
pr,kω ′
)
gk
iˆ`ω ′ − Ciˆ`xkiˆ`
]
+ τkgki`ω ′ > 0.
Consequently, gki`ω ′ = 0 for all i and `, a contradiction of (2.26). 
Remark 2.5. Substituting the expression for the demand D`ω into the complementarity
condition (2.17), it can be seen that this capacity expansion game with consumer surplus
maximization is an instance of a distributed multi-agent optimization problem with price
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complementarity constraints of the MOPEC-type mentioned in Section 2.3. 
2.8 Conclusion
Existence results for general situations involving risk averse investors have become par-
ticularly useful due to the realization that risk neutrality assumptions underlying many
large-scale energy market models are highly unrealistic. In actual energy (and other) mar-
kets, investors are typically characterized by short-sightedness, risk aversion, differences in
beliefs, and the inability to hedge against many risks due to incomplete markets. As a
consequence, policy or investment recommendations based upon models that assume low
discount rates and either perfect foresight or risk neutrality combined with a common set
of beliefs about scenario probabilities might be unwise.
This chapter has established the existence of a Nash equilibrium for more realistic multi-
stage market models that account for risk aversion and player-specific beliefs about the
future. Additionally, three distinct pricing mechanisms were examined and a well-posed
model with risk aversion and market clearing conditions was developed (see (2.16) and (2.18)).
Directions of future work include (a) investigating whether the analytic tools of [75] can
establish equilibria uniqueness properties, and (b) selecting a particular Nash equilibrium
to optimize a secondary (e.g., system-wide) objective through the methodology developed
in [77]. It is conjectured that equilibrium uniqueness will not hold in general, but the more
realistic nature of this problem should bolster confidence in this type of market model.
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Chapter 3
Affine generalized Nash equilibria
and Lemke’s method4
3.1 Introduction
As was briefly discussed in Section 1.1, Nash equilibrium problems in which players’ de-
cisions are restricted by their rivals’ decisions are known as generalized Nash equilibrium
problems. In general, GNEPs are difficult to solve without imposing restrictions on either
the problem form or the desired solution properties; this research focuses on a tractable
subset of GNEPs characterized by convex quadratic player objective functions and affine
constraint sets. With this problem specification, the necessary and sufficient KKT opti-
mality conditions (Theorem 1.1) can be represented by a linear complementarity problem,
thus the naming convention “affine” GNEP (AGNEP). This research analyzes the difficul-
ties that arise when applying Lemke’s method, a well-known pivoting algorithm for linear
4This chapter is slightly adapted from [206] (Co-authors: Jong-Shi Pang and Uday Shanbhag). Springer
and Mathematical Programming, DOI 10.1007/s10107-012-0558-3 (2012), original copyright is given to the
publication in which the material was originally published, by adding; with kind permission from Springer
Science and Business Media. License # 3156660758413.
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complementarity problems (LCPs), to AGNEPs and proposes modifications that address
these issues.
Constraints that link player feasible regions in GNEPs take one of two forms: coupled or
shared. Both constraint types involve the joint variables (xi, x−i), but coupled constraints
may be different for each player while shared constraints must be identical across all players.
This chapter only deals with shared constraints; the interested reader is referred to [178]
for an analysis of problems with coupled constraints. Although the concept of AGNEPs
with shared constraints may seem abstract, equilibrium problems of this form arise in many
applications. Several such examples are listed below, the first three of which are studied
in greater detail subsequently:
• A (static) river basin pollution problem first discussed in [100] and subsequently extended
to a dynamic setting in [128] where shared constraints model locational pollution limits set
by a regulatory authority and respected by the players (see also [45]);
• A rate allocation game in which a set of players compete for bandwidth over a commu-
nication network [4, 240] with shared constraints enforcing the network routing capacity
limits;
• A bilateral electricity market game with piecewise linear prices, transmission network
constraints, and shared constraints representing regional sales caps [110]. More general
nonsmooth Nash games are examined by Pang and Sun in [184];
• An electricity market model with regulated transmission prices [230] where shared con-
straints model limits on net energy flows;
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• A multiclearing electricity market game [28] where the shared constraints model minimum
generation requirements in various markets.
The natural KKT conditions associated with the shared constraints of an AGNEP are
0 ≤ λs1 ⊥
F∑
j= 1
Ajxj − b ≥ 0
...
0 ≤ λsF ⊥
F∑
j= 1
Ajxj − b ≥ 0,
where Aj ∈ Rms×nj for all j and b ∈ Rms . These duplicated constraints may lead to
degeneracy and may therefore make the complete set of KKT conditions difficult to solve if
the presence of F potentially different Lagrange multiplier vectors λsi associated with the
same shared constraints is not taken into account. To address this degeneracy, much past
research has been devoted to specialized problem forms in which the F λsi -vectors are not
independent. In his pioneering paper [197], Rosen introduced the important concept of a
normalized Nash equilibrium to treat the GNEP. Based on optimality theory in nonlinear
programming, a normalized NE is an equilibrium characterized by proportional multipliers
of the shared constraints in all players’ optimization problems. While this is a restrictive
requirement, it nevertheless has certain advantages that render the computation of a GNE
more tractable than the general case where there is no such stipulation on the multipliers.
Furthermore, such a requirement appears to have relevance when these Lagrange multipliers
are interpreted as prices with normalized NEs being viewed as instances of uniform pricing.
A different GNE solution concept, known as a variational equilibrium (VE), was coined in
[73] to describe a NE with common multipliers corresponding to the shared constraints.
The adjective “variational” signifies that such an equilibrium can be obtained as a solution
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of a VI. This research takes a Lemke’s method-specific approach to address this degeneracy
issue and can obtain solutions that are neither normalized Nash equilibria nor variational
equilibria.
Remark 3.1. Because of their relation to variational inequalities, there is a consider-
able amount of research studying the relationship between variational equilibria and other
GNE forms. One such relationship question is whether the existence of a GNE (with no
stipulation on consistency across λsi -vectors) implies the existence of a VE. In economic
parlance, if true, the VE is a refinement of the GNE. The notion of refinement has been
explored extensively: trembling hand perfect [209] and proper [159] equilibria are refine-
ments of mixed strategy Nash equilibria in static finite strategy games [158] while the
subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium is a refinement of the Nash equilibrium of a dynamic
game (see [171, Chapter 3.8]). In [133], conditions are provided under which the VE is
indeed a refinement of a GNE. 
This research fills an important gap in the recent surge of interest in computing GNE
(e.g. [61, 74, 85, 104, 122, 123, 129, 130, 132, 133, 135, 160, 179]). For the most part,
the existing literature as exemplified by these references deals with the GNEP in general
and not the AGNEP; moreover, the algorithms presented therein are generally infinite in
nature: their convergence, if at all, occurs only in the limit and the conditions for con-
vergence are fairly abstract. For instance, [179] introduces a quasi-variational inequality
(QVI) formulation of a GNEP and a penalty-based solution method. For an AGNEP, the
QVI is equivalent to an LCP, but the proposed penalty-based solution method relies on an
implication similar to the Mangasarian-Fromovitz constraint qualification for convergence
that seems unnecessary in the affine case. In contrast, as an LCP, the finitely terminating
Lemke’s method can in principle be applied to compute a GNE. There is a host of literature
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on this topic, ranging from the classic works of Eaves on the LCP of a special kind [63]
that includes the AGNEP, on computing a VE of a polymatrix game [64], on computing
stationary points of affine maps [66, 67] that include the VE, and on solving equations using
piecewise linear homotopies [65], to the more contemporary treatment of [33, 34] and the
unpublished manuscript [178] that presents sufficient conditions to ensure the successful
termination of Lemke’s method for an AGNEP. There is also the publicly available com-
puter software path [59, 81]; while being a fairly robust solver for general LCPs, a major
drawback of this solver for computing equilibria of AGNEPs is that there is no theoretical
guarantee of success even if a solution is known to exist. Thus, the gap filled by the present
work is that it offers a rigorous study on the application of a finitely terminating algorithm
to the AGNEP with a focus on its applicability for realistic instances of such games.
Of the aforementioned papers, [178, Section 6] presents some of the most general research on
AGNEPs: the coupled constraints are all assumed to be particular to the individual players
and there is no stipulation on the Lagrange multipliers of any coupled constraints that
happen to be shared constraints. However, no special attention is paid to the application
of Lemke’s method to solve the AGNEP. This is the departure of the present work; namely,
much of the focus herein is on how shared constraints and their multipliers affect the success
or failure of Lemke’s method. As will be discussed later, Lemke’s method finitely terminates
with either a solution or along an infeasible ray (see Section 3.3). Thus, understanding
the λsi -multiplier properties associated with successful termination of Lemke’s method (i.e.,
identification of a solution) is of obvious importance.
The focus on the λsi -vectors in this research is justified because the Lagrange multiplier
of a constraint is economically interpretted as a “shadow price,” the change in objective
function value that would arise from a marginal relaxation of the constraint. In particu-
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lar, common multipliers for shared constraints may be interpreted as the uniform auction
price of the constraint resource. Players possessing different Lagrange multiplier values for
the same constraint can be interpreted as having contrasting valuations for the same good.
This situation may arise, for instance, when there is an asymmetry in preferences, existence
of market power, incompleteness in information, or incompleteness in markets; pay-as-bid
auctions capture precisely these valuation disparities. A subsequent result, Proposition 3.4,
establishes the λsi -multiplier structure of solutions obtained from a traditional implemen-
tation of Lemke’s method for an AGNEP. In all such equilibria, the binding status of a
shared constraint implies the existence of a single player who obtains all of the benefit from
a marginal unit of the shared resource, a display of market power. This rather interesting
solution property is an unexpected consequence of the way that Lemke’s method works. It
is of prime importance in market design to examine all possible equilibria that may arise,
and this special λsi -multiplier structure provides a key motivation for the present work. To
what extent and how each such equilibrium is of practical value depends on the application
and other issues beyond the scope of this chapter.
The main contributions of this research are as follows:
(a) It is proven that a successful application of Lemke’s method to the natural LCP formu-
lation of an AGNEP (i.e., without any special stipulation of the λsi -vectors) will compute
a GNE of a particular kind.
(b) The notion of a partial variational equilibrium is introduced; this equilibrium is char-
acterized by the property that the Lagrange multipliers of some shared constraints are
forced to be common across all players while Lagrange multipliers associated with other
shared constraints are not so restricted. Using this notion in conjunction with a modified
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Lemke’s method (refer to (c)), it is possible to compute generalized Nash equilibria that do
not satisfy the property specified in (a). A brief sketch of a further generalization of this
kind of NE, a coalitional equilibrium, is also presented for which each shared constraint is
associated with a partition of the player set into coalitions (i.e., mutually disjoint subsets
whose union is the whole set of players) such that the players within each such coalition
are required to have common multipliers for the given shared constraint.
(c) A modification of Lemke’s method is introduced and is shown to compute a solution of
the AGNEP under certain conditions. The solution may be of the form referred to in (a) or
(b). Computational results demonstrate that the proposed modification of Lemke’s method
can compute generalized Nash equilibria that may not be obtained by the standard version
of the method due to random degenerate pivots. Furthermore, a performance analysis
suggests that the algorithm scales roughly linearly with the number of shared constraints.
(d) It is shown that specific regularizations of the natural LCPs arising from AGNEPs pro-
duce trajectories that are guaranteed to converge to a variational equilibrium if one exists;
more generally, it is shown that a certain regularization scheme of the LCP formulation
of an AGNEP will produce in the limit a broad class of generalized Nash equilibria that
generalizes Rosen’s normalized NE concept. Similar to Rosen’s normalized NE, the general-
ization provided in this paper is a special case of the restricted GNE of [85] corresponding to
equilibria in which shared constraint multipliers lie in a cone. Such a regularization scheme
can in turn be combined with the idea of a coalitional equilibrium to further expand the
solution types that can be found by Lemke’s method.
(e) A constraint reformulation and parametrization idea is introduced that will produce yet
another kind of generalized Nash equilibria that is characterized by a different λsi -multiplier
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property. Solutions with this multiplier property are not readily computable without the
problem reformulation.
The remainder of the chapter is organized in 9 sections. In Section 3.2, the examined
AGNEP is explicitly formulated and its associated natural LCP is provided. After a
summary of Lemke’s method in Section 3.3, the classes of partial variational equilibria
and coalitional equilibria are introduced in Section 3.4. The modified Lemke method is
presented in Section 3.5 and its successful termination is analyzed therein. In Section 3.6,
the identification of alternate generalized Nash equilibria is demonstrated by introducing a
novel problem reformulation. A regularization technique that leads to generalizations of the
traditional normalized equilibria of Rosen is discussed in Section 3.7. Section 3.8 addresses
the aforementioned application problems while the performance of the modified Lemke
method is presented in Section 3.9, together with a description of alternate equilibria that
can be obtained through coalitional and reformulation techniques. Section 3.10 provides
concluding remarks on this research.
3.2 Problem formulation
In this section, the canonical form of the AGNEP studied in this work is introduced along
with its LCP formulation. Following the notation of Chapter 1, the AGNEP G consists of F
non-cooperative players, each of whom solves a convex quadratic program whose objective
function and constraints contain the rival players’ decision variables. Specifically, taking
the rivals’ decision variable vector x−i , (xj)j 6= i as exogenous, player i’s optimization
problem is:
minimize
xi∈Ki(x−i)
fi(xi;x−i) , 12x
T
i Hiixi + x
T
i
∑
j 6= i
Hijxj + h
T
i xi,
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where, for a given x−i,
Ki(x−i) ,
xi ∈ Rni+ | Bixi ≥ ri,
F∑
j= 1
Ajxj ≥ b
 .
Here, Hii is an ni × ni symmetric positive semidefinite matrix, Hij ∈ Rni×nj , hi ∈ Rni ,
Bi ∈ Rmi×ni , ri ∈ Rmi , Aj ∈ Rms×nj , and b ∈ Rms . The inequality Bixi ≥ ri describes
player i’s private constraints, whereas
F∑
j= 1
Ajxj ≥ b, which is common to all players’
problems, represents the shared constraints that couple all players’ variables. Throughout
the paper, the superscripts p and s signify “private” and “shared”, respectively, with respect
to constraint Lagrange multipliers.
The above definition of the AGNEP is not of the most general kind. For instance, coupled
[but non-shared] constraints like
F∑
j= 1
Eijxj ≥ gi for player i have been omitted. There are
several reasons for not dealing with coupled constraints of the latter type. One, without
them, this research can focus on understanding the impact of the shared constraints on the
solution of the AGNEP by Lemke’s method. Two, there have not been many realistic prob-
lems reported in the literature that possess such non-shared, coupled, affine constraints.
Three, a preliminary analysis of the AGNEP with non-shared coupled constraints can be
found in [178]; the results obtained therein have thus far remained abstract due to the lack
of reported applied problems of this kind to motivate further developments.
By introducing multipliers λpi ∈ Rmi+ for player i’s private constraint set Bixi ≥ ri and
λsi ∈ Rms+ for the same player’s shared constraint set
F∑
j= 1
Ajxj ≥ b, and by concatenating
all players’ necessary and sufficient KKT optimality conditions, it is easy to see that a
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GNE is characterized as a solution to the LCP(q,M):
0 ≤ z ⊥ w , q +Mz ≥ 0, (3.1)
where the vectors z, w, and q are all of dimension L ,
F∑
i= 1
ni +
F∑
i= 1
mi + Fms and given
by
z ,

x ,

x1
...
xF

λp ,

λp1
...
λpF

λs ,

λs1
...
λsF


, w ,

wx ,

wx1
...
wxF

wp ,

wp1
...
wpF

s ,

s1
...
sF


, q ,

h ,

h1
...
hF

r ,

−r1
...
−rF

b ,

−b
...
−b


,
(3.2)
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and
M ,

H11 · · · H1F −BT1 −AT1
...
. . .
...
. . .
. . .
HF1 · · · HFF −BTF −ATF
B1
. . .
BF
A1 · · · AF
... · · · ...
A1 · · · AF

∈ RL×L. (3.3)
The solution set of the LCP(q,M) (3.1) is denoted by SOL(q,M). Throughout this chapter,
the components of each xi-variable are indicated by xik for k = 1, · · · , ni, similarly for the
λpi and λ
s
i variables. Note that the players’ slack variable vectors si ,
F∑
j= 1
Ajxj − b are all
equal to the same s for all i.
The primary goal of this work is to perform a comprehensive investigation of how the shared
constraints
F∑
j= 1
Ajxj ≥ b affect the solvability of the AGNEP G via Lemke’s method,
focusing on the types of equilibria that can be obtained by the algorithm and its proposed
variants by providing sufficient conditions to rule out method failure (i.e., ray termination;
see Section 3.3). The premise of this investigation is that without the shared constraints,
the game can be formulated as an “affine” variational inequality (AVI) [75] defined by the
mapping F (x) , h +H0x and the Cartesian product of polyhedra K ,
F∏
i= 1
Ki where H0
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is the players’ “Jacobian matrix” given by
H0 ,

H11 · · · H1F
...
. . .
...
HF1 · · · HFF

and Ki ,
{
xi ∈ Rni+ | Bixi ≥ ri
}
. Several previous works have already extensively ex-
amined the solution of such an AVI by Lemke’s method [33, 34, 63, 64, 66, 67].
3.3 Lemke’s method: The traditional version
Lemke’s method [138] attempts to solve the LCP(q,M) by following an almost comple-
mentarity solution path of the augmented LCP:
0 ≤ z ⊥ w , q + dz0 +Mz ≥ 0 (3.4)
0 ≤ z0 ⊥ w0 , q0 − dT z ≥ 0 (3.5)
where q0 is a sufficiently large constant, the positive vector d is called the covering vector
(typically 1), the scalar z0 is called the artificial variable, and an almost complementary
solution is a tuple (z, z0) for which all but one of the complementarity conditions are
satisfied. For Lemke’s method, the unsatisfied complementarity condition is always (3.5);
if (3.5) becomes satisfied, the sufficiently large nature of q0 guarantees that z0 = 0 and
that a solution of LCP(q,M) has been obtained.
For technical reasons, the augmented LCP (3.4)–(3.5) can be studied purely via (3.4).
To follow a feasible almost complementary path, Lemke’s method starts with the feasible
point of (3.4), the most obvious of which is z = 0 and z0 = max
k
{−qk
dk
}
. After this ini-
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tialization, Lemke’s method performs successive simple pivotal exchanges of variables [47,
Section 2.3] where the entering (driving) variable is the complement of the previous ex-
iting (blocking) variable [for (3.4), zk is complementary to wk] and the current blocking
variable is determined by a minimum ratio test. Notationally, each simple pivot exchange
of Lemke’s method is represented as 〈Blocking variable,Driving variable〉. The following
Lemke’s method tableau example [47, Example 4.4.7] illustrates this pivoting concept.
Example 4. Consider the Lemke’s method tableau
Nonbasic variables
1 w1 w3 z2 z3
Basic variables
z0 3 1 0 1 -2
w2 13 3 -2 5 -8
z1 2 1 -1 2 -2
From this tableau, it can be deduced that either w3 or z3 was the previous blocking variable
because both of these complementary elements are nonbasic. For this example, the previous
pivot involved w3 exiting the basis so the current driving variable of Lemke’s method is
z3. By the minimum ratio test, it can be seen that increasing z3 decreases all three basic
variables. Therefore, the appropriate minimum ratio test is
min
{
3
2
,
13
8
,
2
2
}
= 1
which gives that z1 must be the blocking variable. Hence, the pivot 〈z1, z3〉 gives
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1 w1 w3 z2 z1
z0 1 0 1 -1 1
w2 5 -1 2 -3 4
z3 1
1
2 −12 1 −12
as the post-pivot tableau. 
In the absence of pivot cycling induced by degeneracy, Lemke’s method will finitely termi-
nate either at a solution of the LCP(q,M) (corresponding to a pivot resulting in z0 = 0)
or on a secondary ray without yielding a solution. The latter ray termination corresponds
to the absence of an exiting variable during the simple pivots of Lemke’s method for (3.4)
and is examined in further detail in Section 3.3.1. Naturally, a considerable amount of
research has been conducted to identify sufficient conditions under which Lemke’s method
will terminate at a solution. Widely used results of this nature are provided in Theorem 3.1.
Definition 3.1. A matrix M is
(a) a P matrix if all its principal minors are positive;
(b) an E [strictly semimonotone] matrix if for every 0 6= z ≥ 0, there exists an index k
such that zk > 0 and (Mz)k > 0;
(c) an E0 [semimonotone] matrix if for every 0 6= z ≥ 0, there exists an index k such
that zk > 0 and (Mz)k ≥ 0;
(d) an R0 [pseudo-regular] matrix if SOL(0,M) = {0}.
These matrix classes follow the inclusions P ⊂ E ⊂ E0 and E ⊂ R0 [46]. 
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Theorem 3.1 (Section 4.4, [47]). Lemke’s method terminates at a solution of LCP(q,M)
if M is a P matrix, an E matrix, or an E0 ∩R0 matrix. 
Unfortunately, the conditions on M required by Theorem 3.1 cannot be satisfied for LCPs
arising from AGNEPs, thus the need for a rigorous analysis of Lemke’s method when
applied to LCP(q,M) (3.1).
As previously mentioned, there are three possible outcomes of Lemke’s method when ap-
plied to a general LCP(q,M): (a) pivot cycling, (b) ray termination, or (c) solution iden-
tification. By assuming throughout that cycling will not occur, the last two cases will be
studied. This blanket no-cycling assumption is made without proposing a cycling preven-
tion scheme such as the lexicographic degeneracy resolution method of [47, Section 4.9].
This assumption is consistent with the practical implementation of Lemke’s method which
typically does not include anti-cycling rules.
3.3.1 Ray termination
Because of the importance of ray termination in the analysis of Lemke’s method, a nec-
essary condition for ray termination and a sufficient condition for the non-occurrence of
ray termination for an LCP(q,M) with M ∈ E0 are presented. Drawn from [180, Lemma
2], the former condition is stated in part (a) of Proposition 3.1 and the latter condition is
stated in part (b) of the proposition.
Proposition 3.1. Consider Lemke’s method applied to LCP(q,M) with the covering vec-
tor d > 0. The following two statements hold.
(a) If the method terminates on a secondary ray, then there exists a tuple (w∗, w˜, z∗, z˜, z∗0 , z˜0)
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with z∗0 > 0 and z˜ 6= 0 such that for all τ ≥ 0,
0 ≤ z∗ + z˜τ ⊥ w∗ + w˜τ , q + d(z∗0 + z˜0τ) +M(z∗ + z˜τ) ≥ 0. (3.6)
(b) If M ∈ E0, then the scalar z˜0 satisfying (3.6) must equal zero; hence, if for every
scalar z0 > 0, SOL(q+ dz0,M) is bounded, then LCP(q,M) has a solution that can
be computed by Lemke’s method with d as the covering vector. 
As may be expected from Proposition 3.1(b), a sufficient condition for the semimonotonicity
of the matrix M (3.3) corresponding to the AGNEP G can be derived. For this result, it
is assumed that the leading principal submatrix J0 of M is semimonotone, where
J0 ,

H11 · · · H1F −BT1
...
. . .
...
. . .
HF1 · · · HFF −BTF
B1
. . .
BF

(3.7)
and is obtained from the KKT conditions of the AVI corresponding to AGNEP G without
the shared constraints. This property easily holds if the diagonal block

H11 · · · H1F
...
. . .
...
HF1 · · · HFF

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is copositive
(
on RL0+ , where L0 ,
F∑
i=1
ni
)
; indeed, in this case, J0 is copositive and is
therefore semimonotone. Recall that an n×n matrix M is copositive if xTMx ≥ 0 for all
x ∈ Rn+ [46].
Under the semimonotonicity assumption on the matrix J0, the following result identifies a
sign condition on the rows of the aggregated matrix
A ,
[
A1 · · · AN
]
that will ensure the semimonotonicity of M (3.3) from which a sufficient condition can be
obtained for the existence of a solution to LCP(q,M) (3.1).
Proposition 3.2. Let J0 and M be given by (3.7) and (3.3), respectively. Assume that
J0 ∈ E0. If the nonzero entries in each row of the matrix A are of a single sign, then
M ∈ E0.
Proof. It suffices to show that for every index set α ⊆ {1, · · · , L} and every positive
vector zα, there exists an index k ∈ α such that (Mz)k ≥ 0, where z , (zα, 0) is the vector
obtained from zα by assigning zeros to the α¯-components where α¯ is the complement of α
in {1, · · · , L}. The desired claim is clearly true if zα does not contain an element of x. Let
ẑ be the subvector of z with λs removed. By taking into account the semimonotonicity of
the matrix J0 and the structure of the matrix M , it suffices to consider the case that there
is an index k ∈ α such that zk corresponds to some xik ′ variable and the corresponding
component of J0ẑ, which is here denoted by (J0ẑ)ik ′ , is nonnegative.
(Mz)k = (J0ẑ)ik ′ − (ATi )j•λsi = (J0ẑ)ik ′ −
ms∑
`= 1
(Ai)`jλ
s
i` = (J0ẑ)ik ′ −
∑
` |λsi`> 0
(Ai)`jλ
s
i`.
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If (Ai)`j > 0 for some ` ∈ {1, · · · ,ms} with λsi` > 0, then by the sign assumption, it
follows that the entire `th-row of A is nonnegative. Thus, the row of Mz corresponding
to λsi` is nonnegative. Otherwise, (Ai)`j ≤ 0 for all ` ∈ {1, · · · ,ms} with λsi` > 0 so
(Mz)k ≥ (J0ẑ)ik ′ ≥ 0. 
By Proposition 3.1(b), the solvability of the LCP(q,M) by Lemke’s method under the
assumptions of Proposition 3.2 hinges on the solution rays of LCP(q + dz0,M), if any.
By definition, these solution rays are determined by the solutions of the homogeneous
LCP(0,M). In what follows, a technical result that relates the (nonzero) solutions of the
latter LCP to those of the LCP(0, J0) is presented. This problem relationship is crucial
for upcoming termination proofs in that it restricts the possible directions along which ray
termination can occur.
Proposition 3.3. Let J0 and M be given by (3.7) and (3.3), respectively. Assume that
the following two conditions hold:
(a) for every shared constraint ` = 1, · · · ,ms, the implication holds:
Bixi ≥ 0, xi ≥ 0, for all i = 1, · · · ,F( F∑
i= 1
Aixi
)
`
= 0
⇒ xi = 0 for all i = 1, · · · ,F ; (3.8)
(b) for every player i = 1, · · · ,F , the implication holds:
BTi λ
p
i +A
T
i λ
s
i ≤ 0
λpi , λ
s
i ≥ 0
⇒ ATi λsi = 0. (3.9)
If
(
x˜, λ˜
p
, λ˜
s
)
is a solution of the LCP(0,M), then
(
x˜, λ˜
p
)
is a solution of the LCP(0, J0).
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Proof. Let
(
x˜, λ˜
p
, λ˜
s
)
be a solution of the LCP(0,M); it suffices to show that ATi λ˜
s
i = 0
for all i = 1, · · · ,F . This is clearly true if λ˜si = 0 for all i. Assume that λ˜si ′` ′ > 0 for
some pair (i ′, ` ′). The vector x˜ then satisfies the left-hand side of the implication (3.8).
Thus, x˜ = 0. It follows that
0 ≤
F∑
j= 1
Hij x˜i −BTi λ˜ pi −ATi λ˜ si = −BTi λ˜ pi −ATi λ˜ si ,
implying that
(
λ˜si , λ˜
p
i
)
satisfies the left-hand side of (3.9) for every i = 1, · · · ,F . By
assumption (b), ATi λ˜
s
i = 0 for all i = 1, · · · ,F and the proposition follows. 
The implication (3.9) is difficult to satisfy when the matrix A is entrywise nonpositive. It
turns out that this case requires an alternative condition that imposes a sign restriction on
the vectors ri and b (see condition (B) in Theorem 3.2).
To build intuition about the functioning of Lemke’s method when applied to AGNEPs with
shared constraints, a simple 2-player example from [110] is provided next. In this example,
condition (3.8) holds but A is entrywise negative. Furthermore, the example illustrates
a special feature of Lemke’s method when applied to this class of AGNEPs, one which is
formalized in the subsequent Proposition 3.4.
Example 5. Consider a 2-player game in which the individual optimization problems are
minimize
x1
−x1(1− 0.5x1 − 0.5x2)
subject to 1− x1 − x2 ≥ 0 (λs1)
x1 ≥ 0
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minimize
x2
−x2(2− 0.5x1 − 0.5x2)
subject to 1− x1 − x2 ≥ 0 (λs2)
x2 ≥ 0
The resulting equilibrium conditions are given by LCP(q,M) with
q =

−1
−2
1
1

and M =

1 0.5 1 0
0.5 1 0 1
−1 −1 0 0
−1 −1 0 0

.
This game has an infinite number of Nash equilibria given by

1
0
0
1.5 + α

, α ≥ 0;

0
1
0.5 + α
1

, α ≥ 0; and

α
1− α
0.5− 0.5α
1 + 0.5α

, α ∈ (0, 1).
However, Lemke’s method is not guaranteed to terminate at one of these solutions with
the typical covering vector of ones. In actuality, the only solution that Lemke’s method
can possibly find is
(
1 0 0 1.5
)
(a general result related to this observation is given
by Proposition 3.4). The following 2 tableaux detail the first pivot in Lemke’s algorithm
with the blocking variables in bold italics.
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1 z0 x1 x2 λ
s
1 λ
s
2
w1 -1 1 1 0.5 1 0
w2 -2 1 0.5 1 0 1
s1 1 1 -1 -1 0 0
s2 1 1 -1 -1 0 0
−→
1 w2 x1 x2 λ
s
1 λ
s
2
w1 1 1 0.5 -0.5 1 -1
z0 2 1 -0.5 -1 0 -1
s1 3 1 -1.5 -2 0 -1
s2 3 1 -1.5 -2 0 -1
Note the identical shared constraint rows in these 2 tableaux. Due to these repeating rows,
Lemke’s method does not have a unique blocking variable in the second tableau. If s2 is
made nonbasic, pivots of 〈s2, x2〉, 〈w1, λs2〉, 〈z0, x1〉 terminate at the specified solution. If
instead Lemke’s method makes s1 nonbasic, pivots of 〈s1, x2〉, 〈Unblocked, λs1〉 lead to ray
termination and the method fails. This blocking variable issue is not unique to this example
and may occur whenever Lemke’s method is employed to solve an AGNEP without taking
special care of the Lagrange multipliers of the shared constraints.
If the variational equilibrium formulation of this game is considered (i.e., the case where
λs1 = λ
s
2 is enforced), the LCP(q,M) is defined by
q =

−1
−2
1
 and M =

1 0.5 1
0.5 1 1
−1 −1 0
 .
Lemke’s method will successfully solve the latter problem with any positive covering vector
and obtain the solution
(
0 1 1
)
, or equivalently
(
0 1 1 1
)
. 
In what follows, an important property of the solutions of LCP(q,M) obtained by Lemke’s
method for M given by (3.3) is established. This result shows that Lemke’s method
computes generalized Nash equilibria only of a special kind characterized by a distinguished
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property of the multipliers of the shared constraints. The semimonotonicity of J0 is not
needed for the result; the only requirement is the structure of M .
Proposition 3.4. Let the vector q and matrix M be given by (3.2) and (3.3), respectively.
If Lemke’s method finds a solution of the LCP(q,M), then for each shared constraint
` = 1, · · · ,ms, there exists in that solution at most one i ∈ {1, · · · ,F} such that λsi` > 0.
Proof. The covering vector d in partitioned form can be expressed as
d ,

dx ,

dx1
...
dxF

dp ,

dp1
...
dpF

ds ,

ds
...
ds


in the same way that the variable z is partitioned into (x,λp,λs). Note that the subvector
d s is taken to be
ds ,

ds
...
ds

for some positive vector ds ∈ Rms . More generally, each ds can be replaced by a player-
specific positive vector dsi ∈ Rms and the result still holds. With the covering vector as
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specified, consider the operation of Lemke’s method and focus on the iteration where λsi`
is the first λs-variable to become basic. Define the set I ′ , {1, 2, · · · , i− 1, i+ 1, · · · ,F}.
After the pivot of λsi` into the basis (recall that the complement si` of λ
s
i` is nonbasic),
si ′` = si` = 0 for all i
′ ∈ I ′. In order for the variable λsi ′` with i ′ ∈ I ′ to become
basic, its complement si ′` has to first leave the basis. This cannot happen unless si` is
brought back into the basis, which implies that λsi` would have to become nonbasic before
λsi ′` becomes basic. Therefore, never in the pivot process will there be two multipliers λ
s
i`
and λsi ′` with i 6= i ′ corresponding to the same shared constraint
 F∑
j= 1
Ajxj ≥ b

`
both
being basic variables. 
With the multiplier result of Proposition 3.4, the first Lemke’s method termination result
for an AGNEP can be developed. First, note that the ray termination condition (3.6) for
Lemke’s method applied to the game G is defined by the following:
• for all τ ≥ 0 and i = 1, · · · ,F ,
0 ≤ x∗i + x˜iτ ⊥ wx,∗i + w˜xi τ , hi +
F∑
j= 1
Hij(x
∗
j + x˜jτ) + d
x
i (z
∗
0 + z˜0τ)
−BTi (λp,∗i + λ˜pi τ)−ATi (λs,∗i + λ˜si τ) ≥ 0
0 ≤ λp,∗i + λ˜pi τ ⊥ wp,∗i + w˜pi τ , −ri + dpi (z∗0 + z˜0τ) +Bi(x∗i + x˜iτ) ≥ 0
0 ≤ λs,∗i + λ˜si τ ⊥ s∗i + s˜iτ , −b+ ds(z∗0 + z˜0τ) +
F∑
j= 1
Aj(x
∗
j + x˜jτ) ≥ 0.
(3.10)
When ray termination occurs, the scalar z˜0 = 0 when M is semimonotone by Proposi-
tion 3.1(b). In this case, one of the three vectors x˜, λ˜
p
,and λ˜
s
must not be zero. Thus, for
some player i, one of 3 possibilities must occur after a suitable normalization:
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(a) x˜ik = 1 for some k ∈ {1, · · · , ni};
(b) λ˜pi` = 1 for some ` ∈ {1, · · · ,mi};
(c) λ˜ si` = 1 for some ` ∈ {1, · · · ,ms}.
We refer to these 3 cases, respectively, as ray termination: on a primal x-variable, on a
private λp-variable, or on a shared λs-variable. The proof of Proposition 3.4 applies also
to the case when Lemke’s method terminates in the third case. More precisely, if ray
termination occurs when the (shared) multiplier λsi` is brought into the basis, then all the
other λsi ′` for i
′ 6= i corresponding to the same `th shared constraint are nonbasic variables.
This observation motivates a modification of Lemke’s method that may be considered a
degeneracy resolution technique for ties in the minimum ratio test arising from a shared
constraint among the players. It turns out that under suitable conditions, this modification
will compute a kind of NE introduced in the next section.
The following result identifies a sufficient condition under which ray termination on a
primal x-variable can easily be ruled out.
Proposition 3.5. Let the vector q and matrix M be given by (3.2) and (3.3), respectively.
Assume that M ∈ E0, the principal submatrix J0 given by (3.7) is R0, and condition (a) of
Proposition 3.3 holds. Applied to the LCP(q,M), Lemke’s method cannot ray terminate
on a primal x-variable.
Proof. The semimonotonicity of M implies that z˜0 = 0. If the algorithm ray terminates
on a primal x-variable, then x˜ 6= 0. By condition (a) of Proposition 3.3, it follows that
λ˜
s
= 0. Thus, the LCP(0, J0) has a nonzero solution, a contradiction of J0 ∈ R0. 
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3.4 Partial variational equilibria
By definition, a normalized NE in the sense of Rosen [197] is a solution to the LCP(q,M)
for which there exists a positive vector e ∈ RF and a nonnegative vector η ∈ Rms such
that λsi` =
η`
ei
for all i = 1, · · · ,F and ` = 1, · · · ,ms. In terms of the multipliers of the
shared constraints, the NE computable by Lemke’s method and Rosen’s normalized NE are
at two extremes in the following sense: for the former equilibrium, corresponding to every
shared constraint `, if a player has a positive multiplier, then all other players must have
zero multipliers (see Proposition 3.4); in contrast, for the latter equilibrium, if a player
has a positive multiplier, then all players must have positive multipliers. It turns out this
spectrum of equilibria with distinct properties of the multipliers of the shared constraints
can be partially filled with the introduction of coalitional multipliers. Specifically, let
α ⊆ {1, · · · ,ms} be a nonempty index subset of the shared constraints and let α¯ be its
complement. Now consider the LCP
(
q̂, M̂
)
where M̂ is given by

H11 . . . H1F −BT1 −(AT1 )•α −(AT1 )•α¯
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
. . .
HF1 . . . HFF −BTF −(ATF )•α −(ATF )•α¯
B1
. . .
BF
(A1 )α• . . . (AF )α•
(A1 )α¯• . . . (AF )α¯•
... · · · ...
(A1 )α¯• . . . (AF )α¯•

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and
q̂ ,

h
r
−bα
−bα¯
...
−bα¯

.
This LCP, whose solutions are hereafter called partial variational equilibria, is obtained by
setting, for each ` ∈ α, λsi` = λs` for all i = 1, · · · ,F . As an abbreviation, a partial varia-
tional equilibrium is also called a partial VE. An economic interpretation of the multipliers
of a partial VE can be given in terms of a price mechanism for an affine generalized Nash
game with affine side constraints (refer to Section 2.6). Specifically, consider a modified
game wherein player i, taking the rival players’ strategy tuple x−i and a price vector pα as
parameters, solves the following quadratic program:
minimize
xi
fi(xi, x−i)− pTα
 F∑
j= 1
Ajxj − b

α
subject to xi ∈ Kα¯i (x−i) ,
xi ∈ Rni+ | Bixi ≥ ri,
 F∑
j= 1
Ajxj ≥ b

α¯
 ;
the description of this game is completed by imposing the market clearing condition that
is stated here in terms of a complementarity relation between the price vector pα and the
shared constraints indexed by α:
0 ≤ pα ⊥
 F∑
j= 1
Ajxj − b

α
≥ 0,
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or equivalently as a trivial price-minimization problem:
minimize
pα≥ 0
pTα
 F∑
j= 1
Ajxj − b

α
.
The Lemke-type NE and the VE can be obtained by letting α to be the empty set and the
full set {1, · · · ,ms}, respectively.
Appearing as early as the renowned general economic equilibrium model of [7], non-
cooperative Nash games with side conditions and associated price mechanisms are quite
pervasive in applications; [182] presents a general theory of such a game, albeit without
the shared constraints but allowing the players’ optimization problems to be nonconvex.
The lack of explicit bounds on the price vector pα is a source of difficulty for treating this
problem as was discussed in Chapter 2. Supported by the theory herein, the LCP
(
q̂, M̂
)
formulation provides a constructive approach for dealing with the affine case.
The partial VE concept divides the shared constraints into 2 groups: each constraint in one
group (indexed by α) has common multipliers across all players, while the constraints in the
other group (indexed by α¯) have no such restriction. A refinement of this concept, which
is here called a coalitional equilibrium, is possible in which each shared constraint ` =
1, · · · ,ms is associated with a partition of the player set {1, · · · ,F} into γ` coalitions (i.e.,
subsets), say C`k for k = 1, · · · , γ`, such that C`k∩C`k′ = ∅ for k 6= k′,
γ⋃`
k= 1
C`k = {1, · · · ,F},
and λsi` = λ
s
j` for all i, j ∈ C`k. Hence, a player is allowed to belong to different coalitions
with respect to individual shared constraints. The partial VE is a special kind of coalitional
equilibrium with the specifications: (a) for all ` ∈ α, γ` = 1 and C`1 = {1, · · · ,F}, and
(b) for all ` ∈ α¯, γ` = F and C`i = {i} for all i = 1, · · · , γ`. An LCP formulation for
a coalitional equilibrium can be derived to which the modified Lemke method and the
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regularization technique can be applied. The details are omitted.
3.5 A modified Lemke’s method for partial VE
In this section, a modification of Lemke’s method is developed for solving the AGNEP
G. This modified algorithm, if successful, will compute a partial VE of the game. Suffi-
cient conditions for successful termination will be presented subsequently. Throughout the
method, it is assumed that degeneracy (i.e., ties in blocking variables) only occurs with
respect to s-variables.
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Modified Lemke’s method.
Step 0: Implement Lemke’s method until either (a) termination occurs, or (b) s•` be-
comes blocking for some `.
• For (a), stop and declare solution or ray termination as appropriate;
• For (b), proceed to Step 1.
Step 1: Call ` a distinguished shared constraint. Set Tableau` ← Current Lemke tableau,
i` ← 1, and I` ← {1}. Pivot with s1` as the blocking variable.
Step 2: Continue Lemke’s method until either (a) termination occurs, or (b) s•` ′ becomes
blocking for some ` ′ 6= `.
• For (a), proceed to Step 3;
• For (b), return to Step 1 with index ` ′.
Step 3: If a solution was obtained, stop. Otherwise,
• If ray termination occurred after aggregation to s` and λs` (see third bullet), return
to Step 3 for the previous distinguished shared constraint.
• If ray termination occurred and I` 6= {1, · · · ,F}, set i` ← i`+ 1 and I` ← I`∪{i`}.
Pivot with si`` as the blocking variable in Tableau`. Return to Step 2.
• If ray termination occurred and I` = {1, · · · ,F}, perform the following operations
on Tableau`:
1. Delete all but one row corresponding to shared constraint ` and relabel the
slack of that constraint s`;
2. Combine all λs•`-variables into a single multiplier labeled λ
s
` , called an aggre-
gated shared constraint multiplier;
3. Recalculate the λs` column of the new tableau and call s` aggregated;
4. Pivot with s` as the blocking variable;
5. Return to Step 2.
Several remarks on the modified Lemke’s method are in order.
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First, as a result of the aggregation in Step 3, ray termination will not occur on a non-
aggregated shared constraint slack variable s or on a non-aggregated multiplier. Indeed,
for a secondary ray to occur on a variable leading to termination, that variable must be
nonbasic. Therefore, if a secondary ray occurs on a non-aggregated shared constraint slack
variable si` ′ , then si` ′ is nonbasic; moreover, either `
′ itself is the distinguished shared
constraint in Step 1 or ` ′ occurs in the sequence of pivots stemming from some current
distinguished Tableau` with ` 6= ` ′. Either way, the method will not terminate on si` ′
because either Step 3 will pick an alternate slack variable of the distinguished shared
constraint as the blocking variable or an aggregation of the distinguished shared constraint
will take place. A similar argument applies if a secondary ray is encountered on a non-
aggregated shared constraint multiplier λsi` ′ . Second, if a solution is found only after Step
3 aggregation is employed for some shared constraint `, the solution must be a partial
VE of the AGNEP G as defined in Section 3.4. Third, it is possible for multiple pivots
to take place prior to a return to Tableau`. While this is a waste of effort, there is no
mechanism to take advantage of the work done in these pivots. However, one benefit of
seeking an alternate blocking variable is that it provides a way for the method to take an
alternate pivot path, thus avoiding immediate ray termination. Fourth, when a return to
Tableau` takes place, say with the slack si` replaced by si ′` as the blocking variable, it
suffices to exchange the two indices i and i ′ in the post-pivot tableau after si` was the
blocking variable. Finally, the choice of a suitable alternative multiplier λsi ′` in Step 3
has not been specified; depending on further problem structure, judicious choices of such
driving variable could be made that involve several “look-ahead calculations”. Details of
refinements like this are omitted.
The ray termination condition of the modified method after the shared constraints α ⊆
{1, · · · ,ms} are aggregated can be expressed as follows:
93
• for all τ ≥ 0 and i = 1, · · · ,F ,
0 ≤ x∗i + x˜iτ ⊥ wx,∗i + w˜xi τ , hi +
F∑
j= 1
Hij(x
∗
j + x˜jτ) + d
x
i (z
∗
0 + z˜0τ)
−BTi (λp,∗i + λ˜pi τ)−
(
ATi
)
•α (λ
s,∗
α + λ˜sατ)−
(
ATi
)
•α¯ (λ
s,∗
i + λ˜
s
i τ)α¯ ≥ 0
0 ≤ λp,∗i + λ˜pi τ ⊥ wp,∗i + w˜pi τ , −ri + dpi (z∗0 + z˜0τ) +Bi(x∗i + x˜iτ) ≥ 0
0 ≤ λs,∗α + λ˜sατ ⊥ s∗α + s˜ατ ,
−b+ ds(z∗0 + z˜0τ) + F∑
j= 1
Aj(x
∗
j + x˜jτ)

α
≥ 0
0 ≤ λs,∗i + λ˜si τ ⊥ s∗i + s˜iτ , −b+ ds(z∗0 + z˜0τ) + F∑
j= 1
Aj(x
∗
j + x˜jτ) ≥ 0

α¯
.
(3.11)
When ray termination occurs, the scalar z˜0 = 0 when M is semimonotone; moreover, one
of the three vectors x˜, λ˜
p
, and λ˜
s
α must not be zero. Furthermore, under the assumptions
therein, the proof of Proposition 3.5 yields x˜ = 0. In what follows, sufficient conditions
are provided for ruling out the two remaining ray termination cases
(
λ˜
p 6= 0 or λ˜sα 6= 0
)
,
thus ensuring that the modified Lemke’s method will successfully compute a solution of
the AGNEP G.
Theorem 3.2. Let the vector q and matrix M be given by (3.2) and (3.3), respectively.
Assume that M ∈ E0, the principal submatrix J0 given by (3.7) is R0, and condition (a)
of Proposition 3.3 holds. The modified Lemke algorithm as described above will compute
a solution of the AGNEP G under either one of the following two conditions:
(A) condition (b) of Proposition 3.3 holds;
(B) the matrix A, the vector b, and the vectors {ri}Fi= 1 are all nonpositive.
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Proof. Assume that ray termination occurs on a private λpi -multiplier in (3.11). Without
loss of generality, assume that λ˜pi ′` ′ = 1 for some pair (i
′, ` ′). As noted above, x˜ = 0.
Therefore,
0 ≤ x∗i ′ ⊥ −BTi ′ λ˜pi ′ −
(
ATi ′
)
•α λ˜
s
α −
(
ATi ′
)
•α¯
(
λ˜si ′
)
α¯
≥ 0.
If condition (A) holds, then
(
ATi ′
)
•α λ˜
s
α+
(
ATi ′
)
•α¯
(
λ˜si ′
)
α¯
= 0, implying that the LCP(0, J0)
has a nonzero solution, which is a contradiction. If (B) holds, it follows that
(
λ˜pi ′
)T
Bi ′x
∗
i ′ = −
(
λ˜sα
)T
(Ai ′x
∗
i ′)α −
(
λ˜si ′
)T
α¯
(Ai ′x
∗
i ′)α¯ ≥ 0.
Hence,
0 =
(
λ˜pi ′
)T [−ri ′ + dpi ′z∗0 +Bi ′x∗i ′] ≥ mi ′∑
`= 1
(
λ˜pi ′`
)T [−ri ′ + dpi ′z∗0]` ≥ −ri ′` ′+dpi ′` ′z∗0 > 0,
which is a contradiction. Thus λ˜
p
= 0.
Assume that ray termination occurs on an aggregated shared constraint multiplier λs` ′ for
some ` ′ ∈ α. Without loss of generality, assume that λ˜s` ′ = 1. By complementarity,−b+ dsz∗0 + F∑
j= 1
Ajx
∗
j

` ′
= 0.
Since −b` ′+ds` ′z∗0 is necessarily positive, there must exist a pair (i0, k0) such that x∗i0k0 > 0
and (Ai0)` ′k0 < 0 by the nonpositivity of A. Taking into account λ˜
p
= 0, x˜ = 0, and
z˜0 = 0, F∑
j= 1
Hi0j x˜j + d
x
i0 z˜0 −BTi0 λ˜pi0 −
(
ATi0
)
•α λ˜
s
α −
(
ATi0
)
•α¯ (λ˜
s
i0)α¯

k0
≥ − (Ai0)` ′k0 > 0,
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contradicting x∗i0k0 > 0. 
Remark 3.2. There is no restriction on the matrices Bi, i = 1, · · · ,F , in the players’
private constraints for condition (B) of the above theorem. Notice that the requirement
that the vector b and the vectors {ri}Fi= 1 are all nonpositive imply that x = 0 is feasible to
all players’ problems. This requirement is consistent with the theory of generalized Nash
equilibrium problems which invariably requires the existence of a reference vector satisfying
certain conditions that is denoted xref in [76, Theorem 1] and served by the zero vector in
the present context. 
Remark 3.3. The assumption that J0 ∈ R0 is somewhat restrictive when players have
private constraints. However, it can be relaxed at the expense of more notation; in-
deed, the only purpose of the assumption is to guarantee that the LCP(q ′, J0) can be
solved by Lemke’s method where q ′ ,
(
h r
)
. In this light, the utilization of the R0
property guarantees that the augmented LCP(q ′ + d ′z0, J0) has no solution rays where
d′ ,
(
dx dp
)
. This assumption makes the Lemke’s method termination statement of
Proposition 3.1(b) applicable. Any other condition that guarantees the successful termi-
nation of Lemke’s method at a solution for LCP(q ′, J0) may be employed in Theorem 3.2
for the same result. 
Remark 3.4. The above modification of Lemke’s method admits several variations. For
instance, two or more multipliers of a shared constraint ` can be grouped if they all lead
to ray termination; such grouping does not need to wait until all the multipliers of shared
constraint ` are tested as described above. Such a refinement of the method, if successful,
allows for the computation of more general coalitional equilibria. 
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3.6 Alternate generalized Nash equilibria via reformulations
Proposition 3.4 and the partial variational equilibria that can be identified by the modified
Lemke’s method provided in Section 3.5 obviously do not cover all potential types of
equilibria that may arise for AGNEP G. Therefore, a different LCP is provided here
with solutions that are distinct from those obtained by the original or modified Lemke’s
method. This reformulation is based on the observation that instead of repeating the
shared constraint
F∑
j= 1
Ajxj ≥ b a total of F times in the LCP(q,M) formulation, one copy
of the constraint can to be kept (say player 1’s copy without loss of generality) and the
complementarity conditions
0 ≤ λsi ⊥
F∑
j= 1
Ajxj − b ≥ 0, i = 2, · · · ,F (3.12)
can be replaced by
0 ≤ λsi ⊥ 1msβ −Dsiλs1 ≥ 0, i = 2, · · · ,F , (3.13)
where 1ms is the ms-vector of ones, β ≥ 0 is a nonnegative parameter, and Dsi is a positive
diagonal matrix of order ms with diagonal entries denoted D
s
i` for ` = 1, · · · ,ms. Under
the condition that
0 ≤ λs1 ⊥
F∑
j= 1
Ajxj − b ≥ 0, (3.14)
it can be seen that if the right-hand side of (3.13) holds with equality for index ` and some
β > 0 at a solution, then the right-hand side of (3.12) holds with equality for index `.
Hence, conditions (3.13) for β > 0 and (3.14) together imply (3.12) for AGNEP solutions.
The case β = 0 is addressed below.
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Note that the constraint (3.13) upper bounds the multipliers λs1 during Lemke’s method
pivoting when z0 is bounded. In the parametric algorithm described below, such a con-
straint helps prevent ray termination on the λs1`-variable. Moreover, when a component
inequality becomes binding (i.e., when λs1` reaches the upper bound (β + d
s
`z0)/D
s
j` for
some j ∈ {1, · · · ,F}), player j’s multiplier λsj` could become basic, thereby resulting in
more than one multiplier corresponding to the same shared constraint being basic. Recall
from Proposition 3.4 that this is impossible for Lemke’s method with the original problem
formulation.
To describe the parametric procedure, consider applying Lemke’s method to the LCP(qrf ,Mrf),
which is expressed in tableau form with a covering vector added as
1 z0 x1 . . . xF λ
p
1 . . . λ
p
F λ
s
1 . . . λ
s
F
w1 h1 d
x
1 H11 . . . H1F −BT1 −AT1
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
. . .
wF hF dxF HF1 . . . HFF −BTF −ATF
wp1 −r1 dp1 B1
...
...
...
. . .
wpF −rF dpF BF
s1 −b ds A1 . . . AF
ŝ2 1msβ d
s −Ds2
...
...
...
...
ŝF 1msβ ds −DsF
In what follows, β is allowed to be zero. Note that the first shared multiplier λs that would
become basic is one of the λs1`-variables. Furthermore, a λ
s
i` variable is basic for some i ≥ 2
98
only if λs1` is already basic. Thus, when z0 reaches 0, the right-hand side of (3.14) must
hold with equality whenever a λsi` is basic for all β ≥ 0. Therefore, it is evident that all
solutions to the LCP(qrf ,Mrf) obtained by Lemke’s method are solutions to the original
LCP(q,M).
In executing Lemke’s method, treat β as a parameter. Additionally, define
q ,

h
r
−b
0
...
0

and p ,

0
0
0
1ms
...
1ms

.
For extending Lemke’s method to this β-parametrized problem, consider the parametric
LCP with primary variable z, artificial variable z0, covering vector d > 0, and the param-
eter β ≥ 0,
0 ≤ z ⊥ w , q + pβ + dz0 +Mz ≥ 0.
While serving as a parameter, the role of β here is to guide the Lemke pivots toward a
solution of the problem by driving the artificial variable z0 to zero; thus, termination of
Lemke’s method at a solution for LCP(q + pβ,M) for any value of β ≥ 0 is satisfactory.
When the method terminates successfully, it will typically end with a solution of the
LCP(q + pβ,M) for an interval of β values. Therefore, multiple GNE of the AGNEP G
can be obtained by evaluating the solution form for specific β values in the given interval.
Unlike the Lemke’s method scheme in parametric form described in [47, Algorithm 4.5.4] or
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the parametric principle pivoting method described in [47, Algorithm 4.5.2], the parametric
version of Lemke’s method described herein works as follows. Consider the initial tableau
and that at the beginning of a general pivot:
1 z0 z
w q + pβ d M
−→
Basic variables 1 Nonbasic variables (z¯)
w¯ q¯ + p¯β M
Initial tableau: β ∈ [ 0,∞)
General tableau: β ∈ [β, β ]
w¯ contains z0; q¯ + p¯β ≥ 0
Assume that z¯k is the driving nonbasic variable in the current iteration. The following
ratio test is performed:
θ(β) , min
j
{
q¯j + p¯jβ
−M jk
| M jk < 0
}
, β ∈ [β, β ] .
If M•k ≥ 0, then ray termination occurs. Otherwise, there is a partition
[
β, β
]
=
L⋃
`= 1
I`
into non-overlapping [except at endpoints] subintervals within each of which, say the `th
one, an index j` exists with M j`k < 0 such that for all β ∈ I`,
θ(β) =
q¯j` + p¯j`β
−M j`k
.
Such an index j` determines the blocking basic variable. The pivots continue until z0 leaves
the basis or ray termination occurs. In the former case, a range of values of β is obtained
for each of which a solution to the LCP(q + pβ,M) is readily obtained. In order to derive
alternative pivot sequences, each of the subintervals I` could be examined, which could
generate further subdivision of the β range. This parametric method is best illustrated
100
through an application to the simple 2-player Example 5.
Example 6. (Continuation of Example 5) The initial tableau is given by
1 z0 x1 x2 λ
s
1 λ
s
2
w1 -1 1 1 0.5 1 0
w2 -2 1 0.5 1 0 1
s1 1 1 -1 -1 0 0
s2 β 1 0 0 -1 0
After the initial pivot of 〈w2, z0〉, x2 is driving while s1 is blocking. Recall that both s1
and s2 were blocking at this point before the reformulation. After pivoting 〈s1, x2〉, λs1 is
driving in the following tableau and s2 is the only possible blocking variable with an upper
bound for β equal to ∞.
1 w2 x1 s1 λ
s
1 λ
s
2
w1 0.25 0.75 0.875 0.25 1 -0.75
z0 0.5 0.5 0.25 0.5 0 -0.5
x2 1.5 0.5 -0.75 -0.5 0 -0.5
s2 0.5 + β 0.5 0.25 0.5 -1 -0.5
If not for the constraint reformulation, Lemke’s method would have ray terminated at this
point After pivoting 〈s2, λs1〉, the driving variable is λs2 in the next tableau.
1 w2 x1 s1 s2 λ
s
2
w1 0.75 + β 1.25 1.125 0.75 -1 -1.25
z0 0.5 0.5 0.25 0.5 0 -0.5
x2 1.5 0.5 -0.75 -0.5 0 -0.5
λs1 0.5 + β 0.5 0.25 0.5 -1 -0.5
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In this tableau, the β value affects the blocking variable. There are 4 ratios to be considered
by the minimum ratio test:
min{ 0.6 + 0.8β, 1, 3, 1 + 2β } =

0.6 + 0.8β if β ∈ [ 0, 0.5 ],
1 if β ∈ [ 0.5,∞).
Therefore, two β subintervals are created ([ 0, 0.5 ] and [ 0.5,∞)) whose common end point
leads to a tie minimum ratio. For β in the subinterval [ 0.5,∞), z0 is the next blocking
variable which leads to a solution of the form
(
0 1 β 1
)
. For β in the subinterval
[ 0, 0.5 ], the next tableau is
1 w2 x1 s1 s2 w1
λs2 0.6 + 0.8β 1 0.9 0.6 -0.8 -0.8
z0 0.2− 0.4β 0 -0.2 0.2 0.4 0.4
x2 1.2− 0.4β 0 -1.2 -0.8 0.4 0.4
λs1 0.2 + 0.6β 0 -0.2 0.2 -0.6 0.4
Because x1 is the driving variable, the minimum ratio test is min
{
1− 2β, 1− β3 , 1 + 3β
}
.
It should be obvious that every β ∈ [ 0, 0.5 ] results in the same minimum ratio of 1− 2β.
Therefore, no new β subintervals are generated and z0 must be the blocking variable.
The solution obtained is of the form
(
1− 2β 2β β 1.5− β
)
for β ∈ [ 0, 0.5 ]. This
solution has both multipliers λ1 and λ2 basic but not equal in value; in particular, at
β = 0, λ1 = 0 so the solution is degenerate. At β = 0.5, this solution coincides with the
one from β ∈ [ 0.5,∞) as expected. 
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3.7 Regularization and generalized Nash equilibria
While it may be possible to design alternative ways to resolve ray termination of Lemke’s
method when solving the AGNEP G, this topic will not be discussed further. Instead, a
brief study of how Lemke’s method can be used to obtain normalized Nash equilibrium in
the sense of Rosen [197] will be presented. Recall that a normalized Nash equilibrium is a
solution to the LCP(q,M) for which there exist a positive vector e ∈ RF and a nonnegative
vector η ∈ Rms such that λsi` =
η`
ei
for all i = 1, · · · ,F and ` = 1, · · · ,ms. In principle,
if the vector e is known, it is not difficult to show that such a normalized equilibrium
corresponds to a solution of the LCP
(
q̂ e, M̂ e
)
with
q̂ e ,

e1h1
...
eFhF
−r1
...
−rF
−b

and M̂ e ,

e1H11 . . . e1H1F −BT1 −AT1
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
eFHF1 . . . eFHFF −BTF −ATF
B1
. . .
BF
A1 . . . AF

.
It is worth emphasizing that when e is a vector of ones, then the reduced problem can be
solved to obtain a variational equilibrium. However, when e does not satisfy this property,
then a drawback of the matrix M̂ e is that certain desirable properties of the leading
principal submatrix H0 (e.g., copositivity or positive semidefiniteness) could be destroyed
by the scalings. [To be fair, it should also be noted that an appropriate scaling could
uncover missing desirable properties of H0, but exploring this possibility is outside the
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scope of this research.] Thus, a natural question arises as to whether normalized NE
can be computed by Lemke’s method without relying on the conversion to the scaled
LCP(q̂ e, M̂ e).
Via a limiting argument, the answer is affirmative. This conclusion is based on the dis-
covery of a basic connection between a normalized Nash equilibrium and the well-known
regularization idea applied to the LCP(q,M). More generally, such regularization produces
GNE that are characterized by a sign-consistency property across the multipliers of the
shared constraints; namely, if a player has a positive multiplier corresponding to a certain
shared constraint, then all the rival players also have positive multipliers corresponding
to the same (shared) constraint. Such tuples of multipliers λs can be formally defined as
follows. For any ms positive matrices Es` ,
[
e`ij
]F
i, j= 1
∈ RF×F satisfying e`ije`ji = 1 for
all i and j, let Λ(Es) be defined as follows:
Λ(Es) ,
{
λs | λsi` = e`ijλsj` for all ` = 1, · · · ,ms and i, j = 1, · · · ,F
}
.
Rosen’s normalized Nash equilibria correspond to the case where each matrix Es` is the same
with entries given by e`ij = ej/ei for a positive vector e ∈ RF . A variational equilibrium is
a special kind of normalized NE where e is the vector of ones. From this perspective, we
see that Rosen’s normalized NE and the VE are indeed quite special in that Es` is identical
for every ` = 1, · · · ,ms.
To see how GNE with multipliers of the shared constraints belonging to the set Λ(Es)
can be computed as solutions of LCPs, define the following matrix obtained by adding
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diminishingly small positive scalars to the diagonal entries of M given by (3.3):
Mν ,

H11 + E
ν;x
1 . . . H1F −BT1 −AT1
...
. . .
...
. . .
. . .
HF1 . . . HFF + E
ν;x
F −BTF −ATF
B1 E
ν;p
1
. . .
. . .
BF E
ν;p
F
A1 · · · AF Eν;s1
... · · · ... . . .
A1 · · · AF Eν;sF

, (3.15)
where each Eν;x,p,si is a positive diagonal matrix with lim
ν↓0
Eν;x,p,si = 0. The following
proposition describes several properties of the LCP(q,Mν).
Proposition 3.6. Let Mν be given by (3.15) where each E
ν;x,p,s
i is as given above. The
following statements hold.
(a) If M ∈ E0, then Mν is strictly semimonotone; thus, SOL(q,Mν) 6= ∅ for every q.
(b) If M ∈ R0, then
lim sup
ν↓0
{‖zν‖ | zν ∈ SOL(q,Mν)} < ∞.
(c) Assume that positive matrices Es` ,
[
e`ij
]F
i, j= 1
with entries satisfying e`ije
`
ji = 1 for
all (i, j) exist such that for all ` = 1, · · · ,ms and i, j = 1, · · · ,F ,
lim
ν(∈κ)↓0
(Eν;sj )``
(Eν;si )``
= e`ij .
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If ẑ = lim
ν(∈κ)↓0
zν , where zν ∈ SOL(q,Mν) for every ν ∈ κ, then ẑ ,
(
x̂, λ̂
p
, λ̂
s
)
is a
solution of the LCP(q,M) with λ̂
s ∈ Λ(Es).
Proof. Part (a) is obvious. Part (b) follows from a standard normalization/limiting
argument. To prove part (c), let zν ∈ SOL(q,Mν). Assume that λν,si ′` ′ > 0 for some pair
(i ′, ` ′). It then holds, for any j = 1, · · · ,F ,
( F∑
i= 1
Aix
ν
i
)
` ′
+ (Eν;si ′ )` ′` ′λ
ν,s
i ′` ′ = b` ′ ≤
( F∑
i= 1
Aix
ν
i
)
` ′
+ (Eν;sj )` ′` ′λ
ν,s
j` ′ , (3.16)
which implies (Eν;sj )` ′` ′λ
ν,s
j` ′ ≥ (Eν;si ′ )` ′` ′λν,si ′` ′ > 0. Therefore, equality holds in (3.16) and,
as a result, (Eν;sj )` ′` ′λ
ν,s
j` ′ = (E
ν;s
i ′ )` ′` ′λ
ν,s
i ′` ′ . Passing to the limit easily yields the desired
conclusion that
λ̂
s ∈ Λ(Es). 
3.8 Some applications
In Section 3.5, a modification of Lemke’s method was presented with sufficient conditions
for successful method termination; it is natural to question how restrictive these require-
ments are in pratice. In Sections 3.8.1, 3.8.2 and 3.8.3, models of strategic games in
environmental pollution, communication networks, and power markets are presented to
demonstrate that these assumptions are indeed satisfied in realistic applications.
3.8.1 Environmental pollution games
Traditionally, environmental and resource economics focuses on the utilization of renew-
able resources (e.g., fisheries, forests) and exhaustible resources (e.g., minerals, coal, oil,
natural gas) as well as public environmental goods (e.g., water, soil, air). Both extrac-
tion and utilization of natural resources, particularly exhaustible ones, lead to pollution
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while abatement comes at a cost; in economics, pollution is often categorized as a negative
externality and represents a cost imposed on society that remains uncompensated by the
firms responsible. Naturally, several ideas have been proposed to economically value the
societal cost of pollution so that the externality can be internalized by the market. Here,
the design of “Pigouvian” taxes is considered. Such taxes, in theory, represent a penalty
imposed on the firm that is identical in value to the resulting externality.
One instance of such a game [100] considers a river with contaminated eﬄuent inputs from
diverse sources that subsequently mix and lead to increased pollution levels downstream.
For example, these sources could be a set of pulp mills competing in a spatially distributed
oligopoly. Assume that there are F players, each indexed by i where i ∈ {1, · · · ,F},
and that there are Θ production technologies, each indexed by θ ∈ {1, · · · ,Θ}. Given a
technology θ, player i’s production decisions are denoted by (xiθ)
Θ
θ= 1. The player is charged
a unit cost of ciθ ≥ 0 for production decision xiθ that is bounded from above by a capacity
xiθ. Additionally, processing requirements are imposed on the production decisions and are
modeled by the constraint Bixi ≥ ri for all i, where the vector ri is nonpositive. Letting ρθ
denote the unit contribution of output of technology θ, the resulting output of firm i can be
expressed as Xi ,
Θ∑
θ= 1
ρθxiθ. The aggregated emission impacts are given by the expression
Θ∑
θ= 1
Uθxiθ, where Uθ denotes the per unit emission rate associated with technology θ. A
scalar conversion factor β is employed to represent the total emission level as a cost in
the player’s objective functions (i.e., the cost of purchasing the required emission permits).
The commodity price is prescribed by the following equation:
p(X) = a− bX, where X ,
F∑
i= 1
Xi
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and scalars a, b > 0. Firm i solves the optimization problem
maximize
xi
(
p(X)Xi −
Θ∑
θ= 1
ciθxiθ
)
− β
Θ∑
θ= 1
Uθxiθ
subject to 0 ≤ xiθ ≤ xiθ, θ = 1, · · · ,Θ
Bixi ≥ ri
α0`q0 +
F∑
j= 1
αj`
Θ∑
θ= 1
eθxjθ ≤ qmax,`, ` = 1, · · · , L,
where the final shared constraints stipulate the regulatory authority’s restrictions on pol-
lution levels at L locations: α0`, · · · , αF` are exponential (and thus positive) pollution
decays, q0 denotes the background pollution quantities, and qmax,` denotes the maximum
concentration of pollutants allowable at locations ` = 1, · · · , L. Assuming that the shared
constraints are consistent, it can be deduced that the constants
{
qmax,` − α0`q0
}L
`= 1
are
all nonnegative. It is easy to see that the conditions of (B) in Theorem 3.2 are satisfied.
Condition (a) of Proposition 3.3 also holds. Therefore, if M is semimonotone and the LCP
without the shared constraints is solved by Lemke’s method (the alternative to J0 ∈ R0),
the modified Lemke’s method will successfully compute a generalized Nash equilibrium of
this game.
Notably, in [100], an open-loop dynamic game where players minimize their individual costs
over a finite horizon is considered with price-taking farmers. In the interest of brevity, only
a simpler static game was analyzed here so that the structure of the coupled constraints
could be studied. A related question at a macro-level is examined in [218] where strategic
behavior of countries was analyzed when international environmental regulations such as
the the Kyoto Protocol are in effect. A more detailed review of environmental games, both
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static and dynamic, is presented in [118].
3.8.2 Rate allocation in communication networks
Non-cooperative game-theoretic models have been utilized widely in analyzing strategic
behavior in wired and wireless communication networks, specifically with respect to ques-
tions of routing [174], bandwidth allocation [4], and optical networks [177, 186]. The setting
presented here is aligned with recent work [4, 240] where flow control, in the presence of
congestion, is considered in communication networks.
Consider a network of N nodes with K links connecting these nodes. Assume that there
are F players sharing this set of resources and that player i has an associated route Ri that
relates a unique source-destination pair and specifies a set of links. The routing matrix A
defines the set of routes and links and is defined as
Ak,i =

1 if route Ri uses link k,
0 otherwise.
The [shared] link capacity constraints are given by
F∑
i= 1
Ak,ixi ≤ bk for all k ∈ {1, · · · ,K}
where bk ∈ R+. Player i’s payoff function is given by his utility of transmission flow xi,
denoted by the function Ui(xi), less the cost arising from congestion given by fi(x). In [4],
the congestion cost is specified by
K∑
k= 1
Pi
 ∑
j | k∈Rj
xj
 where Pi(•) is an increasing convex
function in its argument. If the utility functions are quadratic and the congestion cost
metric is the same quadratic function for all players (denoted by f(x)), then the associated
mapping in the variational formulation of the game has a constant Jacobian matrix defined
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as
H0 =

−∇2x1U1(x1)
. . .
−∇2xFUF (xF )
+∇2f(x).
A shortcoming of this metric is that every player is charged the same amount, regardless of
utilization. A natural extension lies in charging users in accordance with their utilization;
in [240], a scaled congestion metric is considered which leads to a Jacobian matrix given
by
H0 =

−∇2x1U1(x1)
. . .
−∇2xFUF (xF )
+

∇2x1f1(x) · · · ∇2x1xF f1(x)
...
. . .
...
∇2xFx1fF (x) · · · ∇2xF fF (x)
 ,
a P matrix. In the resulting Nash equilibrium problem, player i solves the following
optimization problem:
minimize
xi
−Ui(xi) + fi(x)
subject to
F∑
i= 1
Ak,ixi ≤ bk for all k ∈ K
xi ≥ 0.
It is relatively easy to show that the resulting game, when employing a quadratic utility
and congestion metric, leads to an LCP that satisfies the requirements for applying the
modified Lemke’s method. The details are omitted.
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3.8.3 Strategic behavior in power markets
A key challenge facing deregulated electricity markets is strategic and possibly manipulative
behavior on the part of electricity generators and traders. Arguably, equilibrium models
represent a tractable avenue for accommodating the oligopolistic structure prevalent in
these markets and allow for the characterization and computation of equilibria. In this
subsection, a setting in which generating firms and the independent system operator (ISO)
compete in a Cournot game is examined. Refer to Chapter 4 for a much more complete
description and analysis of power market models.
Consider a collection of F generation firms where firm i may generate and sell power
at node ` (denoted by gi` and si`, respectively), where ` is in the set of network nodes
{1, · · · ,N}. Furthermore, the cost of generation associated with firm i and node ` is given
by a linear cost ci`gi`. The price of power at node ` is assumed to be an affine function of
aggregate sales, denoted by S`, and is defined as
p`(S`) , P 0` −
P0`
Q0`
S` for all ` = 1, · · · ,N
with P 0` and Q
0
` being positive constants. The cost of power transmission from an arbitrary
node (referred to as the hub) to node ` is given by w`. [From its usage, there should not
be any confusion between this w` and the w of LCP(q,M) (3.1).] While generators see
transmission prices as exogenous parameters, these prices are an outcome of the equilibrium
in the market as will be discussed shortly.
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The resulting problem faced by generator i may be stated as
maximize
gi, si
N∑
`= 1
[
p`(si`;S
∗
−i`)si` − ci`gi` − (si` − gi`)w∗`
]
subject to 0 ≤ gi` ≤ capi` for all ` = 1, · · · ,N
F∑
j= 1
sj` ≤ S` for all ` = 1, · · · ,N
N∑
`= 1
(si` − gi`) = 0
si` ≥ 0 for all ` = 1, · · · ,N ,
where S∗−i` ,
∑
i ′ 6= i
s∗i ′`, capi` is the generation capacity of firm i at node ` and S` is the
maximum allowable sales to node `. By noting that gi1 =
N∑
`= 1
si`−
N∑
`= 2
gi`, the firm problem
reduces to
maximize
gi, si
N∑
`= 1
[
p`(si`;S
∗
−i`)si` − (w∗` − w∗1)si`
]
+
N∑
`= 2
[
ci`gi` − (w∗` − w∗1)gi`
]
subject to 0 ≤
N∑
`= 1
si` −
N∑
`= 2
gi` ≤ capi1
0 ≤ gi` ≤ capi` for all ` = 2, · · · ,N
F∑
j= 1
sj` ≤ S` for all ` = 1, · · · ,N
si` ≥ 0 for all ` = 1, · · · ,N .
The independent system operator (ISO) decides the flows on the transmission lines in
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accordance with the solution of the optimization problem given by
maximize
y
N∑
`= 1
y`w
∗
`
subject to T−k ≤
N∑
`= 1
PTDF`ky` ≤ T+k for all k = 1, · · · ,K,
where y` represents the outflow at node `, T
±
k denote the directional capacity associated
with link k ∈ {1, · · · ,K} (the set of nodal links), and PTDF`k denotes the power transfer
distribution factor for the pair (`, k) (the DC flow through link k as a consequence of a
unit MW injection at an arbitrary hub node and withdrawal at node `).
Finally, the market clearing requirement requires that the nodal outflows at node ` are
given by the aggregate excess of sales over generation over the entire set of firms:
y∗` =
F∑
i= 1
(s∗i` − g∗i`) for all ` = 1, · · · ,N .
While the above market clearing equations are not in the form of an optimization problem,
they can trivially be stated as a single linear program with the variable vector w and
(y, s, g) as parameters:
minimize
w
N∑
`= 1
w`
[
y∗` −
F∑
i= 1
(s∗i` − g∗i`)
]
.
In summary, this AGNEP has F + 2 players: F generating firms, the ISO, and the market
clearing mechanism. The shared constraints of this game are the regional sales caps:
S` ≤ S` for all ` = 1, · · · ,N . Note that the variables w` and y` are not restricted in sign;
nevertheless, each can be expressed as the difference of two nonnegative variables as in
elementary linear programming. Omitting the details, it can be deduced that Theorem 3.2
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holds for this game if Lemke’s method successfully terminates for the game without the
shared constraints via condition (B).
A host of related questions has been considered in the literature. In 1997, [230] presented
a similar model where both investment and generation were considered, again leading to a
generalized Nash equilibrium problem. Extensions to allow for the presence of arbitrageurs
were provided in [151] while bilateral and pool-based models were investigated in [105].
More recently, two-period stochastic generalizations have been examined in [122] under
a risk-aversion setting and in [123] under a risk-neutral setting. Notably, in all of these
settings, variational equilibria (VE) were sought, the sole exception being [110] where the
challenge of using Lemke’s method for obtaining more general generalized Nash equilibria
was touched upon.
3.9 Computational results
In this section, the behavior of the modified Lemke’s method of Section 3.5 is investigated
for a range of test problems. In Subsection 3.9.1, a short description of the test problems
is provided. The performance and scalability (with respect to the number of players)
of the modified Lemke’s method is examined relative to the original Lemke’s method in
Subsection 3.9.2, while Subsection 3.9.3 focuses on the simplified river basin pollution
game of Subsection 3.8.1 and provides a description of how the alternate generalized Nash
equilibria may be computed via the problem reformulation method of Section 3.6. The
possible failure of Lemke’s method is also illustrated.
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3.9.1 Description of test problems
Since a standard set of affine generalized Nash equilibrium problems does not currently
exist, four sets of problems were constructed to compare the behavior of the presented
computation schemes:
(1) 4-player, 2 shared constraint game: The first group of problems entails a simple
4-player, 2 shared constraint game without private constraints. The corresponding LCP
has the form
q ,

h1
...
h4
−b
...
−b

and M ,

H11 · · · H14 −AT1
...
. . .
...
. . .
H41 · · · H44 −AT4
A1 · · · A4
... · · · ...
A1 · · · A4

where J0 as defined by (3.7) is a symmetric positive semidefinite matrix in R4×4, −Ai ∈ R2+
for all i ∈ {1, · · · , 4}, hi ∈ R for all i ∈ {1, · · · , 4}, and −b ∈ R2+.
(2) Networked power markets with piecewise linear price functions: The second
set of test problems is from [110] and models an electricity market with piecewise linear
demand functions as described in Section 3.8.1. Each player’s [multivariate] optimization
problem consists of six decision variables corresponding to generation and sales at each
of three regions. Additionally, each player is subject to shared constraints representing
regional sales caps. Parameters include regional sales caps (nonnegative), firm genera-
tion costs (nonnegative), firm generation capacities (nonnegative), transmission capacities
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(nonnegative), and price function parameters (breakpoints nonnegative, slopes negative).
All three regions were assumed to have one breakpoint in the price function and the game
consisted of 60 KKT conditions.
(3) Rate allocation in communication networks: The third set of problems is a
simplification of the network congestion game presented in Subsection 3.8.2 and adapted
from [240]. In the tested version of the game, 6 players compete for transmission on
a linear network consisting of 6 nodes. Player i chooses xi ≥ 0 to maximize aix2i − bixi
where ai, bi ≥ 0. The shared constraints take the form of shared transmission line capacity
on the linear network. Additionally, a congestion cost metric is imposed on every agent
based on the aggregate residual capacity in a link.
(4) River basin pollution game: The last set of problems is the river basin pollution
game from [160] composed of three players and two shared constraints, a simplified version
of the game described in Subsection 3.8.1. Player i faces the optimization problem
minimize
xi
[
αixi + 0.01 (x1 + x2 + x3)− χi
]
xi
subject to 3.25x1 + 1.25x2 + 4.125x3 ≤ 100
2.2915x1 + 1.5625x2 + 2.8125x3 ≤ 100
xi ≥ 0
with parameters α1 = 0.01, α2 = 0.05, α3 = 0.01, χ1 = 2.9, χ2 = 2.88, and χ3 = 2.85.
The tests was carried out via a Matlab implementation on an Intel Core(TM)2 Quad CPU
Q9550 (2.83GHz) with a Linux 10.04 operating system.
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3.9.2 Comparison of performance
Each set of test problems consisted of 25 randomly generated problems. The problems
examined were required to (a) have a solution, and (b) have ray termination (if any) only
arising from a λs-multiplier being made basic. Each problem was solved 50 times due to
the potentially random nature of Lemke’s method pivots when faced with tied blocking
variables.
First, a comparison of the performance of the original Lemke’s method in terms of number
of ray termination occurrences per 50 solution attempts versus the proposed modified
Lemke’s method was made. The average number of complete pivots and partial pivots
are presented in Table 3.1. Partial pivots represent the single column pivots used when a
shared constraint is blocking to determine which s•` variable may be made nonbasic without
immediate ray termination when the associated λs•`-variable is entering the basis. It can
be seen that the modified Lemke’s method accomplishes its goal of avoiding unnecessary
ray termination for this simple problem. Next, the performance of the modified Lemke’s
method for the more complex piecewise linear network demand function model from [110]
is examined. Table 3.2 presents the results, and it is again observed that unnecessary
ray termination is avoided by the modified method. It is worth emphasizing that this
modification is achieved at relatively minor cost in terms of partial pivots.
Table 3.3 examines the modified Lemke’s method performance for the linear network prob-
lem from [240]. As the results show, the modified Lemke’s method eliminates all ray ter-
mination occurrences for relatively little cost in terms of additional partial and complete
pivots.
Next, the performance of modified Lemke’s method is examined with respect to problem
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Ray Termination Average complete pivots
(Average partial pivots)
# Lemke Modified Lemke Lemke Modified Lemke
1 36 0 2.28 3 (1.72)
2 37 0 2.26 3 (1.58)
3 0 0 2 2 (0)
4 35 0 3.56 5 (1.06)
5 34 0 2.32 3 (1.7)
6 0 0 2 2 (0)
7 0 0 2 2 (0)
8 24 0 4.8 5.72 (0.3)
9 39 0 2.44 4 (1.58)
10 0 0 2 2 (0)
11 36 0 3.5 5 (0.94)
12 0 0 2 2 (0)
13 0 0 3 3 (0)
14 36 0 2.56 4 (1.68)
15 34 0 2.32 3 (1.42)
16 38 0 3.84 5.5 (1.06)
17 37 0 2.26 3 (1.4)
18 41 0 2.18 3 (1.3)
19 0 0 2 2 (0)
20 0 0 2 2 (0)
21 0 0 2 2 (0)
22 37 0 2.26 3 (1.46)
23 32 0 2.72 4 (1.38)
24 41 0 3.52 5 (1.06)
25 34 0 2.32 3 (1.56)
Table 3.1: Comparison of performance. Test problem 1
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Ray Termination Average complete pivots
(Average partial pivots)
# Lemke Modified Lemke Lemke Modified Lemke
1 0 0 12 12 (0)
2 0 0 11 11 (0)
3 0 0 10 10 (0)
4 0 0 14 14 (0)
5 0 0 9 9 (0)
6 0 0 7 7 (0)
7 0 0 12 12 (0)
8 15 0 7 8.12 (0)
9 0 0 13 13 (0)
10 0 0 11 11 (0)
11 0 0 5 5 (0)
12 0 0 12 12 (0)
13 0 0 11 11 (0)
14 0 0 19 19 (0)
15 0 0 14 14 (0)
16 0 0 15 15 (0)
17 0 0 12 12 (0)
18 37 0 10.4 14.08 (0.72)
19 0 0 10 10 (0)
20 0 0 11 11 (0)
21 0 0 11 11 (0)
22 0 0 9 9 (0)
23 0 0 9 9 (0)
24 30 0 10 11.56 (0.56)
25 0 0 14 14 (0)
Table 3.2: Comparison of performance. Test problem 2
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Ray Termination Average complete pivots
(Average partial pivots)
# Lemke Modified Lemke Lemke Modified Lemke
1 40 0 7.06 11.08 (0.56)
2 36 0 3.96 9 (1.54)
3 36 0 5.32 9.28 (1.1)
4 16 0 7.68 8.44 (0)
5 14 0 8 8.88 (0)
6 39 0 8.22 12.88 (0)
7 25 0 8 9.12 (0)
8 22 0 8 9.12 (0)
9 39 0 7.14 10.66 (0.48)
10 31 0 7.66 10.36 (0)
11 33 0 7.02 11.04 (0)
12 40 0 7.72 12.02 (0.54)
13 36 0 8 11.36 (0)
14 42 0 6.98 11.04 (0.5)
15 23 0 8.58 10.24 (0)
16 0 0 7 7 (0)
17 0 0 7 7 (0)
18 44 0 7.7 12.46 (0)
19 15 0 7.78 8.44 (0.28)
20 40 0 7.2 11.72 (0)
21 27 0 6.48 9.56 (0.5)
22 40 0 5.86 9 (0.86)
23 31 0 8.06 10.32 (0.7)
24 28 0 8 9.04 (0)
25 36 0 6.9 8.92 (0.44)
Table 3.3: Comparison of performance. Test problem 3
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Figure 3.1: Problem scaling. Test problem 1
(a) Ray termination comparison for scaling
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scaling. These randomly generated problems are identical to the 4-player, 2 shared con-
straint problem above except that there are now F players solving univariate optimization
problems. For each F ∈ {2, · · · , 20}, 25 problems were generated and solved 50 times each.
The ray termination results are plotted in Figure 3.1a with pivot results in Figure 3.1b.
Confirming the results of Table 3.1, modified Lemke’s method does not ray terminate at
all when the problem is scaled. However, Figure 3.1b shows that the number of partial
pivots required by the modified Lemke’s method increases with problem size as should be
expected. Despite this, each partial pivot evaluates at most one column of the tableau and
is therefore not computationally intensive unless the problem is very large.
3.9.3 Constructing manifolds of equilibria
Last, the partial variational equilibria and the reformulation methods are examined for
obtaining alternate equilibria for the river pollution problem of [160] as presented in Test
problem (4) of Subsection 3.9.1. The partial VE problem formulations yielded two equilib-
ria, denoted by X’s in Figure 3.2, and problem reformulations yielded 5 different manifolds
121
Figure 3.2: Equilibria identification. Test problem 4
of equilibria, shown as lines in Figure 3.2. One reformulation utilized the method previ-
ously described in Section 3.6 by keeping the first occurrence of the shared constraint KKT
conditions and replacing the latter two with identical conditions. Two more complex refor-
mulations involved a “stairstep” reformulation in which the replaced KKT conditions do
not refer to the same λsi`-variable. As an example, one of the two “stairstep” reformulations
used for this problem took the form:
q =

−2.9
−2.88
−2.85
100
β
β
100
β
β

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and
M =

0.04 0.01 0.01 3.25 0 0 2.2915 0 0
0.01 0.12 0.01 0 1.25 0 0 1.5625 0
0.01 0.01 0.04 0 0 4.125 0 0 2.8125
−3.25 −1.25 −4.125 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 −1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 −1 0 0 0 0
−2.2915 −1.5125 −2.8125 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 −1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −1 0

.
The term “stairstep” refers to the placement of the new −1 terms in the reformulated
KKT conditions. There are obviously many different ways to reformulate problems in
this manner with each such reformulation potentially providing additional equilibria. To
generate the shown manifolds of equilibria, each reformulated problem was solved with
Lemke’s method and successive division of the β interval as described in Section 3.6; each
manifold corresponds to the solution of a reformulated problem for a specific β subinterval.
Several β subintervals may yield solution manifolds for a given reformulation.
As a supplement to the above partial variational equilibrium results where the groupings of
shared constraints are preset, selected pivots of the modified Lemke’s method are presented
where the groupings of the shared constraints are carried out only if needed during the
pivots. For this particular AGNEP, successful termination requires the presence of a shared
constraint grouping rule such as that specified in Step 2 of the modification. The numbers
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in Tables 3.5 through 3.11 below are rounded to 2 decimal digits to fit the page margins.
After a few pivots from the original Table 3.4 of this game, Table 3.5 is obtained where the
driving variable is the variable x3; there is a tie in the blocking s•1-variables. Initially, let
s11 be the blocking variable; this pivot leads to Table 3.6 in which λ
s
11 is the next driving
variable. After pivoting on λs11, ray termination occurs on the next driving variable w1.
Return to Table 3.5 and choose s31 as the blocking variable; this pivot leads to Table 3.8
in which λs31 is the next driving variable. After pivoting on λ
s
31, ray termination occurs
on the next driving variable w3. Finally, the same delayed ray termination occurs with
s21 brought into the basis instead of s31; the details are omitted. Notice that Tables 3.6
and 3.8 are identical except for the exchange of s11 and s31. This property was mentioned
in Section 3.5 and can be exploited to save computation time. At this point, group the
first shared constraints and the corresponding multipliers (Table 3.10). After pivoting x3
into the basis, λs1 becomes driving with the blocking variable z0 as shown in Table 3.11.
Thus, the solution
(
21.1448 16.0279 2.7260 0.5744 0 0 0
)
is identified.
3.10 Conclusion
In this chapter, the solution of AGNEPs via Lemke’s method was analyzed with an em-
phasis on solutions that are not variational equilibria. An important source of Lemke’s
method failure was identified and illustrated through a simple example, and a crucial limi-
tation of Lemke’s method was proven. In order to remedy the problem of unnecessary ray
termination of Lemke’s method, a modification to the method was developed and sufficient
conditions for its successful termination were provided. This method was shown to help
eliminate ray termination in problems that only ray terminated when shared constraint
multipliers became basic. It is therefore a significant improvement to the current solution
methodology. Since problem regularization is a commonly proposed solution method, a reg-
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ularization framework was discussed and convergence properties were established. More
specifically, it was shown that under different conditions, regularized solutions can converge
to variational equilibria, normalized equilibria, and potentially other GNEs. Coalitional
equilibria and partial variational equilibria were introduced to demonstrate the applica-
bility of the modified Lemke’s method to a broad range of problems. Most importantly,
this research developed a problem reformulation and associated solution methodology that
has the ability to find solutions that were previously impossible to identify with Lemke’s
method. The reformulation solution method also has the ability to find points on solu-
tion manifolds that could not previously be determined. Future work in this area could
examine extensions of the problem reformulation method to find restricted Nash equilibria
and its potential applicability to other parametric LCP problems. The application of this
methodology to nonlinear equilibrium problems through a sequence of linearized problems
may also be a fruitful area of research. Finally, while significant strides have been made
in this research to improve the robustness of Lemke’s method for computing generalized
Nash equilibria of various kinds, there are still realistic AGNEPs that escape treatment;
further work is needed in this direction.
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Chapter 4
A survey of contemporary
electricity market models5
4.1 Introduction
The first power sector deregulation measures took place in Chile, England, and New
Zealand in the 1990s with similar changes arising in California, New England, Pennsylvania-
Jersey-Maryland (PJM), and New York in the late 1990s. Whereas the traditional power
market structure is basically a government-regulated monopoly, deregulated markets are
distinguished by the presence of an independent transmission system operator (ISO), com-
petitive bidding for electricity generation, and purely financial markets for a variety of
electricity-related services. These competitive market elements are often viewed as an
intricate coupling between two systems, a physical electricity grid and a more abstract fi-
nancial framework. The combination of these elements presents many interesting modeling
and mathematical questions that will be assembled and discussed in this chapter.
5This chapter is an excerpt of a longer manuscript being prepared for submission (Co-authors: Uday
Shanbhag and Jong-Shi Pang).
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To understand how the physical and financial market elements interact, it is important to
understand [and then simplify] the systems involved. The physical electricity transmission
system is best viewed as a network of generation and demand nodes connected by a fixed
set of transmission lines. Instead of fully modeling the alternating current (AC) electricity
flow through the network resulting from a certain combination of generation and demand
quantities (e.g., [15, 136, 187, 188, 228, 229]), electricity flow is commonly assumed to be
direct current (DC) so that Kirchhoff’s laws hold. The linearity of these laws makes them
easy to model mathematically, and this simplification provides reasonable transmission
estimates for most AC power flow situations [175]. Transmission limits are also usually
imposed on certain transmission lines to capture the limitations of the electricity grid.
The financial layer of electricity markets can be seen as functioning on a higher level than
the physical transmission network in the sense that decisions in the financial market de-
termine how the transmission network will function. Namely, the clearing of the financial
market [approximately] specifies the generation levels of each generator over a given time
horizon, typically 24 hours; the approximation arises from possible transmission line fail-
ures, incorrect demand forecasts, and instantaneous supply-demand balancing. Closely
associated with these financial market clearings is the concept of locational marginal price
(LMP). In general, LMPs are determined for aggregated geographic areas of demand via
a sensitivity analysis. Finally, financial markets for reserves, capacity, and financial trans-
mission rights play important roles in electricity markets.
A notable power market restructuring effort took place in the United Kingdom [69, 80] and
is popularly referred to as the “British Electricity Experiment.” Later developments in the
United States showed two distinct deregulation trajectories for the power industry [40, 234].
One type of deregulated market design relies on centralized dispatch of generation capacity
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by an ISO based on submitted generator bid curves (a POOLCO market [27, 87]) while the
other type of market involves bilateral transactions between generators and suppliers where
the ISO only manages electricity grid imbalances (a bilateral market [113]). Prominent
POOLCO markets in the United States include New York and the PJM Interchange;
California and Texas follow the bilateral market framework.
The establishment of power markets after deregulation presents a challenge for both market
designers and operators: how should the market be structured, cleared, and managed? The
presence of strategic and selfish agents, possibly endowed with market power, makes this
analysis more difficult than the original central planning-type problem. Furthermore, the
concept of an “optimal” solution is somewhat ambiguous; steady-state Nash equilibria
present an obvious starting point for examining this complex market structure. Because of
their theoretical properties and practical importance, equilibrium models of power markets
have been the subject of much research in the past two decades and have grown immensely
in scope and intricacy. For instance, early models focused on strategic bidding in single-
period deterministic power markets under a variety of assumptions, a relatively simplistic
view of how the market functions that has since been extended in several directions. As
the emphasis on reliability and environmental sustainability emerged, energy-based models
have given way to expansive formulations that incorporate ancillary reserves, capacity, and
emissions. In these models, a sequence of market clearings is necessary, leading to the study
of multi-period models that incorporate both financial and physical transactions. Because
of the importance of risk and uncertainty in power market decision-making as discussed in
Chapter 2, research has more recently focused on the stochastic analogs of power market
equilibrium problems (e.g., [13, 30, 156, 189, 242]).
In addition to the POOLO/bilateral market distinction, the nature of interactions betweeen
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generators and demanders raises another important modeling question. In what appears
to be the earliest attempt at examining these markets, Green and Newbery [90] considered
a supply-function equilibrium (SFE) framework for capturing the strategic interactions in
the United Kingdom in a newly deregulated regime. Bolle [21] examined similar approaches
and subsequently extended these directions to incorporate demand side bidding [20]. In the
late 1990s, as deregulatory efforts proceeded in the U.S., SFE models were applied in the
American context [10, 199]. An alternate approach for modeling strategic interactions is
to assume a Cournot model in which firms bid in quantity, where Cournot prices are upper
bounds on prices resulting from SFE models [126]. The resulting equilibrium conditions
are compactly captured by a variational inequality or complementarity problem (e.g., [54,
105, 106, 111, 230]) and have proven to be an attractive approach given the tractability of
such problems from the standpoint of both analysis and computation.
Given the sheer breadth of the research on power markets, there have been several past
literature review efforts. Of these, the earliest known review is that of Hobbs and Hel-
man [106], which concentrated on deterministic perfectly competitive and Nash-Cournot
models as well as hierarchical models. A subsequent review by Ventosa, Ba´ıllo, Ramos,
and Rivier [222] had a similar focus but also examined supply function equilibrium prob-
lems and incorporated agent-based models. The recent book by Gabriel, Conejo, Fuller,
Hobbs, and Ruiz [86] also presents a broad overview of this field; the authors focus on
both static and hierarchical equilibrium models as well as settings with discrete decisions
while capturing a broad class of energy and environmental markets. Despite these liter-
ature reviews, many research gaps persist. Namely, there is a lack of a comprehensive
treatment of power market equilibrium models characterized by the following properties:
(a) a range of competitive interactions (perfectly competitive, Cournot, and conjectured
supply function), and (b) the ability to incorporate additional markets such as those for
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capacity and emission permits. Motivated by these deficiencies, this chapter provides a
reasonably expansive review of power market research through a unified model and details
the relevant theoretical and algorithmic foundations for the presented formulations.
The early efforts in modeling strategic interactions in power markets were largely restricted
to deterministic and static regimes. In Section 4.2, the initial efforts focused on power
generators and independent system operators are reviewed. Each generator attempts to
maximize profit by generating and selling electricity on a DC power grid managed by
an independent system operator. The behavioral assumptions of perfect, Cournot, or
conjectured supply function competition are unified into a single model. The market for-
mulations are studied through finite-dimensional variational inequalities that correspond,
either wholly or partially, to the Nash equilibria of the game. Finally, tractable conditions
for equilibrium existence and uniqueness are provided along with relevant computational
methods. In Section 4.3, three different extensions to the unified model of Section 4.2
are presented: consumer surplus maximization, capacity markets, and emission permit
schemes. The theoretical results of Section 4.2 are extended to include these more complex
models in a straightforward manner. The chapter is concluded in Section 4.4.
4.2 Basic market models
In Subsection 4.2.1, three power market models are introduced and unified where the
market consists of generators, an ISO with an associated DC transmission grid, and market
clearing conditions. In each model, a different assumption regarding generator behavior is
specified. Drawn from microeconomics, these assumptions are:
• Perfect competition (firms take prices as given);
• Cournot competition (firms realize that generation and sales decisions affect market
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prices and take this into account when optimizing decisions);
• Conjectured supply function competition (firms believe that prices change based on
competitor decisions in a specified manner).
The perfect competition assumption is often difficult to justify for deregulated power mar-
kets [48, 102, 200], so the Cournot and conjectured supply function approaches may be seen
as more attractive. The unified model of this section shows that each of these behavioral
assumptions is a specialization of a more general game formulation.
While Subsection 4.2.1 formulates the three power market models and the associated uni-
fied model, theoretical and computational considerations are addressed in Subsection 4.2.2.
Several new results answering existence and uniqueness questions are proven, and numer-
ical schemes for identifying equilibria based on equivalent variational inequality problems
are described. Although the examined problems are somewhat simple, the theory and
algorithms are applicable to more realistic market representations with the same problem
form.
4.2.1 Competitive market models
Consider F generators competing on a fixed set of N nodes connected by a DC electricity
transmission grid. Let firm i’s generation and sales at node ` be denoted by gi` and si`, re-
spectively, where generation and sales are not required to be equal (i.e., shipments between
nodes may occur to realize locational price differences). This separation of generation and
sales may seem superfluous but is important in power markets where transmission grid con-
straints become binding. A generator’s revenue comes from sales at each node and possibly
transmission grid revenue as will be described momentarily. Generators incur costs from
physical generation and possibly transmission grid payments. Assume that each generator
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can own assets at multiple nodes with the cost of generation for firm i’s capacity at node
` given by an increasing convex cost function ci`(gi`).
The ISO/transmission grid is represented by a set of linear power transfer distribution
factor (PTDF) constraints based on Kirchoff’s laws (for calculation methodology, refer
to [150, Chapter 3]). The PTDF values arise by specifying an arbitrary node as the “hub”
and calculating induced electricity flows for injection at the hub and withdrawal at a given
node. Each node ` has an associated per-unit wheeling fee w` that is charged for generator
shipment of electricity from the hub to node `. Given their directional property, wheeling
fees are unrestricted in sign and a shipment in the opposite direction of the wheeling fee-
specified direction incurs a negative wheeling fee (i.e., shipments in the opposite direction
of a positive/negative wheeling fee incur a negative/positive wheeling fee). It follows that
wheeling fees can be either revenue or costs for generators shipping electricity through the
transmission network. The ISO chooses net injection/withdrawal quantities y so that the
PTDF constraints are not violated. However, it should be apparent that this ISO-chosen
quantity is actually a result of the generators’ decisions. This requirement is specified in
the market clearing conditions described next.
Market clearing in power market models guarantees the fulfillment of consumer demand
and agreement of the ISO and generator net electricity transmission values. Namely, supply
must at least meet demand and the ISO net injection/withdrawal quantities must equal
the net result of generator decisions.
The perfect competition, Cournot competition, and conjectured supply function competi-
tion specifications of this model are developed as follows. For notational simplicity, define
g ,
(
gi , (gi`)N`= 1
)F
i= 1
, s ,
(
si , (si`)N`= 1
)F
i= 1
, y , (y`)N`= 1, w , (w`)
N
`= 1, and mar-
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ket prices p , (p`)N`= 1.
Perfectly competitive equilibrium models
In a perfectly competitive market model, each player treats prices as parameters rather than
variables. Therefore, each generator treats the nodal electricity prices and wheeling fees
exogenously in its profit optimization problem. Let p∗` and w
∗
` represent the electricity price
and wheeling fee for node `, respectively. The generator is constrained by a capacity limit
and a conservation requirement between sales to generation quantities. Mathematically,
generator i solves the problem
maximize
gi, si
N∑
`= 1
[ p∗`si` − ci`(gi`)− (si` − gi`)w∗` ]
subject to 0 ≤ gi` ≤ capi` for all ` = 1, · · · ,N
si` ≥ 0 for all ` = 1, · · · ,N
N∑
`= 1
(gi` − si`) = 0.
(4.1)
Although both p∗` and w
∗
` are treated exogenously in each generator’s problem, the values
are endogenous to the game as a whole and factor into the ISO problem and market clearing
conditions.
As described, the ISO manages the net flow of electricity along the transmission lines. In
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this light, the ISO solves the following problem while treating wheeling fees w∗ exogenously:
maximize
y
N∑
`= 1
y`w
∗
`
subject to T−k ≤
N∑
`= 1
PTDF`ky` ≤ T+k for all k = 1, · · · ,K,
(4.2)
where y` represents the nodal inflow to node `, {1, · · · ,K} is the set of all transmission
lines, PTDF`k denotes the power transfer distribution factor for node ` through line k, and
T±k denote the directional capacities associated with transmission line k. This objective
function implies that the ISO makes decisions to maximize wheeling fee revenue, a standard
assumption in power market literature even though it is not the governing principle of ISOs.
The first market clearing condition mandates that the nodal electricity outflow is equal to
the aggregate nodal sales less generation:
y∗` =
F∑
i= 1
(s∗i` − g∗i`) for all ` = 1, · · · ,N ,
or equivalently,
minimize
w
N∑
`= 1
w`
[
y∗` −
F∑
i= 1
( s∗i` − g∗i` )
]
. (4.3)
It is important to note that (4.3) has w unrestricted in sign just as was originally specified
in the game description. Furthermore, g∗, s∗, and y∗ are treated exogenously.
The second market clearing condition requires that consumer demand is satisfied. In this
case, it is assumed that consumer demand at node ` is fixed at a specified value D` > 0.
In a slight adaptation of the approach taken in Chapter 2, the associated uniform price
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method is given by the complementarity condition
p` free ,
F∑
i= 1
s∗i` −D` = 0 for all ` = 1, · · · ,N ,
or equivalently,
maximize
p
N∑
`= 1
p`
( F∑
i= 1
s∗i` −D`
)
. (4.4)
Note that neither (4.3) nor (4.4) takes prices and wheeling fees as given. Instead, both of
these values are variables, thereby allowing their endogenous determination in the model.
Together, the concatenated optimization problems (4.1), (4.2), (4.3), and (4.4) define the
most fundamental, albeit simplified, model of electricity market equilibrium under the
perfect competition (PC) assumption. There are several extensions and variants of this
model that are briefly summarized after a formal PC equilibrium definition is provided.
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Perfectly Competitive Nash Equilibrium. A tuple (g∗, s∗, y∗, w∗, p∗) is a perfectly
competitive Nash equilibrium if and only if
(PCE1) for each i = 1, · · · ,F ,
(g∗i , s
∗
i ) ∈ argmax
gi, si
N∑
`= 1
[ p∗`si` − ci`(gi`)− (si` − gi`)w∗` ]
subject to 0 ≤ gi` ≤ capi` for all ` = 1, · · · ,N
si` ≥ 0 for all ` = 1, · · · ,N
N∑
`= 1
(gi` − si`) = 0 ;
(PCE2) y
∗ ∈ argmax
y
N∑
`= 1
y`w
∗
`
subject to T−k ≤
N∑
`= 1
PTDF`ky` ≤ T+k for all k = 1, · · · ,K;
(PCE3) w
∗ ∈ argmin
w
N∑
`= 1
w`
[
y∗` −
F∑
i= 1
(s∗i` − g∗i`)
]
, or equivalently,
y∗` =
F∑
i= 1
(s∗i` − g∗i`) for all ` = 1, · · · ,N ;
(PCE4) p
∗ ∈ argmax
p
N∑
`= 1
p`
( F∑
i= 1
s∗i` −D`
)
, or equivalently,
F∑
i= 1
s∗i`−D` = 0. 
This simple model has served as the basis of several more complex market formulations
that address issues such as arbitrage, different pricing methods, and emission allowances.
In [106], perfectly competitive markets that include transporters/arbitragers are studied.
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As opposed to generators, these players attempt to maximize profit by buying and selling
electricity at different nodes to realize locational price differences with nodal demand being
determined by the solution of consumer optimization problems. In accordance with the
perfectly competitive assumption, consumers assume that they cannot affect market prices.
In the related work [54], power markets in which the ISO imposes zonal as opposed to
nodal pricing and charges both congestion charges and “postage stamp” transmission fees
are modeled.
Competition in a market with emissions was examined in [41] with an allowance require-
ment imposed at three different points within the electricity supply chain. In this study,
players were assumed to be perfectly competitive with respect to the prices of both elec-
tricity and emission allowances. The enforcement of emission allowance constraints for
different point-of-regulation scenarios was not found to lead to significant decreases in to-
tal emissions due to either “leakage” or “contract reshuﬄing.” In [101], the effects of the
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) were analyzed with a focus on the in-
teraction of large utilities, small power producers, and cogeneration plants. As stated by
PURPA, utilities must purchase small supplier production at their avoided cost (assumed
to be marginal cost) but may sell electricity on the grid for their average cost. It was found
for a simulation of the New England power system that PURPA increased the cost for
utilities, decreased the costs for small power producers, and caused changes in generation
investment strategies.
Nash-Cournot equilibrium models
Through a modification of the price-taking market model, a Cournot game can be con-
structed in which generators compete in quantity and know that their production quan-
tities affect prices. Unlike the previously formulated perfectly competitive model, nodal
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demand is not an exogenous parameter in a Cournot model; instead, demand quantities are
determined by inverse demand functions assumed to be known by generators. The nodal
electricity price at node ` is assumed to be a decreasing function of aggregate sales and is
denoted by p`(S`), where S` ,
F∑
i= 1
si`. Because each generator treats the decisions of all
other generators as given, the nodal price function is more correctly denoted by p`(si`;S
∗
−i`)
for generator i, where S∗−i` ,
∑
i ′ 6= i
s∗i ′`. As before, the cost of power transmission from
an arbitrary hub node to node ` is given by the wheeling fee w∗` . While generators treat
transmission prices as exogenous parameters, these prices are an outcome of the ISO op-
timization problem and market clearing conditions as discussed previously. In summary,
generator i solves the problem
maximize
gi, si
N∑
`= 1
[
p`(si`;S
∗
−i`)si` − ci`(gi`)− (si` − gi`)w∗`
]
subject to 0 ≤ gi` ≤ capi` for all ` = 1, · · · ,N
si` ≥ 0 for all ` = 1, · · · ,N
N∑
`= 1
(gi` − si`) = 0.
(4.5)
This Nash-Cournot power market model is completed with the ISO optimization prob-
lem (4.2) and the market clearing optimization problem (4.3). In this model, there is
no need for the price clearing conditions (4.4) because the supply-demand relationship is
already accounted for in the specified nodal pricing function. In practice, this electrity
pricing function is often taken to be linear:
p`(S`) , P0` −
P0`
Q0`
S` for all ` = 1, · · · ,N
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with P0` and Q
0
` being positive constants.
Nash-Cournot models have been the focus of much power market research. As opposed to
the lack of market power implied by the perfectly competitive model, a Cournot framework
allows for the formulation and solution of models that can include generators with market
power. It can also be argued that actual deregulated electricity markets are similar to
oligopolies due to high barriers to entry and a small number of sizeable generation com-
panies. Similar to the perfectly competitive case, there have been a variety of proposed
extensions to this simple game.
A simple extension to this Nash-Cournot model arises when arbitragers are introduced.
In [105], arbitragers were modeled as eliminating non-cost-based price differentials between
nodes in the transmission network (i.e., buying and selling electricity at different nodes until
wheeling fee costs equal nodal price differences). With their presence, it was proven that
a bilateral market framework similar to that presented in this section is equivalent to a
POOLCO model. Additionally, uniqueness of the equilibrium outcome was proven under
certain conditions. A further generalization was presented in [151] where arbitrager actions
were either anticipated by the generators or modeled as a separate Cournot optimization
problem. The former model takes the form of a Stackelberg game while the latter case is
similar to the game presented here. It was proven that both of these arbitrager assumptions
lead to the same equilibrium prices, profit, and electricity supply.
An important analysis of market power with respect to the electricity industry was pre-
sented in [32] where a simplified version of the proposed model was used to demonstrate that
transmission constraints can result in counterintuitive displays of market power. Namely,
generators may be able to increase profits by producing excess electricity to force decreased
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production of competing firms due to Kirchoff’s laws and transmission grid limitations. A
similar idea was studied in [22] where the possibility of Bertrand competition in the electric-
ity market was also discussed. The consequences of different transmission pricing methods
was discussed in [230] with transmission prices determined by exogenous functions based
on requested generator power flows rather than by an ISO optimization problem. Pricing
variants involving both average-cost and marginal-cost pricing were also explored. In [60],
a different ISO optimization problem form was considered. Instead of modeling the ISO as
a profit-maximizing player, the authors model the ISO as an economic dispatch problem.
In this framework, the goal of the ISO is to minimize the cost of meeting consumer demand
while servicing nodes on a radial distribution network.
Lastly, the Nash-Cournot game has been expanded to an axiomatic bargaining setting
where generators aim to maximize a collusive payoff function. Such a collusive game
without an ISO was formulated in [97] as a nonconvex optimization problem and upper
and lower bounding procedures on the global Nash bargaining solution were derived. An
extension of this collusive framework was presented in [139] and subsequently published
in [140] to include the transmission optimization problem of the ISO.
Conjectured supply function equilibrium problems
While perfectly competitive and Cournot models allow for agents to make quantity bids, the
majority of market designs in the U.S. and elsewhere require that firms make price-quantity
bids. In an effort to capture this intricacy, there has been much interest in equilibrium
problems where players bid in supply functions. With the work of [126] providing the
initial foundations, there has been significant research in this area over the last two decades
(e.g., [5, 6, 11, 12, 21, 89, 90, 92, 114, 126, 137, 172, 199, 226, 227, 229, 241]). However, this
problem form is generally nonconvex and infinite-dimensional, making complementarity-
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based approaches less useful. It can be noted that Cournot quantity bids can be viewed as
supply functions with infinite slopes, but solution methods and theoretical results cannot
be readily generalized from the Cournot framework to supply function games.
Complementarity-based approaches have been useful in constructing a related conjectured
supply function (CSF) model [55, 111] even though this formulation does not apply to
supply function equilibrium problems in general. In a CSF model, generators utilize a [not
necessarily correct] belief regarding how competitors will change their decisions based on
market price. In the following CSF model description, p` denotes the price at node ` while
pi` denotes generator i’s belief about the price at node `. These values are related with a
market clearing condition as will be specified later.
• Each node ` is characterized by a continuous nodal demand function q`(p`) of price
(e.g., a linear demand function q`(p`) = Q
0
` −
Q0`
P0`
p`);
• Generator i conjectures that net competitor sales correspond to the function
σi`(S
∗
−i`, pi`), where S
∗
−i` ,
∑
i′ 6= i
s∗i′` is the cumulative supply of firm i’s competitors.
With these two functions, generator i’s optimization problem is
maximize
gi, si, pi
N∑
`= 1
[ pi`si` − ci`(gi`)− (si` − gi`)w∗` ]
subject to 0 ≤ gi` ≤ capi` for all ` = 1, · · · ,N
si` ≥ 0 for all ` = 1, · · · ,N
N∑
`= 1
(gi` − si`) = 0
si` + σi`(S
∗
−i`, pi`) = q`(pi`).
(4.6)
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The CSF equilibrium model is completed with the addition of the transmission optimization
problem of the ISO (4.2), the nodal clearing optimization problems (4.3), and a market
clearing condition stipulating that, with pi , (pi`)N`= 1, there is a set of optimal solutions
(g∗i , s
∗
i , p
∗
i )
F
i= 1 of (4.6) such that p
∗
i = p
∗ for all i = 1, · · · ,F . It is worth emphasizing
that in the CSF framework, generator i optimizes over its generation, sales, and belief
regarding prices (as denoted by pi`). At equilibrium, the believed prices must match the
actual market clearing prices.
A noteworthy feature of generator i’s optimization problem (4.6) is that the cumulative
competitor sales variable S∗−i` is present in the constraints; moreover, this constraint could
be firm-dependent in a slightly different model formulation. As was discussed in the Chap-
ter 1, the term generalized is used to describe Nash equilibria of games with this type of
constraint.
For a CSF model, an important problem specialization arises when the conjectured supply
function σi`(S
∗
−i`, p`) has a “slope-intercept” form:
σi`(S
∗
−i`, p`) = S
∗
−i` + βi`(S
∗
−i`, p
∗
` )(p` − p∗` ),
where p∗` is the equilibrium market clearing price and βi`(S
∗
−i`, p
∗
` ) is a conjectured correc-
tion term to approximate how much deviation from the equilibrium market price will alter
net competitor sales. In this situation, the optimization problem (4.6) can be converted
into one where competitor decisions appear only in the objective function, thereby remov-
ing difficulties inherent to generalized Nash equilibrium problems. Indeed, substituting
this form of σi`(S
∗
−i`, p`) into the constraint equation
si` + σi`(S
∗
−i`, pi`) = q`(pi`)
150
gives
si` + S
∗
−i` − βi`(S∗−i`, p∗` )p∗` = q`(pi`)− βi`(S∗−i`, p∗` )pi`. (4.7)
If the mapping from pi` to q`(pi`)−βi`(S∗−i`, p∗` )pi` is invertible, pi` can be explicitly deter-
mined from (4.7). In general,
pi` = ρi`(si`;S
∗
−i`, p
∗
` )
for some function ρi`(si`;S
∗
−i`, p
∗
` ). With this expression, (4.6) becomes
maximize
gi, si
N∑
`= 1
[
ρi`(si`;S
∗
−i`, p
∗
` )si` − ci`(gi`)− (si` − gi`)w∗`
]
subject to 0 ≤ gi` ≤ capi` for all ` = 1, · · · ,N
si` ≥ 0 for all ` = 1, · · · ,N
N∑
`= 1
(gi` − si`) = 0.
(4.8)
Upon close examination, (4.8) resembles the perfectly competitive and Cournot models
when the function ρi` is specified appropriately. It is precisely this observation that allows
for the following unified power market model.
A unified equilibrium formulation
Formulating a CSF model entails specifying three different functions (βi`(S
∗
−i`, p
∗
` ), q`(pi`),
and ρi`(si`;S
∗
−i`, p
∗
` )), and, as has already been indicated, perfectly competitive and Cournot
models can be obtained by appropriately defining these functions. The specialization of
the nodal demand function q`(pi`) is relatively straightforward according to which model is
chosen. The “correction term” βi`(S
∗
−i`, p
∗
` ) is more difficult to specify but can be seen as
the change in net competitor sales resulting from marginal price deviations from equilib-
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rium. Using this marginal change concept, the perfectly competitive and Cournot model
specializations of βi`(S
∗
−i`, p
∗
` ) are more apparent. Namely, it should be obvious that
βi`(S
∗
−i`, p
∗
` ) ≥ 0 because a higher-than-equilibrium price should result in higher-than-
equilibrium net competitor sales. Therefore, two relevant limits for βi`(S
∗
−i`, p
∗
` ) are 0 and
∞. In typical CSF models, βi`(S∗−i`, p∗` ) is taken to be a rational function instead of a con-
stant so that the intensity of the net competitor sales correction can vary. The interested
reader is referred to [111] for additional details on CSF model specifications from a similar
but not identical market formulation.
Before delving into the stated problem specializations, it is important to note that some
form of supply-demand market clearing condition is required for each of these three market
models. Luckily, the relevant market clearing condition can be captured by the simple
equation S∗` = q`(p
∗
` ), where S
∗
` is the nodal supply and q`(p
∗
` ) is the nodal demand at
the equilibrium market price p∗` . Recalling that this condition could be enforced through
the optimization problem (4.4) for the perfectly competitive market model, a more general
optimization problem can easily be formulated to accommodate different q`(p`) functions:
p∗` ∈ argmax
p`
[ ∫ p`
0
q`(p
′
`)dp
′
` − S∗` p`
]
,
which becomes S∗` = q`(p
∗
` ) by the second fundamental theorem of calculus.
• Perfect competition: Because the demand for node ` in a perfectly competitive game
is fixed at D`, it is obvious that q`(pi`) = D` for all i = 1, · · · ,F and ` = 1, · · · ,N . In
essence, this specification indicates that the nodal demand is independent of market price.
Let βi`(S
∗
−i`, p
∗
` ) = ∞ for all i = 1, · · · ,F and ` = 1, · · · ,N , basically implying that
any deviation from the equilibrium price is believed to be infeasible by each player. After
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normalization by βi`(S
∗
−i`, p
∗
` ) and noting that si` is bounded by
N∑
`= 1
capi`, (4.7) gives that
pi` = p
∗
` (i.e., generator i’s belief about the market price at node ` agrees with the actual
market price). Thus, ρi`(si`;S
∗
−i`, p
∗
` ) = p
∗
` for all i = 1, · · · ,F and ` = 1, · · · ,N . In
summary, for all i = 1, · · · ,F and ` = 1, · · · ,N ,
• q`(pi`) = D`;
• βi`(S∗−i`, p∗` ) = ∞;
• ρi`(si`;S∗−i`, p∗` ) = p∗` .
• Cournot: For a Cournot problem, nodal demand is not fixed. Instead, it is given by
the inverse demand function q`(p`) = Q
0
` −
Q0`
P0`
p`. Consequently, each generator assumes
q`(pi`) = Q
0
`−
Q0`
P0`
pi`, an inverse demand function based on their believed market price. Let
βi`(S
∗
−i`, p
∗
` ) = 0 for all i = 1, · · · ,F and ` = 1, · · · ,N , indicating that no player believes
that net competitor production will change because of deviation from the equilibrium
price. It follows from (4.7) that pi` = P
0
` −
P0`
Q0`
(
si` + S
∗
−i`
)
. Therefore, the Cournot model
is obtained by specifying, for all i = 1, · · · ,F and ` = 1, · · · ,N ,
• q`(pi`) = Q0` −
Q0`
P0`
pi`;
• βi`(S∗−i`, p∗` ) = 0;
• ρi`(si`;S∗−i`, p∗` ) = P0` −
P0`
Q0`
(
si` + S
∗
−i`
)
.
• Conjectured supply function: No special treatment is needed to model conjectured
supply function games in this unified framework. Therefore, instead of specifying required
function forms, a specialization resulting in a model indentical to that of [111] is presented.
As in the Cournot model, let q`(pi`) be an affine function q`(pi`) = Q
0
` −
Q0`
P0`
pi`. Consider
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the rational function βi`(S
∗
−i`, p
∗
` ) =
S∗−i`
p∗` −A−i`
where A−i` is a positive player-specific
constant for node ` that serves as an equilibrium price comparison. After substitution and
simplification, (4.7) gives
pi` =
Q0` − si` − S∗−i` +
S∗−i`
p∗`−A−i` p
∗
`
Q0`
P0`
+
S∗−i`
p∗`−A−i`
For this particular CSF model, for all i = 1, · · · ,F and ` = 1, · · · ,N ,
• q`(pi`) = Q0` −
Q0`
P0`
pi`;
• βi`(S∗−i`, p∗` ) =
S∗−i`
p∗` −A−i`
;
• ρi`(si`;S∗−i`, p∗` ) =
Q0`−si`−S∗−i`+
S∗−i`
p∗
`
−A−i`
p∗`
Q0
`
P0
`
+
S∗−i`
p∗
`
−A−i`
.
In summary, the proper specification of q`(pi`), βi`(S
∗
−i`, p
∗
` ), and ρi`(si`;S
∗
−i`, p
∗
` ) allows for
the recovery of the three models presented thus far. Therefore, a unified equilibrium prob-
lem can be formulated to obtain a host of perfectly and imperfectly competitive electricity
market equilibrium problems studied in the literature. Similar to the perfectly competitive,
Cournot, and conjectured supply function game formulations, other constraints can be im-
posed within the respective optimization problems; in particular, bounds on prices can be
easily included if needed. This flexibility is a distinct advantage of the optimization-based
formulation of the equilibrium problem.
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Unified Nash Equilibrium. Given an appropriate specification of ρi`(si`;S
∗
−i`, p
∗
` )
and q`(pi`), a tuple (g
∗, s∗, y∗, w∗, p∗) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if the following
conditions hold, where S∗−i` ,
∑
i′ 6= i
s∗i′` and S∗` ,
F∑
i= 1
s∗i`,
(UE1) for each i = 1, · · · ,F ,
( g∗i , s
∗
i ) ∈ argmax
gi, si
N∑
`= 1
[
ρi`(si`;S
∗
−i`, p
∗
` )si` − ci`(gi`)− (si` − gi`)w∗`
]
subject to 0 ≤ gi` ≤ capi` for all ` = 1, · · · ,N
si` ≥ 0 for all ` = 1, · · · ,N
N∑
`= 1
(gi` − si`) = 0;
(UE2) y
∗ ∈ argmax
y
N∑
`= 1
y`w
∗
`
subject to T−k ≤
N∑
`= 1
PTDF`ky` ≤ T+k for all k = 1, · · · ,K;
(UE3) w
∗ ∈ argmin
w
N∑
`= 1
w`
[
y∗` −
F∑
i= 1
(s∗i` − g∗i`)
]
, or equivalently,
y∗` =
F∑
i= 1
(s∗i` − g∗i`) for all ` = 1, · · · ,N ;
(UE4) for each ` = 1, · · · ,N ,
p∗` ∈ argmax
p`
[∫ p`
0
q`(p
′
`)dp
′
` − S∗` p`
]
, or equivalently, S∗` = q`(p
∗
` ). 
For theoretical reasons that will become evident in Section 4.2.2, it is worth noting that
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the ISO problem (UE2) and the flow-balancing problem (UE3) can be absorbed into the
generator problems by changing (UE1) to (UE
′
1):
(UE ′1) for each i = 1, · · · ,F ,
( g∗i , s
∗
i ) ∈ argmax
gi, si
N∑
`= 1
[
ρi`(si`;S
∗
−i`, p
∗
` )si` − ci`(gi`)
]
subject to 0 ≤ gi` ≤ capi` for all ` = 1, · · · ,N
si` ≥ 0 for all ` = 1, · · · ,N
N∑
`= 1
(gi` − si`) = 0
T−k ≤
N∑
`= 1
PTDF`k
F∑
i= 1
( si` − gi` ) for all k = 1, · · · ,K
T+k ≥
N∑
`= 1
PTDF`k
F∑
i= 1
( si` − gi` ) for all k = 1, · · · ,K,
(4.9)
where the last two constraints are shared by all players. By enforcing common multipliers
for these constraints (i.e., finding the variational equilibrium as was discussed in Chapter 3),
the wheeling fees are given by
w` =
K∑
k= 1
PTDF`k(λ
+
k − λ−k ) for all ` = 1, · · · ,N
with λ+k and λ
−
k being the common Lagrange multipliers associated with the upper and
lower bounds on transmission, respectively.
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Other shared constraints
In the development of the CSF market model, it was noted that the CSF concept is
naturally related to a generalized Nash game where the [exogenous] amount of cumulative
competitor nodal sales S∗−i` is present in each generator’s constraint set. Although the final
CSF (and thus unified) model did not contain this type of coupling constraint as the result
of the given assumptions/manipulations, generalized Nash games are still important in
other areas of power market research. For instance, there are several realistic constraints
that may couple generator feasible regions together, including regional sales caps [110],
piecewise linear price functions [184], shared limited resources [110, 206], and minimum
generation requirements [28]. In addition to the problem simplications already specified, it
is assumed here that regional sales caps and minimum generation requirements are imposed
on generators even though these constraints are typically imposed on consumers/load-
serving entities in reality. In the following development, an extended optimization problem
for the generators containing nodal sales caps S` and minimum generation requirements Q `
is formulated. Although a special subset of nodes could be defined at which these shared
constraints are enforced, it is notationally simpler to enforce these constraints at every
node and then specify S` ′ , 1 +
F∑
i= 1
capi` and Q ` ′ , −1 for all nodes ` ′ not requiring
these constraints (the ±1 ensures that degeneracy is not accidentally introduced through
these extraneous constraints).
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(UE1 with shared constraints) for each i = 1, · · · ,F ,
( g∗i , s
∗
i ) ∈ argmax
gi, si
N∑
`= 1
[
ρi`(si`;S
∗
−i`, p
∗
` )si` − ci`(gi`)− (si` − gi`)w∗`
]
subject to
N∑
`= 1
(gi` − si`) = 0
0 ≤ gi` ≤ capi`
si` ≥ 0
si` +
∑
j 6= i
s∗j` ≤ S`
gi` +
∑
j 6= i
g∗j` ≥ Q`

for all ` = 1, · · · ,N .
An optimization problem analogous to (4.9) can be obtained by absorbing (UE2) and
(UE3) into (UE1 with shared constraints). Although omitted here because of its similarity
to (4.9), this combined problem is referenced later as (UE ′1 with shared constraints).
Clearly, a necessary condition for feasibility is
N∑
`= 1
S` ≥
N∑
`= 1
Q
`
. This feasibility condition,
however, is not sufficient to yield the existence of a Nash equilibrium.
4.2.2 Analysis
In the same vein as the earlier chapters of this dissertation, the power market games of
Section 4.2.1 will be analyzed via finite-dimensional variational inequalities [75] and linear
complementarity problems [47]. This approach is natural (see Chapter 1) and allows for
the rich theoretical results of these fields to be leveraged. In addition to the previously
cited papers dealing exclusively with power markets, the recent survey [76] presented a
comprehensive review on the application of this mathematical programming methodology
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to non-cooperative games. While the survey provided some broad existence results, the
applicability of these results to the unified problem is not immediate. Therefore, the
following developments prove existence and uniqueness for the given power market models
with shared constraints.
Existence of equilibria
For the power market models formulated in Section 4.2.1, unbounded variables include the
net transmission quantities y, the wheeling fees w, and the market prices p. Therefore,
Corollary 1.1, Theorem 1.2, and Theorem 1.3 cannot be applied and special care must be
taken when proving equilibrium existence.
To demonstrate different approaches for proving Nash equilibrium existence, two existence
results are presented. The first result applies to the perfectly competitive market model and
relies on the observation that the mapping F : K → K is integrable on K; see the discussion
of gradient maps in Section 1.3.1. With this integrability property, it is simple to establish
that a Nash equilibrium corresponds to an optimal solution of a single optimization problem
through an examination of necessary and sufficient optimality conditions. The second
existence result requires slightly more analysis but is basically a fixed-point proof that
requires an assumption on the form of q`(p`) to guarantee feasible region compactness.
To gain intuition about the first game equivalence, note that the necessary and sufficient
optimality conditions of the perfectly competitive game, given the convexity (but not nec-
essarily differentiability) of objective function in (PCE1), are
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• for all i and `,
0 ∈ ∂gi`ci`(g∗i`)−
K∑
k= 1
PTDF`k(λ
+,∗
k − λ−,∗k )− µ1,∗i` + µ2,∗i` − µ3,∗i
0 ≤ s∗i` ⊥ −p∗` +
K∑
k= 1
PTDF`k(λ
+,∗
k − λ−,∗k ) + µ3,∗i ≥ 0
0 ≤ µ1,∗i` ⊥ g∗i` ≥ 0
0 ≤ µ2,∗i` ⊥ capi` − g∗i` ≥ 0;
• for all i,
µ3,∗i free ,
N∑
`= 1
(g∗i` − s∗i`) = 0;
• for all `,
p∗` free ,
F∑
i= 1
s∗i` −D` = 0;
• for all k,
0 ≤ λ+,∗k ⊥ T+k −
N∑
`= 1
PTDF`k
F∑
i= 1
(s∗i` − g∗i`) ≥ 0
0 ≤ λ−,∗k ⊥
N∑
`= 1
PTDF`k
F∑
i= 1
(s∗i` − g∗i`)− T−k ≥ 0.
To establish the stated integrability property, it suffices to note that these optimality
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conditions are equivalent to those of the optimization problem
minimize
g, s
F∑
i= 1
N∑
`= 1
ci`(gi`)
subject to
F∑
i= 1
si` −D` = 0 for all ` = 1, · · · ,N
N∑
`= 1
(gi` − si`) = 0 for all i = 1, · · · ,F 0 ≤ gi` ≤ capi`si` ≥ 0
 for all i = 1, · · · ,Fand ` = 1, · · · ,N
T−k ≤
N∑
`= 1
PTDF`k
F∑
i= 1
(si` − gi`)
T+k ≥
N∑
`= 1
PTDF`k
F∑
i= 1
(si` − gi`)
 for all k = 1, · · · ,K.
(4.10)
Therefore, if (g∗, s∗, y∗, w∗, p∗) is a Nash equilibrium, then (g∗, s∗) is an optimal solution
of (4.10). Conversely, if (g∗, s∗) is an optimal solution of (4.10), then (g∗, s∗, y∗, w∗, p∗) is
a Nash equilibrium by defining, for all ` = 1, · · · ,N ,
• y∗` ,
F∑
i= 1
(s∗i` − g∗i`);
• w∗` ,
K∑
k= 1
PTDF`k(λ
+,∗
k − λ−,∗k );
• p∗` as the Lagrange multiplier of the constraint
F∑
i= 1
s∗i` −D` = 0.
Proposition 4.1 (Existence of a perfectly competitive Nash equilibrium). Assume that
the cost function ci`(gi`) is convex for all i and `. For the perfectly competitive power
market game defined by (PCE1)–(PCE4), a necessary and sufficient condition for Nash
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equilibrium existence is that there exists a sales and generation pair ( ĝ , ŝ ) such that
N∑
`= 1
(ĝi` − ŝi`) = 0 for all i = 1, · · · ,F
F∑
i= 1
ŝi` −D` = 0 for all ` = 1, · · · ,N 0 ≤ ĝi` ≤ capi`ŝi` ≥ 0
 for all i = 1, · · · ,Fand ` = 1, · · · ,N
T−k ≤
N∑
`= 1
PTDF`k
F∑
i= 1
(ŝi` − ĝi`)
T+k ≥
N∑
`= 1
PTDF`k
F∑
i= 1
(ŝi` − ĝi`)
 for all k = 1, · · · ,K.
Proof. Because (PCE1)–(PCE4) is equivalent to (4.10), the latter optimization problem
can be analyzed. Namely, the feasible set of (4.10) is convex, compact, and nonempty (by
the stated ( ĝ , ŝ ) assumption). Therefore, the convex optimization problem (4.10) has an
optimal solution. 
Remark 4.1. The existence of the point ( ĝ , ŝ ) simply assumes that there is a combination
of player generation and sales decisions that satisfies transmission constraints and meets
demand requirements. Thus, this assumption is very weak and can be taken as given for
all functioning markets. 
It is important to note that the integrability property of the perfectly competitive game
allows for a compactness-based existence proof even though y, w, and p are not necessarily
bounded in the formulation (PCE1)–(PCE4). This result is possible because the equivalent
optimization problem (4.10) is solely in terms of g and s, thus requiring compactness only
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in these variables. Unfortunately, this type of problem equivalence does not hold for the
other presented power market models so a different existence proof approach must be used.
To prove Nash equilibrium existence for the unified model with shared constraints, consider
the problems (UE ′1 with shared constraints) and (UE4). Because a subdifferential version
of Corollary 1.1 will be leveraged in the next proof, feasible region compactness must be
established for the relevant VI formulation. Define the polyhedron
K ,

( g , s ) | • for all i = 1, · · · ,F
N∑
`= 1
(gi` − si`) = 0
0 ≤ gi` ≤ capi`
si` ≥ 0
 for all ` = 1, · · · ,N
• for all ` = 1, · · · ,N
F∑
i= 1
si` ≤ S`
F∑
i= 1
gi` ≥ Q`
• for all k = 1, · · · ,K
T−k ≤
N∑
`= 1
PTDF`k
F∑
i= 1
(si` − gi`)
T+k ≥
N∑
`= 1
PTDF`k
F∑
i= 1
(si` − gi`)

, (4.11)
which is clearly bounded. It remains to be shown that the feasible region of p is bounded,
a property that is not immediate for the unified model problem. Assume that q`(p`) is a
continuous, strictly decreasing function of p` and therefore has an inverse. Let constants
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p
`
and p` satisfy the inequality
−∞ < p
`
< q−1`
(
S`
)
< q−1` (0) < p` < ∞.
With these price bounds in mind, consider a constrained version of the optimization prob-
lem in (UE4):
maximize
p
`
≤ p`≤p`
[∫ p`
0
q`(p
′
`)dp
′
` − S∗` p`
]
, (4.12)
It holds that (4.12) is equivalent to the optimization problem in (UE4) for all S` ∈
[
0, S`
]
(i.e., any optimal solution p∗` of must lie strictly between the bounds p ` and p`). Indeed,
any optimal solution p∗` of (4.12) must satisfy the following complementarity conditions for
some multiplier ν`:
0 ≤ p∗` − p ` ⊥ S∗` − q`(p∗` ) + ν` ≥ 0
0 ≤ ν` ⊥ p` − p∗` ≥ 0.
• Assume that p∗` = p `. It holds that ν` = 0 and S` ≥ S∗` ≥ q`(p∗` ). This implies
that p∗` ≥ q−1`
(
S`
)
, a contradiction.
• Assume that p∗` = p`. It holds that S∗` − q`(p∗` ) + ν` = 0, implying that q`(p∗` ) =
S∗` + ν` ≥ S∗` ≥ 0. Therefore, p∗` ≤ q−1` (0), a contradition.
Thus, a continuous and strictly decreasing q`(p`) allows for the restriction of the price fea-
sible region to the bounded interval
[
p
`
, p`
]
without loss of generality. As a consequence,
the desired existence proof is straightforward.
Proposition 4.2 (Existence of a unified Nash equilibrium). Assume that the cost function
ci`(gi`) is convex for all i and `. Furthermore, assume that the nodal demand function q`(p`)
is a continuous and strictly decreasing function of p` for all `. If K as defined by (4.11)
is nonempty and the function ρi`(si`;S−i`, p`)si` is concave in si` for each fixed (S−i`, p`)
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and all i and `, then a Nash equilibrium exists for the power market game defined by (UE1
with shared constraints) and (UE2)–(UE4).
Proof. To formulate a generalized VI [75, Section 1.6] that is equivalent to the unified
market model with shared constraints, define the set K̂ , K ×
N∏
`= 1
[
p
`
, p`
]
and the
set-valued map
F (g, s, p) ,

[
∂gi`ci`(gi`)
]F ,N
i, `= 1[ − ∂si` (ρi`(si`;S−i`, p`)si`) ]F ,Ni, `= 1[
S` − q`(p`)
]N
`= 1
 .
Consider the generalized variational inequality defined by the pair
(
K̂, F
)
; this problem
attempts to identify a tuple (g∗, s∗, p∗) ∈ K̂ and subgradients ai` ∈ ∂ci`(g∗i`) and bi` ∈
−∂si`
(
ρi`(s
∗
i`;S
∗
−i`, p
∗
` )s
∗
i`
)
such that for every (g, s, p) ∈ K̂,
F∑
i= 1
N∑
`= 1
[ ai`( gi` − g∗i` ) + bi`( si` − s∗i` ) ] +
N∑
`= 1
(S∗` − q`(p∗` ) )( p` − p∗` ) ≥ 0.
Because K̂ is nonempty (by assumption), convex, and compact, existence follows from an
adaptation of Corollary 1.1. 
Remark 4.2. It is simple to verify that the Cournot specification of the unified model
fulfills the required assumptions of Proposition 4.2. Depending on the specification of A−i`
for each i = 1, · · · ,F and ` = 1, · · · ,N , existence for the given CSF example from [111]
holds as well. 
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Uniqueness of equilibria
Equilibrium uniqueness is a desirable theoretical property for Nash games and typically
requires stronger assumptions than those for solution existence. For instance, establishing
solution existence for an optimization problem may only require objective function con-
vexity while uniqueness commonly needs strong convexity (or solution existence and strict
convexity). As was discussed in Section 1.3.2, monotone and P functions play a simi-
lar role for VIs; thus, uniqueness for VIs still hinges on verifying certain matrix-theoretic
properties. Two different uniqueness proofs are provided, one for the perfectly competitive
market model and one for the unified model. This approach mirrors that used to establish
equilibrium existence for the respective problems.
Based on the equivalence between (PCE1)–(PCE4) and (4.10), a unique solution (g
∗, s∗)
of (4.10) corresponds to a unique solution (g∗, s∗, y∗, w∗, p∗) of (PCE1)–(PCE4) if LICQ
holds for (g∗, s∗). However, it can easily be seen that the objective function of (4.10) cannot
be made strictly convex in both g and s. Therefore, solution uniqueness cannot be proven
but a weaker statement based on F -uniqueness still holds.
Proposition 4.3 (Partial uniqueness of the perfectly competitive Nash equilibrium). If
the cost function ci`(gi`) ∈ C2 has d
2ci`(gi`)
dg2i`
> 0 for all i and ` and the feasibility condition
of Proposition 4.1 is satisfied, then g∗ and the aggregate nodal sales values
N∑
`= 1
s∗i` for each
i are unique for the perfectly competitive power market game defined by (PCE1)–(PCE4).
Proof. Formulating (4.10) as a primal VI,
F (g, s) ,

[
dci`(gi`)
dgi`
]F ,N
i, `= 1
0

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and
JF (g, s) ,
 diag
((
d 2ci`(gi`)
dg2i`
)F ,N
i, `= 1
)
0
 .
By assumption, F fulfills the monotonicity requirement of Corollary 1.2, implying that
SOL(K,F ) is F -unique and therefore that g∗ is unique. The uniqueness of
N∑
`= 1
s∗i` follows
immediately. 
Because integrability does not hold for the unified market model, equilibrium uniqueness for
(UE1 with shared constraints) and (UE2)–(UE4) must be proven via a different argument.
Namely, strengthening the assumptions of Proposition 4.2 allows for the application of
Propositions 1.5 and 1.6 to the primal VI formulation of the game. This result requires
that the conjectured price function is simplified to depend on (S`, p`), meaning that it only
depends on sales through the total nodal sales S` ,
F∑
i= 1
si`; a uniqueness result for the
more general conjectured price function of (UE1 with shared constraints) and (UE2)–(UE4)
remains illusive.
Proposition 4.4 (Uniqueness of the unified Nash equilibrium). Assume that
(A) K̂ as defined in the proof of Proposition 4.2 is nonempty;
(B) LICQ holds for K̂ at the Nash equilibrium point;
(C) for each pair (i, `), the function ci`(gi`) ∈ C2 with d
2ci`(gi`)
dg2i`
> 0;
(D) for each `, the function q`(p`) ∈ C1 with dq`(p`)
dp`
< 0;
(E) for each pair (i, `), the conjectured price function depends on (S`, p`)
(i.e., ρi`(si`;S−i`, p`) , ρi`(S`, p`)) with the following properties for all
(S`, p`) ∈
[
0 ,
F∑
i= 1
N∑
`= 1
capi`
]
×
[
p
`
, p`
]
:
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1.
∂ρi`(S`, p`)
∂S`
< 0;
2.
∂ 2ρi`(S`, p`)
∂S2`
≤ 0;
3.
∂ρi`(S`, p`)
∂p`
≥ 0;
4.
∂ 2ρi`(S`, p`)
∂p` ∂S`
≥ 0.
The Nash equilibrium point of the unified power market game defined by (UE1 with shared
constraints) and (UE2)–(UE4) is unique.
Proof. Given the differentiability assumptions here, the F mapping of the primal VI is
defined as
F (g, s, p) ,

[
dci`(gi`)
dgi`
]F ,N
i, `= 1[
−ρi`(S`, p`)− si` ∂ρi`(S`, p`)
∂S`
]F ,N
i, `= 1[
S` − q`(p`)
]N
`= 1

,
although the more general Clarke subdifferentials of Proposition 4.2 are also technically
correct. Therefore, the game of (UE1 with shared constraints) and (UE2)–(UE4) corre-
sponds to VI
(
K̂, F
)
, where K̂ is defined in the proof of Proposition 4.2. It is claimed that
F is a P function by Proposition 1.5. For notational simplicity, define the following values
(suppressing dependence on (si`;S−i`, p`)):
• ιi` , −∂ρi`(S`, p`)
∂S`
− si` ∂
2ρi`(S`, p`)
∂S2`
;
• ξi` , −∂ρi`(S`, p`)
∂S`
;
• υi` , −∂ρi`(S`, p`)
∂p`
;
• ηi` , −si` ∂
2ρi`(S`, p`)
∂p` ∂S`
;
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• θ` , −1 /
(
dq`(p`)
dp`
)
.
By assumption, ιi`, ξi`, θ` > 0 and υi`, ηi` ≤ 0 for all i and `.
Because JF (g, s, p) can be arranged to have a block diagonal structure according to the
nodal index `, it suffices to examine
Jz`F`(z`) ,

diag
((
d 2ci`(gi`)
dg2i`
)F
i= 1
)
P̂` a`
1T 1/θ`
 ,
where z` , (g`, s`, p`), 1T is a unit row vector,
P̂` ,

ι1` + ξ1` ι1` ι1` · · ·
ι2` ι2` + ξ2` ι2` · · ·
...
...
. . .
...
ιF` ιF` · · · ιF` + ξF`

, and a` ,

υ1` + η1`
υ2` + η2`
...
υF` + ηF`

.
To apply Proposition 1.5(a) to Jz`F`(z`), a rectangular feasible region is required. Unfor-
tunately, this formulation has a polyhedral but not necessarily rectangular K̂. Luckily, the
rectangular region
K˜ ,
F∏
i= 1
N∏
`= 1
(
[ 0, capi` ]×
[
0,
F∑
i= 1
N∑
`= 1
capi`
])
×
N∑
`= 1
[
p
`
,p`
]
⊃ K̂
and its `th partition K˜` can be used to prove that F is a P function on K̂; this statement
follows from Definition 1.5(a) in that P functions on a Cartesian space are P functions on
a Cartesian subset of that space.
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By assumption, the upper diagonal block of Jz`F`(z`) is a P matrix. Therefore, it suffices
to verify that all principal submatrices of the lower diagonal block are also P matrices. By
assumption, 1/θ` > 0 so, without loss of generality, only P̂` and the entire lower diagonal
block need to be evaluated.
Consider P̂` first. It holds that
det
(
P̂`
)
= det

F∑
i= 1
ιi` + ξ1` ξ2` − ξ1` ξ3` − ξ1` · · ·
ι2` ξ2`
...
. . .
ιF` ξF`

= det

ι1` + ξ1` −ξ1` · · · −ξ1`
ι2` ξ2`
...
. . .
ιF` ξF`

=
( F∏
i= 2
ξi`
)
det
(
ι1` + ξ1`
(
1 +
ι2`
ξ2`
+
ι3`
ξ3`
+ · · ·+ ιF`
ξF`
))
,
where the first equality follows from adding rows 2–F to the first row and subsequently
subtracting the first column from the other columns, the second equality follows from
subtracting rows 2–F from row 1, and the final equality follows from the block determinant
formula
det
 A B
C D
 = det (D) det (A−BD−1C)
when D is invertible. From the stated assumptions, det
(
P̂`
)
> 0 as desired.
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Using a similar approach, it can be concluded that
det
 P̂` a`
1T 1/θ`
 = det (1/θ`) det(P̂` − a`θ`1T) > 0
because
det
(
P̂` − a`θ`1T
)
= det

ι1` + ξ1` − θ(υ1` + η1`) −ξ1` · · · −ξ1`
ι2` − θ(υ2` + η2`) ξ2`
...
. . .
ιF` − θ(υF` + ηF`) ξF`

=
( F∏
i= 2
ξi`
)
det
(
ι1` − θ`(υ1` + η1`)+
ξ1`
(
1 +
ι2` − θ`(υ2` + η2`)
ξ2`
+ · · ·+ ιF` − θ`(υF` + ηF`)
ξF`
))
> 0.
Therefore, Jz`F`(z`) is a P matrix on K˜` so F is a P function on K̂. The existence of a
unique solution (g∗, s∗, p∗) follows from Proposition 1.6 and Proposition 4.2. Uniqueness of
the solution (g∗, s∗, y∗, w∗, p∗) of (UE1 with shared constraints) and (UE2)–(UE4) follows
from LICQ holding and setting y∗ =
F∑
i= 1
(s∗i` − g∗i`) and w∗` =
K∑
k= 1
PTDF`k(λ
+
k − λ−k ). 
Remark 4.3. The assumptions needed for Proposition 4.4 are rather general. Similar to
the perfectly competitive case of Proposition 4.3, cost function convexity is strengthened
to strict convexity by Assumption (C). Furthermore, Assumptions (E)1–3 require that con-
jectured prices decrease as total sales increase, are concave in total sales, and increase with
equilibrium price, respectively. These properties should not be unexpected for conjectured
prices. Assumption (E)4 is required but unfortunately does not have a simple interpreta-
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tion; in some sense, it can be seen as conveying a relative difference between conjectured
price function changes caused by total sales versus equilibrium price. 
Remark 4.4. It is simple to see that, given the appropriate cost and nodal demand
function properties, a wide variety of power market games have unique solutions by Propo-
sition 4.4. Namely, any Cournot game formulated as (UE1 with shared constraints) and
(UE2)–(UE4) with pricing functions depending solely on total sales has a unique solution
if LICQ holds and the pricing functions are strictly decreasing and concave. The tradi-
tional linear inverse demand function model obviously fits this framework. Depending on
how prices in CSF models are specified, these models may also have unique solutions by
Proposition 4.4. 
4.2.3 Computation
Given the existence and uniqueness results proven in Section 4.2.2, the next obvious ques-
tion for this unified power market model becomes computational: how can equilibria be
found when they are known to exist? Much like solution methods for optimization prob-
lems, VI solution algorithms are iterative and perform selected computations until a solu-
tion is found with a desired level of accuracy. For the problems examined here, projection-
and Newton-type methods are proven to converge under mild assumptions. To simplify
the following analysis, it is assumed that shared constraints are not present and
• for (PCE1)–(PCE4), the assumptions of Proposition 4.1 hold with ci`(gi`) ∈ C1;
• for (UE1)–(UE4) specialized to the Cournot setting, the assumptions of Proposi-
tion 4.2 hold with ci`(gi`) ∈ C1;
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• for (UE1)–(UE4), the assumptions of Proposition 4.4 hold.
Therefore, the perfectly competitive and the Cournot market formulations are guaranteed
to have solution existence and differentiability of the defining map F . The assumptions
required for existence can obviously be strengthened to give uniqueness, but this simpli-
fication is avoided so that algorithms capable of identifying nonunique VI solutions can
be discussed. For the more general unified model, solution uniqueness is assumed so that
potential convergence difficulties arising from multiple equilibria are avoided.
For both the projection- and Newton-type solution algorithms, the following necessary
and sufficient conditions for a solution to VI(K,F ) are important. The notation ΠK(x)
denotes the projection of point x onto the set K; with a polyhedral K, this operation can
be formulated as the strictly convex optimization problem
ΠK(x) ≡ argmin
y∈K
1
2
(y − x)T (y − x) .
Proposition 4.5 (Propositions 1.5.8 and 1.5.9 of [75]). Let K ⊆ Rn be a closed convex
set and the map F : K → Rn be arbitrary. A vector x ∈ SOL(K,F ) if and only if
(a) FnatK (x) = 0,
where FnatK (x) , x−ΠK(x− F (x)) (the natural map of VI(K,F ));
(b) there exists a vector z such that x = ΠK(z) and F
nor
K (z) = 0,
where FnorK (z) , F (ΠK(z)) + z −ΠK(z) (the normal map of VI(K,F )). 
From this proposition, it can be seen that solving VI(K,F ) is equivalent to solving a set
of nonsmooth equations. This relationship is fundamental to many VI solution methods
because it (a) provides a tractable scheme for solution verification, and (b) suggests a
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variety of different algorithms based on nonlinear equations.
Note that, by definition, using the normal map to solve VI(K,F ) is equivalent to using the
natural map except for the fact that the maps deal with different [but related] variables.
From a computational standpoint, the normal map is preferable because its domain of
definition is Rn; the domain of definition for the natural map is the potentially more
complicated region K ⊆ Rn.
Projection-based algorithms
It has been noted that (PCE1)–(PCE4) is equivalent to the convex optimization prob-
lem (4.10) by integrability. Similarly, because (UE4) is not technically needed in the
Cournot version of the unified model [it is redundant because of the ρi` specification],
the Cournot version of (UE1)–(UE3) is seen to be equivalent to the convex optimization
problem
maximize
g, s
F∑
i= 1
N∑
`= 1
[(
P0` −
P0`
Q0`
F∑
i= 1
si`
)
si` − ci`(gi`)
]
subject to
N∑
`= 1
(gi` − si`) = 0 for all i = 1, · · · ,F 0 ≤ gi` ≤ capi`si` ≥ 0
 for all i = 1, · · · ,Fand ` = 1, · · · ,N
T−k ≤
N∑
`= 1
PTDF`k
F∑
i= 1
(si` − gi`)
T+k ≥
N∑
`= 1
PTDF`k
F∑
i= 1
(si` − gi`)
 for all k = 1, · · · ,K.
(4.13)
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A wide variety of optimization solution methods are applicable for finding equilibria of
these two models but will not be discussed here. Instead, VI-specific solution methods
for these problems are provided. The interested reader is referred to [173] for a detailed
presentation of state-of-the-art optimization algorithms.
Basic projection method. Much as the name suggests, the basic projection algorithm
attempts to find a zero of FnatK via a simple iterative approach.
Basic Projection Algorithm [75, Algorithm 12.1.1].
Let τ > 0, x0 ∈ K, and k = 0.
Step 1: If xk = ΠK(x
k − τ−1F (xk)), stop.
Step 2: Set xk+1 = ΠK(x
k − τ−1F (xk)), k ← k + 1, and return to Step 1.
This algorithm cannot be expected to converge for every mapping F and all τ > 0. As such,
convergence is typically guaranteed by assuming, among other things, strong monotonicity
and Lipschitz continuity of F . Unfortunately, it can be proven that neither the perfectly
competitive model nor the Cournot model satisfy strong monotonicity. Luckily, a much
weaker condition is required for convergence if F is a gradient map of a convex function.
Theorem 4.1 (Exercise 12.8.1, [75]). Let K ⊆ Rn be a closed convex set, F be a Lipschitz
continuous map on K with Lipschitz constant L, and SOL(K,F ) 6= ∅. If F is the gradient
map of a convex function and τ > L/2, then every sequence generated by the basic
projection algorithm converges to some x∗ ∈ SOL(K,F ). 
By the representation of the perfectly competitive model as (4.10), it is obvious that
F (g, s) ,

[
dci`(gi`)
dgi`
]F ,N
i, `= 1
0

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is a gradient map. Let K be the feasible set of (4.10). It only remains to be shown that
F is Lipschitz continuous. If ci`(gi`) ∈ C1 on R, F is obviously continuous and Lipschitz
continuity follows from the compactness of K. A similar development can be performed
for the Cournot model of (UE1)–(UE3) represented as (4.13).
Proposition 4.6. The following statements hold.
(a) Given the assumptions of Proposition 4.1 and ci`(gi`) ∈ C1, the basic projection
algorithm with a sufficiently large τ > 0 converges to a solution of (PCE1)–(PCE4).
(b) Given ci`(gi`) ∈ C1, the basic projection algorithm with a sufficiently large τ > 0
converges to a solution for the Cournot version of (UE1)–(UE3). 
As mentioned previously, there are several extensions of the basic projection method that
lead to better theoretical properties. The extragradient method [75, Algorithm 12.1.9] uti-
lizes two projections per iteration to solve variational inequalities that only satisfy pseudo-
monotonicity, the weakest form of monotonicity. The hyperplane projection algorithm [75,
Algorithm 12.1.12] combines projection iterations with a line search scheme to apply the
method to variational inequalities lacking a Lipschitz continuous map F . Instead of dis-
cussing these extensions of projection-based methods, an algorithm that identifies a specific
type of solution for problems lacking solution uniqueness is presented next.
Tikhonov regularization. The concept of regularization was briefly introduced in Sec-
tion 3.7 and solves VI(K,F ) through a sequence of well-behaved, perturbed problems. For
Tikhonov regularization, the perturbation VI(K,F+I) is analyzed where  > 0 and, with
slight abuse of notation, I is an identity matrix with diagonal entries . Originally devel-
oped for variational inequalities with monotone F , the Tikhonov regularization method has
been proven to converge for P0 mappings F under certain conditions. In these situations,
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solution existence guarantees that SOL(K,F + I) is unique because Tikhonov-regularized
monotone (P0) maps are strictly monotone (P ) (see Theorem 1.4 and Proposition 1.6).
As  → 0, it is obvious that VI(K,F + I) converges to VI(K,F ). Letting x() be the
unique solution of VI(K,F + I), the question of method convergence becomes proving
the existence of lim
→0
x(). For monotone F , the following result provides a straightforward
condition for this existence.
Theorem 4.2 (Thereom 12.2.3, [75]). Let K ⊆ Rn be a closed convex set, F : K → Rn
be continuous and monotone on K, and x() ∈ SOL(K,F + I). If SOL(K,F ) 6= ∅, then
lim
→0
x() = x∞ where x∞ is the unique least Euclidean-norm solution of VI(K,F ). 
This theorem proves a very special convergence property for the Tikhonov solution trajec-
tory for monotone variational inequalities: it will identify the least-norm solution of the
original VI(K,F ).
Tikhonov Regularization Algorithm [75, Algorithm 12.2.9].
Let x0 ∈ K, k = 0, and the sequence {k} → 0 where k > 0 for all k.
Step 1: If xk ∈ SOL(K,F ), stop.
Step 2: Let xk+1 be the solution of VI(K,F + kI).
Step 3: Set k ← k + 1 and return to Step 1.
To solve for the solution of VI(K,F + kI), the basic projection algorithm or its improve-
ments can be utilized when ci`(gi`) ∈ C1.
It is simple to see that the primal variational inequalities arising from (4.10) and (4.13)
have continuous and monotone F maps when ci`(gi`) ∈ C2. Therefore, the Tikhonov
regularization algorithm can be applied as stated in the following proposition.
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Proposition 4.7. The following statements hold.
(a) Given the assumptions of Proposition 4.1 and ci`(gi`) ∈ C2, the Tikhonov regulariza-
tion algorithm converges to the least-norm (g, s) solution of (PCE1)–(PCE4).
(b) Given the convex function ci`(gi`) ∈ C2, the Tikhonov regularization algorithm con-
verges to the least-norm (g, s) solution of the Cournot version of (UE1)–(UE3). 
Although the Tikhonov algorithm applied to the primal VI formulations of (4.10) and (4.13)
is guaranteed to converge, the size of these variational inequalities for power market models
can be prohibitive. Therefore, a distributed regularization approach may be used in lieu
of a single Tikhonov application. In such a distributed computation scheme, the VI is
separated into smaller, more manageable subproblems that are each solved with a Tikhonov
regularization approach. Under certain conditions, the distributed scheme is guaranteed
to converge to the least-norm solution that would have been obtained by implementing
the non-distributed Tikhonov method. For Nash games, individual players are an obvious
means of problem separation.
Drawn from [121], the presented distributed Tikhonov method allows each subproblem to
be solved with independently chosen regularization parameters. Therefore, given a starting
point, the next iterate can be computed in a parallel manner; the only information that
must be shared between subproblems is the previous iterate value. To make the method
precise, define the whole variational inequality as the Cartesian product of N subproblems:
VI(K,F ) where K ,
N∏
ν= 1
Kν and F (x) , (Fν(x))Nν= 1 (4.14)
with Kν ⊆ Rn being closed and convex.
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Iterative Tikhonov Regularization Algorithm [121].
For each ν = 1, · · · , N , let x0ν ∈ Kν , γkν > 0 for all k, kν > 0 for all k, and the sequence
{kν} → 0. Let k = 0.
Step 1: If xkν ∈ SOL(Kν , Fν) for all ν, stop.
Step 2: Set xk+1ν =
∏
Kν
(xkν − γkν (Fν(xk) + kνxkν)) for each ν.
Step 3: Set k ← k + 1 and return to Step 1.
It can be seen that this algorithm falls somewhere between a pure Tikhonov method and a
basic projection method. Instead of solving VI(Kν , Fν+
k
νIν) (where Iν is an appropriately
dimensioned identity matrix) in Step 2 as in the Tikhonov regularization algorithm, a pro-
jection step is taken. Thus, Step 2 cannot be claimed to solve the regularized subproblem.
However, Step 2 does not correspond to the basic projection algorithm either because the
true Fν is regularized by 
k
νIν .
Theorem 4.3 (Theorem 2.4, [121]). Let VI(K,F ) be defined as (4.14). Assume that the
following conditions hold:
(a) F is monotone and Lipschitz continuous with Lipschitz constant L;
(b) SOL(K,F ) is nonempty and bounded;
(c) The sequences {γkν} and {kν} satsify, for all ν = 1, · · · , N ,
1.
∞∑
k= 1
γkν 
k
ν = ∞;
2. lim
k→∞
(maxν γ
k
ν )
2
(minν γkν )(minν 
k
ν)
= 0;
3.
∞∑
k= 1
(γkν )
2 < ∞;
4.
∞∑
k= 1
(γkν 
k
ν)
2 < ∞;
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5. lim
k→∞
maxν 
k−1
ν −minν kν
(minν γkν )
2(minν kν)
= 0;
6. lim
k→∞
(maxν γ
k
ν )(maxν 
k
ν)− (minν γkν )(minν kν)
(minν γkν )(minν 
k
ν)
= 0;
7. lim
k→∞
kν = 0 for all ν = 1, · · · , N .
The iterative Tikhonov regularization sequence {xk} , {(xkν)Nν= 1} converges to x∗, the
least-norm solution of VI(K,F ). 
To illustrate how this method can be applied, its implementation for the Cournot version
of (UE1)–(UE3) is presented next. It can also be applied to (PCE1)–(PCE4), but solution
set boundedness is required for convergence. In general, this boundedness is difficult to
prove through results such as Proposition 1.3; assuming solution uniqueness is a much
easier approach. With this in mind, the final convergence result is presented given the
assumptions required for solution uniqueness although only solution set boundedness is
technically required.
Because of the need for readily available subproblems, the iterative Tikhonov regularization
algorithm is naturally applied to the primal VI formulation of the Cournot (UE1)–(UE3)
(the equivalent (4.13) does not allow for this type of problem division). Define the gener-
ator, ISO, and market clearing feasible regions as
KGeni ,

( gi , si )
N∑
`= 1
(gi` − si`) = 0
0 ≤ gi` ≤ capi` for all ` = 1, · · · ,N
si` ≥ 0 for all ` = 1, · · · ,N

,
KISO ,
{
y | T−k ≤
N∑
`= 1
PTDF`ky` ≤ T+k for all ` = 1, · · · ,N
}
, and KMC , RN ,
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respectively. Let the generator, ISO, and market clearing mappings be
FGeni (g, s, y, w) ,

(
dci`
gi`
− w`
)N
`= 1(
−P0` +
P0`
Q0`
F∑
i= 1
si` +
P0`
Q0`
si` + w`
)N
`= 1

F ISO(g, s, y, w) , (−w`)N`= 1 , and FMC(g, s, y, w) ,
(
y` −
F∑
i= 1
(si` − gi`)
)N
`= 1
.
Define zi as (gi, si),
{
γGen,ki
}
and
{
Gen,ki
}
as generator i’s parameter sequences,
{
γISO,k
}
and
{
ISO,k
}
as the ISO’s parameter sequences, and
{
γMC,k
}
and
{
MC,k
}
as the market
clearing player’s parameter sequences. A step of the iterative Tikhonov regularization
algorithm performs F + 2 independent calculations:
zk+1i = ΠKGeni
(
zki − γGen,ki
(
FGeni
(
zk, yk, wk
)
+ Gen,ki z
k
i
))
for all i = 1, · · · ,F
yk+1 = ΠKISO
(
yk − γISO,k
(
F ISO
(
zk, yk, wk
)
+ ISO,kyk
))
wk+1 = ΠKMC
(
wk − γMC,k
(
FMC
(
zk, yk, wk
)
+ MC,kwk
))
.
(4.15)
Define
K ,
F∏
i= 1
KGeni ×KISO ×KMC (4.16)
and
F (g, s, y, w) ,

(
dci`(gi`)
dgi`
− w`
)F
i= 1(
−P0` +
P0`
Q0`
F∑
i= 1
si` +
P0`
Q0`
si` + w`
)F
i= 1
−w`
y` −
F∑
i= 1
(si` − gi`)

N
`= 1
. (4.17)
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Proposition 4.8. Assume that the following conditions hold:
1. The assumptions of Proposition 4.4;
2. For all i and `, the function ci`(gi`) ∈ C2 has a bounded, positive second derivative
d 2ci`(gi`)
dg2i`
;
3. Assumption (c) of Theorem 4.3 holds.
The iterative Tikhonov regularization algorithm described by (4.15) converges to the unique
solution of the Cournot version of (UE1)–(UE3).
Proof. Given that properties of ci`(gi`), it can easily be verified that F is Lipschitz
continuous and monotone on K. Thus, assumption (a) of Theorem 4.3 holds. From the
convex, compact, and nonempty feasible region of (4.13), a solution is known to exist. The
equilibrium is unique [and therefore bounded] by Proposition 4.4. Theorem 4.3 provides
the desired result. 
Remark 4.5. The identification of sequences {γGen,ki }, {γISO,k}, {γMC,k}, {Gen,ki }, {ISO,k},
and {MC,k} that satisfy assumption (c) of Theorem 4.3 is straightforward. See Lemma
2.5 of [121] for the specification of a valid set of these sequences generated from random,
player-specific positive integers. 
As was seen in this development, the shared constraint version of (UE1) was not included
in this analysis. This simplification originated in the different model specifications re-
quired when solving for generalized versus variational Nash equilibria (see Chapter 3). In
its presented formulation, the unified model with shared constraints in this chapter is a
GNEP because no requirements are imposed on the Lagrange multipliers of the shared
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constraints. Therefore, generator problems with shared constraints cannot be easily sepa-
rated, implying that the iterative Tikhonov algorithm would likely not realize the benefits
of parallel computation because the Cournot model could only be decomposed into 3 (as
opposed to F + 2) subproblems. If the game is slightly adapted to solve for a variational
equilibrium by requiring shared constraint multipliers to be identical between players, the
game can successfully be divided into F + 4 subproblems after exogenously imposing the
shared constraints
F∑
i= 1
si` ≤ S` and
F∑
i= 1
gi` ≥ Q` for all ` = 1, · · · ,N
as the pricing optimization problems
minimize
pS≥ 0
N∑
`= 1
pS`
(
S` −
F∑
i= 1
si`
)
and minimize
pQ≥ 0
N∑
`= 1
pQ`
( F∑
i= 1
gi` −Q`
)
and slightly altering the generator objective functions. It can be verified that this varia-
tional equilibrium version of the game satisfies the convergence requirements of the iterative
Tikhonov algorithm.
Newton-based algorithms
For (UE1 with shared constraints) and (UE2)–(UE4), Newton-type solution methods can
be utilized for identifying solutions. In essence, these methods leverage the first-order
Taylor expansion of the mapping F to solve a set of nonlinear equations. Similar to the
traditional Newton’s method implementation for nonlinear equations (see [173, Algorithm
11.1]), the JF (x) (or the generalized Jacobian ∂F (x)) needs to be somewhat well-behaved
for the method to function properly. For instance, singular Jacobian matrices can cause
the method to stall. The power market model defined by (UE1 with shared constraints)
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and (UE2)–(UE4) satisfies several of these requirements.
Some definitions are in order before discussing Newton-type solution methods. Solution
stability is a desirable property for Newton-type convergence in that it guarantees that
solutions of slightly perturbed variational inequalities [with respect to map F ] are near
the unperturbed solution. With this in mind, the concepts of tangent cones, recession
cones, and critical cones play important roles in identifying directions in which the slightly
perturbed variational inequalities may be poorly behaved. For VI problems in which the
feasible region K can be expressed as the Cartesian product of lower-dimensional sets,
the matrix concepts of semicopositivity and R0 pairs can be leveraged. These properties
generalize the definitions of semimonotone and pseudo-regular matrices (see Definition 3.1)
to VI(K,F ) from the LCP setting.
Definition 4.1. Let map F : U → Rn be continuous where U is an open subset of Rn
containing K. A solution x∗ of VI(K,F ) is stable if for every open neighborhood N of x∗
satisfying clN ⊂ U and SOL(K,F ) ∩ clN = {x∗}, there exist two positive scalars c and 
such that, for every G ∈ B(F ; ,K ∩ clN) and every x ∈ SOL(K,G) ∩N 6= ∅,
‖x− x∗‖ ≤ c ‖F (x)−G(x)‖. 
Definition 4.2. Let K ⊆ Rn.
• The tangent cone of K at point x ∈ K, denoted by T (x;K), is the set of all vectors
d ∈ Rn for which there exist a sequence of vectors {yν} ⊂ K and a sequence of positive
scalars {τν} such that
lim
ν→∞ y
ν = x, lim
ν→∞ τ
ν = 0, and lim
ν→∞
yν − x
τν
= d.
• The recession cone of K, denoted by K∞, is the set of all directions d ∈ Rn such that for
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some vector y ∈ K, the ray {y + τd | τ ≥ 0} is contained in K.
• The critical cone of the pair (K,F ) at point x ∈ K, denoted by C(x;K,F ), is given by
T (x;K)∩F (x)⊥ (i.e., the intersection of the tangent cone and the orthogonal complement
of F at x). 
Definition 4.3. Let K ⊆ Rn be given by the Cartesian product
N∏
ν= 1
Kν , Kν ⊆ Rnν , and
N∑
ν= 1
nν = n. Let M be an n× n matrix.
• If each Kν is a cone in Rnν , M is
(a) semicopositive on K if for every nonzero vector x ∈ K, there exists an index
ν ∈ {1, · · · , N} such that xν 6= 0 and xTν (Mx)ν ≥ 0;
(b) strictly semicopositive on K if
max
1≤ ν≤N
xTν (Mx)ν > 0 for all x ∈ K \ {0}.
• The pair (K,M) is an R0 pair if SOL(K∞,M) = {0}. 
As with proving theoretical properties such as monotonicity, it can be difficult to prove
that a solution x∗ ∈ SOL(K,F ) is stable directly. Therefore, two existing VI results will
be combined in the upcoming proof of stability. The first result establishes a special R0
pair given strict semicopositivity while the second result proves stability under certain
conditions.
Corollary 4.1 (Corollary 3.5.3, [75]). Let K ⊆ Rn be given by the Cartesian product
N∏
ν= 1
Kν , Kν ⊆ Rnν be a closed convex cone,
N∑
ν= 1
nν = n, and M ∈ Rn×n. If M is strictly
semicopositive on K, then M is semicopositive on K and (K,M) is an R0 pair. 
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Proposition 4.9 (Proposition 5.3.15, [75]). Let K be a Cartesian product of N polyhedra
Kν ⊆ Rnν , x∗ ∈ SOL(K,F ), and mapping F be continuously differentiable in a neigh-
borhood of x∗. If JF (x∗) is semicopositive on C(x∗;K,F ), then x∗ is a stable solution of
VI(K,F ) if and only if (C(x∗;K,F ), JF (x∗)) is an R0 pair. 
With the state results and the assumptions of Proposition 4.4, the following proposition
proves that the unique solution x∗ of (UE1 with shared constraints) and (UE2)–(UE4) is
stable.
Proposition 4.10 (Stability of the unified Nash equilibrium). If the assumptions of Propo-
sition 4.4 hold, the unique solution of (UE1 with shared constraints) and (UE2)–(UE4) is
stable.
Proof. For Proposition 4.9 to be applicable, certain properties must be proven on the
unknown critical cone C
(
x∗; K̂, F
)
where the pair
(
K̂, F
)
is as defined in the proof of
Proposition 4.4. Fortunately, these properties can be proven on the whole space Rn and,
by implication, must hold for the specified critical cone.
Let each Kν be the trivial closed, convex cone R and K = Rn, an open, unbounded rect-
angle. In the definition of semicopositivity, M = JF (x∗) which corresponds to the affine
map F ′(x) = JF (x∗)x. Because JF (x∗) is a P matrix by the proof of Proposition 4.4, F ′
is a P function on K. It can be concluded from the definition of a P function that JF (x∗)
is strictly semicopositive on K because each Kν is a cone. By Corollary 4.1, JF (x
∗) is
semicopositive on K
[
and therefore on C
(
x∗; K̂, F
)]
and (K,JF (x∗)) is an R0 pair. Be-
cause
(
C
(
x∗; K̂, F
))
∞
⊂ K,
(
C
(
x∗; K̂, F
)
, JF (x∗)
)
is also an R0 pair. Proposition 4.9
gives the desired conclusion. 
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Josephy-Newton method. A well-known iterative solution method for VI(K,F ) when
stability holds relies on the normal map FnorK as defined in Proposition 4.5. Similar to
Newton’s method for solving nonlinear equations, the Josephy-Newton method utilizes a
first-order approximation of F to iteratively identify a zero of the normal map. After
a series of manipulations, there are two equivalent formulations of this method: the first
scheme solves a nonsmooth equation arising from the normal map, while the second scheme
expresses this equation as the solution of an equivalent VI. Convergence of the Josephy-
Newton method is proven via an appeal to solution stability.
Given an iterate zk, define the subsequent iterate zk+1 as a solution of the nonsmooth
equation
F
(
ΠK(z
k)
)
+ JF
(
ΠK(z
k)
)(
ΠK(z
k+1)−ΠK(zk)
)
+ zk+1 −ΠK(zk+1) = 0. (4.18)
Under conditions that guarantee convergence of these iterates to z∞, the solution of
VI(K,F ) is given by x∗ = ΠK(z∞). From the definition of FnorK and letting x
k =
ΠK(z
k), (4.18) is seen to be equivalent to solving VI(K,F k) where
F k(x) , F (xk) + JF (xk)(x− xk).
Therefore, the Josephy-Newton method can be implemented in either the variable z or the
variable x; the latter algorithm is provided here.
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Josephy-Newton Method for the VI [75, Algorithm 7.3.1].
Let x0 ∈ K,  > 0, and k = 0.
Step 1: If xk ∈ SOL(K,F ), stop.
Step 2: Let xk+1 be any solution of the VI(K,F k) such that xk+1 ∈ B(xk, ).
Step 3: Set k ← k + 1 and return to Step 1.
The only remaining question for the Josephy-Newton method is under what conditions
converge to the solution x∗ of VI(K,F ) is guaranteed. As with many Newton-type results,
convergence can only be claimed for initial points sufficiently close to the optimal solution.
Theorem 4.4 (Theorem 7.3.5, [75]). Let F be continuously differentiable. Assume that
x∗ is a stable solution of VI(K,F ∗), where F ∗(x) , F (x∗) + JF (x∗)(x− x∗) is the strong
first-order approximation of F at x∗. For every  > 0, there exists a δ > 0 such that for
every x0 ∈ K ∩ B(x∗, δ), the Josephy-Newton method generates a well-defined sequence
{xk} in B(x∗, δ), and every such sequence converges to x∗. 
Proposition 4.11. Given the assumptions of Proposition 4.4, the Josephy-Newton iter-
ates starting from any point x0 sufficiently close to the solution x∗ of (UE1 with shared
constraints) and (UE2)–(UE4) will converge to x
∗.
Proof. Let VI
(
K̂, F
)
be as defined in the proof of Proposition 4.4 and F ∗(x) be as
defined in Theorem 4.4. The proof of Proposition 4.4 guarantees that VI
(
K̂, F ∗
)
has a
unique solution. Furthermore, F ∗(x∗) = F (x∗) and, therefore, SOL
(
K̂, F ∗
)
is equivalent
to SOL
(
K̂, F
)
by (1.3). It is also simple to see that Proposition 4.10 guarantees that x∗
is a stable solution of VI
(
K̂, F ∗
)
. Theorem 4.4 gives the desired result. 
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Semismooth Newton method. A different solution approach to (UE1 with shared
constraints) and (UE2)–(UE4) relies on an implementation of Newton’s method for semis-
mooth equations.
Definition 4.4. Let U ⊆ Rn be an open set and mapping F : U → Rn be a locally
Lipschitz continuous function on U . F is semismooth at a point x ∈ U if F is directionally
differentiable near x and there exists a neighborhood U ′ ⊆ U of x and a function
∆ : (0,∞)→ [0,∞) with lim
t→0
∆(t) = 0 such that for any y ∈ U ′ distinct from x,
‖F ′(y; y − x)− F ′(x; y − x)‖
‖y − x‖ ≤ ∆(‖y − x‖). 
For VI(K,F ) where K is polyhedral and F is continuously differentiable, as in (UE1 with
shared constraints) and (UE2)–(UE4), F
nor
K and F
nat
K are both semismooth; the normal
(or natural) map representation of SOL(K,F ) from Proposition 4.5 can be solved via
algorithms for semismooth equations. For semismooth equations, the Jacobian JF (x)
usually required by Newton’s method is replaced by the Clarke generalized Jacobian ∂F (x).
Semismooth Newton Method [75, Algorithm 7.5.1].
Let G be the normal map of VI(K,F ) (i.e., G(z) , F (ΠK(z)) + z − ΠK(z)), x∗ be a
solution of VI(K,F ), z0 ∈ Rn, and k = 0.
Step 1: If G(zk) = 0, set x∗ = ΠK(zk) and stop.
Step 2: Select an element Hk ∈ ∂G(zk). Find a direction dk ∈ Rn such that
G(zk) +Hkdk = 0.
Step 3: Set zk+1 = zk + dk, k ← k + 1, and return to Step 1.
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If Hk is nonsingular in this algorithm, dk is unique and can be easily found. Given that
∂G(z∗) is nonsingular (i.e., all H ∈ ∂G(z∗) are nonsingular), the semismooth Newton
method is guaranteed to converge when the starting point z0 is sufficiently close to the
optimal solution z∗ similar to Theorem 4.4.
Theorem 4.5 (Theorem 7.5.3, [75]). Let U ⊆ Rn be an open set and mapping G : U → Rn
be semismooth at z∗ ∈ U with G(z∗) = 0. If ∂G(z∗) is nonsingular, then there exists a
δ > 0 such that, if z0 ∈ B(z∗, δ), the sequence {zk} generated by the semismooth Newton
method is well-defined and converges to z∗. 
Proposition 4.12. Let G be the normal map associated with VI
(
K̂, F
)
with
(
K̂, F
)
defined as in the proof of Proposition 4.4. Given the assumptions of Proposition 4.4 and
nonsingularity of ∂G(z∗), the semismooth Newton method iterates starting from any point
z0 sufficiently close to the solution z∗ will converge to z∗. The solution of (UE1 with shared
constraints) and (UE2)–(UE4) is given by ΠK(z
∗). 
A noticeable deficiency in these Newton-based methods is that convergence is only guar-
anteed when the starting point is sufficiently close to a solution. Using a merit function
approach, this requirement can be partially relaxed under certain conditions. A merit
function θ : K → R+, by definition, has the property that θ(x) = 0 if and only if
x ∈ SOL(K,F ). Using a given merit function θ, the optimization problem
minimize
x∈K
θ(x) (4.19)
can be solved with globally convergent computational approaches such as iterative line
search or trust region algorithms. Unfortunately, merit functions are typically nonconvex
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and may not be differentiable; consequently, a solution x∗ of (4.19) is a stationary point
but may have θ(x∗) > 0 (i.e., it is possible that x∗ /∈ SOL(K,F )). The conditions
under which a stationary point of (4.19) is indeed a solution of VI(K,F ) are related to
regularity properties. Thus, although implementing a merit function-based approach within
the specified Newton methods gives global as opposed to local convergence, the limiting
point is only guaranteed to solve the desired problem under additional assumptions. For
a much more comprehensive discussion of merit function methods, the interested reader is
referred to [75, Chapters 8 and 10].
4.3 Model extensions
A variety of model extensions have been proposed in the power market literature, each
of which attempts to better represent current and emerging issues. While some of these
proposed extensions have been rigorously studied, other additions have been addressed in
only a vague and simplistic manner. Therefore, this section describes and analyzes the
theoretical consequences of three important power market extensions: consumer surplus
maximization, capacity markets, and emission permit auctions. Each of these extensions is
currently the subject of considerable debate between regulators, ISOs, and industry, thus
making them relevant additions to the unified framework.
4.3.1 Consumer surplus maximization
Due to how the electricity industry has developed, consumers commonly do not know the
real-time price of electricity consumption and are instead charged at an average rate for
their use. This lack of a price signal is undesirable from an economic perspective because
it limits the natural balancing of supply and demand. As such, electricity price spikes
have been observed several times in the recent past. In two days of June 1998, electricity
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prices in the Midwest varied from $25 to $7500 per MWh. After an analysis by the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) [1], it was determined that the conditions causing
this price spike were unlikely to occur again. In July 1999, prices spiked to $10,000 per
MWh under very different conditions. According to [37], the primary culprit behind these
price spikes was demand inelasticity and not the complex interaction of factors identified
by FERC in [1]. Furthermore, it was shown that a small percentage of consumers paying
the real-time electricity price would be very helpful in avoiding these extreme prices.
In spite of the recognition that price signals of some form should be incorporated into
consumer electricity sales, technological limitations have made this effort impractical until
recently. Now that real-time electricity pricing and other price-responsive demand reduc-
tion methods have become more viable, much research has been devoted to the effects,
implementation, and success of these efforts. Generally, these efforts fall under the heading
of demand response, the field of inducing changes in customer electricity use as a response
to electricity prices [3]. The interested reader is referred to [35, 91, 125, 154, 214, 223] for
current research on demand response.
Consumer surplus maximization is a simple way to account for demand response in power
markets, and, under certain specifications of the function q`(p`), the game defined by (UE1
with shared constraints) and (UE2)–(UE4) already includes this extension. In this model,
the nodal consumer is assumed to choose demand such that consumer surplus is maximized;
this concept was briefly discussed in Section 2.7. Defining p∗` as the equilibrium market
price at node ` and PC` −
PC`
2QC`
q` as an affine consumer demand curve at node ` where q`
is the quantity demanded and PC` ,Q
C
` > 0, the consumer surplus maximization problems
are
192
(Affine demand UE5) for each ` = 1, · · · ,N ,
maximize
q`
PC` q` −
PC`
2QC`
q2` − p∗`q`,
or equivalently,
q`(p
∗
` ) , QC` −
QC`
PC`
p∗` for all ` = 1, · · · ,N .
In Section 2.7, q` was constrained to be nonnegative. Although valid, the resulting piecewise
linear function q`(p`) is not strictly decreasing as required for existence and uniqueness in
Propositions 4.2 and 4.4. It is simple to see that the Cournot demand specification of q`(p`)
can be achieved by setting PC` = P
0
` and Q
C
` = Q
0
` .
Remark 4.6. It should be obvious that more general strictly decreasing demand curves
can be used to calculate consumer surplus as long as the function q`(p
∗
` ) can be explicitly
determined; the affine demand specification here is motivated by its mathematical simplic-
ity, its applicability to Cournot models, and the desire to avoid unnecessary notation. The
more general consumer surplus maximization problem will be referred to as (UE5). 
For a unified model (UE1 with shared constraints) and (UE2)–(UE4), this maximization
has been implicitly included if there exist nodal demand functions such that the optimal
demand associated with consumer surplus maximization is given by q`(p`) for all `. With
this in mind, solution existence and uniqueness trivially hold by previous results.
Proposition 4.13. If the strictly decreasing functions (q`(p`))
N
`= 1 arise from consumer
surplus maximization problems (UE5), then a solution exists for (UE1 with shared con-
straints) and (UE2)–(UE5) under the assumptions of Proposition 4.2. The solution is
unique under the assumptions of Proposition 4.4. 
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Although this extension is simple, it is crucial in the following model additions.
4.3.2 Capacity markets
Because electricity demand is projected to continue increasing for the foreseeable fu-
ture [71], generation capacity must likewise increase over time. The current difficulty
is that while an ISO may determine how much additional capacity will be needed in the
future, profit-maximizing generators must individually decide to make these capacity in-
vestments in a deregulated market. When considering the significant capital commitment
and delayed profit realization associated with generation investments along with future
market uncertainty, it is understandable that investment in new generation capacity may
not be adequate given current power market structures as will be discussed momentarily.
Peaking capacity (i.e., capacity with high marginal generation cost that runs to help meet
peak demands) also plays an important role in future capacity expansion because of the
inelastic nature of electricity demand.
Risk aversion alone can decrease generator capacity investments because of considerable
lead times and uncertain electricity prices in the future. Unfortunately, deregulated power
markets also commonly contain regulatory features that further discourage companies from
investing in new capacity [79, 83, 119]. For instance, price caps meant to mitigate price
spikes can decrease investment in peaking capacity by making this capacity less profitable
on the rare occassions when it is utilized. This regulation-induced revenue deficiency is
commonly referred to as the “missing money” problem [49, 50]. To address this investment
issue, markets for generation capacity have been proposed and implemented by many ISOs
to make the installation of capacity more attractive (e.g., [23, 52, 79, 83, 107, 108, 116,
119, 170, 210]).
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Capacity markets typically have one of three forms based on the microeconomic mechanism
utilized by the ISO: price-based, quantity-based, or hybrid. As discussed in [116], the
capacity market should ideally achieve an equilibrium between marginal cost and marginal
benefit of additional capacity. In a locational capacity model, let the equilibrium price and
quantity for node ` be denoted by the pair (pcap,∗` , q
cap,∗
` ). The capacity market developed
by the ISO should lead to this equilibrium point where the additional capacity qcap,∗` at
each node ` is judged by the ISO to be sufficient to satisfy future reliability standards and
demand.
In a price-based market, the ISO establishes a fixed per-unit (e.g., installed MW) subsidy
pcap,∗` for each node ` to induce the desired capacity levels
(
qcap,∗`
)N
`= 1
. A quantity-based
market takes the opposite approach in that the ISO establishes a total required capacity
qcap,∗` for each node ` to induce the equilibrium prices
(
pcap,∗`
)N
`= 1
. A hybrid capacity market
model [107, 170, 210] combines elements of these frameworks and has become prevalent in
the electricity industry. For a hybrid model, the ISO develops a capacity demand curve
based on its target capacity level and pays a per-unit amount to generators according
to the total capacity supplied; this payment is provided by consumers (i.e., load serving
entities) through nodal uplift charges. Unlike the quantity-based approach in which the
demand curve is vertical (i.e., inelastic), the hybrid capacity demand curve is usually a
nonincreasing piecewise linear function, a difference that leads to less abrupt price changes
in the neighborhood of the target capacity level. Unlike the price-based market, capacity
in a hybrid market receives a variable per-unit payment depending on the total capacity
supply. It should be noted that the hybrid approach is more easily implemented than
the price- and quantity-based approaches because the marginal cost and marginal benefit
curves do not need to be known to a high degree of certainty.
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Although many publications have discussed the advantages and disadvantages of each of
these market forms, a vast majority (if not all) of this research has dealt with these mar-
kets in relative isolation. The theoretical consequences of implementing different types of
capacity market have yet to be studied in the framework of a comprehensive power market
model. Therefore, the unified model results are now extended to include quantity-based
and hybrid capacity market forms.
Quantity-based capacity markets
Assume that the ISO decides that CAP` is the capacity required at node ` to satisfy
future demand and reliability standards. The ISO subsequently requires that at least this
much capacity is provided by consumers (i.e., load serving entities). Because consumers
typically do not own substantial generation capacity, it can be assumed that all of this
required capacity is purchased from generators. To reflect these market changes, modify
(UE1 with shared constraints) to
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(
UE
capq
1 with shared constraints
)
for each i = 1, · · · ,F ,
(
g∗i , s
∗
i , s
cap,∗
i
) ∈ argmax
gi, si, s
cap
i
N∑
`= 1
[
ρi`(si`;S
∗
−i`, p
∗
` )si` − ci`(gi`)− (si` − gi`)w∗`
+ pcap,∗` s
cap
i`
]
subject to
N∑
`= 1
(gi` − si`) = 0
0 ≤
N∑
`= 1
scapi` ≤
N∑
`= 1
capi`
0 ≤ gi` ≤ capi`
si` ≥ 0
si` +
∑
j 6= i
s∗j` ≤ S`
gi` +
∑
j 6= i
g∗j` ≥ Q`

for all ` = 1, · · · ,N ,
where pcap` is the [endogenous] capacity subsidy for node ` and s
cap
i` is the capacity sold to
the consumer at node ` by generator i. To reflect the capacity payments from the consumer
at node ` to the generators, modify (Affine demand UE5) to
(
Affine demand UE
capq
5
)
for each ` = 1, · · · ,N ,
maximize
q`
PC` q` −
PC`
2QC`
q2` − p∗`q` − pcap,∗`
F∑
i= 1
scap,∗i` .
The term pcap,∗`
F∑
i= 1
scap,∗i` is called the nodal uplift charge. Note that this charge is unrelated
to the consumer demand at node ` and is therefore treated as constant. In reality, the ISO
can distribute these nodal uplift charges among the consumers in any manner as long
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as the total payments to generators is the still
N∑
`= 1
pcap,∗`
F∑
i= 1
scap,∗i` . A common payment
distribution metric is based on historical nodal peak demand; the assumption that each
consumer pays for its own capacity is used here for simplicity. Similar to before, the more
general version of this consumer maximization problem will be denoted by
(
UE
capq
5
)
.
To complete this quantity-based capacity market, a market clearing condition must be
enforced to determine the prices
(
pcap`
)N
`= 1
:
0 ≤ pcap` ⊥
F∑
i= 1
scapi` − CAP` ≥ 0 for all ` = 1, · · · ,N . (4.20)
The price pcap` cannot be bounded above in this market formulation, leading to diffi-
culty when proving equilibrium existence. Therefore, (4.20) will be incorporated into(
UE
capq
1 with shared constraints
)
as shared constraints with a common multiplier in a
manner similar to the perfectly competitive equivalent formulation (4.10):
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(
UE
capq , ′
1 with shared constraints
)
for each i = 1, · · · ,F ,
(
g∗i , s
∗
i , s
cap,∗
i
) ∈ argmax
gi, si, s
cap
i
N∑
`= 1
[
ρi`(si`;S
∗
−i`, p
∗
` )si` − ci`(gi`)− (si` − gi`)w∗`
]
subject to
N∑
`= 1
(gi` − si`) = 0
0 ≤
N∑
`= 1
scapi` ≤
N∑
`= 1
capi`
0 ≤ gi` ≤ capi`
si` ≥ 0
si` +
∑
j 6= i
s∗j` ≤ S`
gi` +
∑
j 6= i
g∗j` ≥ Q`
F∑
i= 1
scapi` − CAP` ≥ 0

for all ` = 1, · · · ,N ,
where the Lagrange multiplier of the first constraint (i.e., capacity market clearing for each
`) is pcap` for all i = 1, · · · ,F .
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Before proving existence, define
K ,

( g , s , scap ) | • for all i = 1, · · · ,F
N∑
`= 1
(gi` − si`) = 0
0 ≤
N∑
`= 1
scapi` ≤
N∑
`= 1
capi`
0 ≤ gi` ≤ capi`
si` ≥ 0
 for all ` = 1, · · · ,N
• for all ` = 1, · · · ,N
F∑
i= 1
si` ≤ S`
F∑
i= 1
gi` ≥ Q`
F∑
i= 1
scapi` − CAP` ≥ 0
• for all k = 1, · · · ,K
T−k ≤
N∑
`= 1
PTDF`k
F∑
i= 1
(si` − gi`)
T+k ≥
N∑
`= 1
PTDF`k
F∑
i= 1
(si` − gi`)

. (4.21)
Proposition 4.14. Assume that the cost function ci`(gi`) is convex for all i and `. Fur-
thermore, assume that the nodal demand function q`(p`) is a continuous and strictly de-
creasing function of p` for all `. If K as defined by (4.21) is nonempty and the function
ρi`(si`;S−i`, p`)si` is concave in si` for each fixed (S−i`, p`) and all i and `, then a Nash
equilibrium exists for the power market game defined by
(
UE
capq
1 with shared constraints
)
,
(UE2)–(UE4),
(
UE
capq
5
)
, and (4.20).
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Proof. The optimality conditions of
(
UE
capq
1 with shared constraints
)
and (4.20) corre-
spond to
(
UE
capq , ′
1 with shared constraints
)
. Because
(
UE
capq
5
)
is already accounted for
in the specification of q`(p`) in (UE4), it suffices to examine the primal VI formulation
of
(
UE
capq , ′
1 with shared constraints
)
and (UE2)–(UE4). After incorporating (UE2) and
(UE3) into
(
UE
capq , ′
1 with shared constraints
)
, this VI is defined by
K̂ , K ×
N∏
`= 1
[
p
`
, p`
]
and F ,

[
∂gi`ci`(gi`)
]F ,N
i, `= 1[ − ∂si` (ρi`(si`;S−i`, p`)si`) ]F ,Ni, `= 1
0[
S` − q`(p`)
]N
`= 1

.
Corollary 1.1 gives existence because K̂ is compact and nonempty. 
Hybrid capacity markets
In a hybrid capacity market, the ISO does not establish a required capacity level to be
met. Instead, the ISO formulates a capacity demand curve that will [hopefully] result in
the desired capacity levels. Let this demand function be continuous, nonincreasing, and
denoted by pcap`
( F∑
i= 1
scapi`
)
. Because these demand functions are known, it is natural to
model generators as Cournot players in the hybrid capacity market.
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(
UE
caph
1 with shared constraints
)
for each i = 1, · · · ,F ,
(
g∗i , s
∗
i , s
cap,∗
i
) ∈ argmax
gi, si, s
cap
i
N∑
`= 1
[
ρi`(si`;S
∗
−i`, p
∗
` )si` − ci`(gi`)− (si` − gi`)w∗`
+ pcap` (s
cap
i` ;S
cap,∗
−i` )s
cap
i`
]
subject to
N∑
`= 1
(gi` − si`) = 0
0 ≤
N∑
`= 1
scapi` ≤
N∑
`= 1
capi`
0 ≤ gi` ≤ capi`
si` ≥ 0
si` +
∑
j 6= i
s∗j` ≤ S`
gi` +
∑
j 6= i
g∗j` ≥ Q`

for all ` = 1, · · · ,N ,
Because the capacity requirement is not fixed in the hybrid market, it follows that consump-
tion decisions affect capacity payments. Acting strategically with respect to the capacity
market, consumers can be modeled as solving the following optimization problems:
(
Affine demand UE
caph
5
)
for each ` = 1, · · · ,N ,
maximize
q`
PC` q` −
PC`
2QC`
q2` − p∗`q` − pcap` (r`q`)r`q`,
where r` is the nodal capacity requirement for each unit of demand as specified by the
ISO and pcap` (r`q`)r`q` represents the payments for capacity. Upon simplification, if the
mapping from q` to
PC`
QC`
q` − r`pcap` (r`q`)− r2`q`pcap` (r`q`)
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is invertible, then q` can be expressed as a function of p` (i.e., q`(p`)).
Notice that the capacity price function is parametrized by r`q` instead of
F∑
i= 1
scapi` in the
consumer surplus optimization problems. This substitution reflects that price is determined
by demand (as well as supply) at equilibrium, leading to the obvious market clearing
condition
F∑
i= 1
scapi` = r`q`(p`) for all ` = 1, · · · ,N . (4.22)
Because the market clearing condition (4.22) incorporates both scapi` and p` variables, define
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the set K over all variables simultaneously.
K ,

( g , s , scap , p ) | • for all i = 1, · · · ,F
N∑
`= 1
(gi` − si`) = 0
0 ≤
N∑
`= 1
scapi` ≤
N∑
`= 1
capi`
0 ≤ gi` ≤ capi`
si` ≥ 0
 for all ` = 1, · · · ,N
• for all ` = 1, · · · ,N
F∑
i= 1
si` ≤ S`
F∑
i= 1
gi` ≥ Q`
F∑
i= 1
scapi` = r`q`(p`)
• for all k = 1, · · · ,K
T−k ≤
N∑
`= 1
PTDF`k
F∑
i= 1
(si` − gi`)
T+k ≥
N∑
`= 1
PTDF`k
F∑
i= 1
(si` − gi`)

(4.23)
Although p is not explicitly bounded in K, it is implicitly bounded if the function q`(p`)
is strictly decreasing as was proven in Section 4.2.2.
Proposition 4.15. Assume that the cost function ci`(gi`) is convex for all i and `. Further-
more, assume that the nodal demand functions q`(p`) derived from
(
Affine demand UE
caph
5
)
are continuous and strictly decreasing functions of p` for all `. If K as defined by (4.23)
is nonempty and the function ρi`(si`;S−i`, p`)si` is concave in si` for each fixed (S−i`, p`)
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and all i and `, then a Nash equilibrium exists for the power market game defined by(
UE
caph
1 with shared constraints
)
, (UE2)–(UE4),
(
Affine demand UE
caph
5
)
, and (4.22). 
Proposition 4.16. Assume that K as defined by (4.23) is nonempty and LICQ holds for
K at the Nash equilibrium point. If Assumptions (C)–(E) of Proposition 4.4 hold and
(a)
dpcap` (S
cap
` )
dScap`
< 0
(b)
d2pcap` (S
cap
` )
(dScap` )
2
≤ 0
for all ` and all Scap` ∈
[
0,
F∑
i= 1
N∑
`= 1
capi`
]
, then the power market game defined by(
UE
caph
1 with shared constraints
)
, (UE2)–(UE4),
(
Affine demand UE
caph
5
)
, and (4.22) has
a unique solution.
Proof. It suffices to note that the primal VI associated with this game is defined by K
from (4.23) and
F (g, s, scap, p) ,

[
dci`(gi`)
dgi`
]F ,N
i, `= 1[
−ρi`(S`, p`)− si` dρi`(S`, p`)
dS`
]F ,N
i, `= 1[
−pcap` (Scap` )− scapi`
dpcap` (S
cap
` )
dScap`
]F ,N
i, `= 1[
S` − q`(p`)
]N
`= 1

.
Uniqueness follows from an adaptation of the proof of Proposition 4.4. 
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4.3.3 Emission permit markets
Various frameworks have been proposed to help markets internalize the costs of environ-
mental externalities of electricity production. Arguably the most successful example of
such a market is the SO2 emission allowance system established by Title IV of the 1990
Clean Air Act. The implementation of this scheme is credited with helping reduce acid
rain deposition in the eastern United States for a significantly lower cost than a command-
and-control approach [29]. However, most power market models do not account for the
effects of these emission markets.
Following the SO2 system, tradeable permit markets are commonly proposed for addressing
pollution concerns. Basically, each permit allows its holder to emit a certain amount of
pollutant and can be traded on the open market. Each polluter faces a non-compliance
fine if its permit holdings do not cover its emission levels. Because the regulator fixes the
number of permits that are issued, the aggregate pollution level can be controlled and is
usually decreased over time. When the supply of emission permits is tight, polluters can
either purchase permits or invest in pollution mitigation technologies. Given the polluters
are profit maximizers, this market mechanism should result in the least-cost pollution
abatement strategy because polluters should trade and invest until the marginal permit
cost equals the marginal cost of pollution abatement.
There are two primary forms of permit markets: ambient permits and emissions permits [8,
9, 155]. In the ambient permit framework, each permit is location-specific and grants the
ability to pollute such that the ambient pollutant concentration at the location increases
by a certain amount. Thus, based on how diffusion of the pollution is modeled, a single
generation plant may need to purchase ambient permits for several different locations.
Although the monitoring and administration of this system is obviously complex, it should
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not result in geographic regions with unacceptably high ambient pollutant concentrations.
Emission permits take a different approach and are not location-specific. Instead, an
emission permit grants the ability to emit a certain amount of pollution regardless of
location, making a single [or sometimes zonal] market possible. The possible emergence of
pollutant hot-spots for emission permit markets has been an area of substantial research,
and several market adaptations have been proposed to help eliminate this possibility [219].
A popular market change involves a hybrid-type market in which free trading of emission
permits is allowed as long as the trade does not result in the violation of pre-specified
pollution standards at any monitoring location [131, 147, 148].
Because of the relatively small number of generators in the electricity market, market power
is always a concern. When emission permit markets are implemented, the potential for
market power may be unintentionally introduced (e.g., [93, 153]). Examples of this behavior
have been seen in the California electricity market where generators have bid production
without accounting for emission permit cost in order to inflate electricity prices [127].
In [152], the economic welfare implications of this strategic bidding were studied. These
potential market power issues provide further motivation for expanding the scope of the
unified power market model of Section 4.2.
From a theoretical perspective, the implementation of ambient and/or emission permit
markets is very similar to that for quantity-based capacity markets. This relationship
arises because the number of permits is fixed and price is determined by demand. For
simplicity, only the ambient permit setting will be presented here; the emission permit
model trivially follows. In the following development, note the similarities between this
model and that studied in Chapter 2.
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For ambient permit markets, let {1, · · · , R} be the set of air quality monitoring locations
and Uri` be generator i’s permit r requirement for a unit of generation at node `. The con-
stant Uri` takes into account both the amount of pollution-per-unit emitted from generator
i’s production at node ` and the regulator-determined dispersion characteristics of this
pollution. In the case of air pollution, these dispersion characteristics are related to wind
direction, atmospheric mixing, and pollutant decay. Let p r be the [endogenous] price of a
single permit for monitoring location r. With R
r
being the total number of permits issued
for monitoring location r such that air quality standards are not violated, the obvious
auction-based market clearing conditions are
0 ≤ p r ⊥ R r −
F∑
i= 1
N∑
`= 1
Uri`gi` ≥ 0 for all r = 1, · · · , R. (4.24)
Because generators must pay for these permits, this cost must be included in their opti-
mization problems:
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(
UEemit1 with shared constraints
)
for each i = 1, · · · ,F ,
( g∗i , s
∗
i ) ∈ argmax
gi, si
N∑
`= 1
[
ρi`(si`;S
∗
−i`, p
∗
` )si` − ci`(gi`)− (si` − gi`)w∗`
−
R∑
r= 1
Uri` p
rgi`
]
subject to
N∑
`= 1
(gi` − si`) = 0
0 ≤ gi` ≤ capi`
si` ≥ 0
si` +
∑
j 6= i
s∗j` ≤ S`
gi` +
∑
j 6= i
g∗j` ≥ Q`

for all ` = 1, · · · ,N .
The consumer surplus maximization problem given by (UE5) remains unchanged because
consumers are not required to pay for emission-related permits directly. After incorpo-
rating 4.24 as a shared constraint with common multipliers in the generator problems to
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obtain (UEemit, ′1 with shared constraints) [omitted], define
K ,

( g , s ) | • for all i = 1, · · · ,F
N∑
`= 1
(gi` − si`) = 0
0 ≤ gi` ≤ capi`
si` ≥ 0
 for all ` = 1, · · · ,N
• for all ` = 1, · · · ,N
F∑
i= 1
si` ≤ S`
F∑
i= 1
gi` ≥ Q`
• for all r = 1, · · · , R
R
r −
F∑
i= 1
N∑
`= 1
Uri`gi` ≥ 0
• for all k = 1, · · · ,K
T−k ≤
N∑
`= 1
PTDF`k
F∑
i= 1
(si` − gi`)
T+k ≥
N∑
`= 1
PTDF`k
F∑
i= 1
(si` − gi`)

. (4.25)
Proposition 4.17. Assume that the cost function ci`(gi`) is convex for all i and `. Fur-
thermore, assume that the nodal demand function q`(p`) derived from (UE5) is a con-
tinuous and strictly decreasing function of p` for all `. If K as defined by (4.25) is
nonempty and the function ρi`(si`;S−i`, p`)si` is concave in si` for each fixed (S−i`, p`)
and all i and `, then a Nash equilibrium exists for the power market game defined by(
UEemit1 with shared constraints
)
, (UE2)–(UE4), (UE5), and (4.24). The equilibrium is
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unique if LICQ holds for K at the Nash equilibrium and Assumptions (C)–(E) of Propo-
sition 4.4 hold.
As may be expected, this ambient permit framework can easily be combined with capacity
markets for additional theoretical results along the lines of those proved here.
4.4 Conclusion
This chapter has combined and expanded on traditional power market models in several
ways. After describing and formulating perfectly competitive, Cournot, and conjectured
supply function models for electricity markets, a new unified formulation was presented.
This unified model encompasses each of these traditional market forms along with more
exotic behavioral assumptions. For the perfectly competitive model, Nash equilibrium ex-
istence and uniqueness was proven through an appeal to game integrability. The existence
and uniqueness results for the unified model were established using variational inequal-
ity theory. From the presented theory and proof methods, developing results for related
market models should not be difficult for the reader.
Although knowing that an equilibrium exists for a game is useful, tractible computation
schemes are needed if these solutions are to be identified. For the unified model, projection-
and Newton-based algorithms were presented and proven to be applicable under suitable
conditions. The basic projection algorithm and the Tikhonov regularization algorithm can
be directly applied to the model and are guaranteed to terminate at an equilibrium given
appropriate parameters. The distributed Tikhonov regularization scheme from [121] shows
promise but requires that the solution set is bounded, a property that cannot be easily
established for the unified problem. For the Newton-based methods, solution stability
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allows for the application of the Josephy-Newton and the Semismooth Newton methods.
Finally, three different model extensions were presented. Consumer surplus maximization
was a useful addition from a microeconomic perspective because it made the specification
of nodal demand functions less abstract. The consumer surplus maximization problem
is also fundamental to the more complex capacity and emission market additions. Both
quantity-based and hybrid capacity markets were studied with equilibrium existence and
uniqueness results proven when possible. For managing pollution, both ambient permits
and emission permits were discussed. Mathematically, these markets are implemented in
a very similar manner and solution existence was proven. With these additions, it may be
useful to compare these extended unified models to those of Chapter 2.
There are certainly many elements that have not been included in this unified power market
model. Namely, Stackelberg games, uncertainty/risk, and continuous-time dynamics have
not been addressed. Each of these areas would be a fruitful direction for future research.
It is hoped that this chapter can serve as a basis for the comprehensive development of
further model extensions and that it will obviate the need for repetitive research on closely
related power market models.
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Chapter 5
Differential Nash equilibria:
Equivalence and distributed
computation6
5.1 Introduction
Unlike the static (i.e., discrete-time) non-cooperative Nash equilibrium problems [73, 76]
that have been studied from an optimization viewpoint in the preceding chapters, continuous-
time non-cooperative Nash games have been minimally analyzed from a constrained opti-
mization perspective. Namely, past research into numerical methods for differential Nash
games has focused on optimal control problems without algebraic constraints; in realistic
applications, unconstrained player problems are unlikely. From the theoretical viewpoint,
slightly more is known with past research proving equilibrium existence for differential Nash
games with pure control constraints. However, results for games with mixed state-control
6This chapter has been adapted from a manuscript submitted for review at SIAM Journal on Optimiza-
tion and Control, Manuscript # 089824 (Co-author: Jong-Shi Pang).
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control constraints are lacking. The primary goal of this chapter is to at least partially
address these computational and theoretical deficiencies for differential Nash games with
mixed state-control constraints. Under certain conditions,
(a) it is proven that an optimal control problem solution methodology can be applied to
identify equilibria;
(b) the convergence of a new Jacobi-type solution algorithm is established.
The starting point of this work is the recent paper [95] that analyzes the convergence of
a time-stepping method for solving a linear-quadratic (LQ) optimal control problem with
mixed state-control constraints. Such an LQ optimal control problem is the building block
of an open-loop differential linear-quadratic Nash game in which each of a finite number
of non-cooperative players solves an LQ optimal control problem with mixed state-control
constraints and an objective function that depends on rivals’ variables and constrained by
private, mixed state-control constraints. The main contribution of this work is to provide
a constructive analysis of this differential LQ game by considering two cases:
• The Symmetric case. A “symmetry” condition is provided under which a differential
LQ game with mixed state-control constraints is equivalent to a “concatenated” LQ
optimal control problem; the implication of this equivalence is that all such differential
LQ games can be solved by the convergent time-stepping algorithm described in [95].
• The Asymmetric case. A “spectral radius” condition is provided under which the
differential LQ game can be solved by a distributed Jacobi-type algorithm. Such a
distributed algorithm has been used extensively for solving static Nash games arising
from signal processing problems for communication (e.g., [143, 181, 182, 183, 208]).
The general convergence theory of the Jacobi algorithm for solving static Nash games
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was developed in [76] and is extended to the specified differential LQ game in this
chapter.
In addition to the equivalences and computational methods noted above, examples of both
symmetric and asymmetric differential Nash games that satisfy the assumptions of their re-
spective results are provided. The symmetric example is a continuous-time Nash-Cournot
equilibrium problem while the asymmetric case is illustrated by a conjectured supply func-
tion equilibrium problem. Thus, the assumptions required by the proven theorems are
shown to be not entirely unreasonable.
The remainder of the chapter is organized in five sections. Section 5.2 formulates the
LQ optimal control problem being solved by each player, develops a variational princi-
ple regarding solution optimality, and summarizes the assumptions and existence theorem
presented in [95]. Section 5.3 proves the equivalence of a symmetric differential LQ game
with a concatenated LQ optimal control problem, and Section 5.4 proves the convergence
of a Jacobi-type iterative scheme for solving an asymmetric differential LQ game. Illustra-
tive examples of both symmetric and asymmetric differential LQ games are presented in
Section 5.5. The chapter concludes in Section 5.6.
5.2 The differential LQ game with mixed-state control con-
straints
Consider the linear-quadratic F-player non-cooperative game on the time interval [ 0, T ]
where T < ∞ is the finite horizon. Each player, indexed by i ∈ {1, · · · ,F}, chooses an
absolutely continuous state function xi : [ 0, T ] → Rni and a bounded measurable (thus
integrable) control function ui : [ 0, T ] → Rmi to solve an LQ optimal control problem;
these state and control variables are constrained by a player-specific linear inequality sys-
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tem. Define x , (xi)Fi= 1 and u , (ui)Fi= 1 for all players’ state and control variables,
respectively. Furthermore, define x−i , (xj)j 6= i and u−i , (uj)j 6= i for the state and con-
trol tuples of player i’s rivals. Taking (x−i, u−i) as constant, player i solves the following
continuous-time optimal control problem:
minimize
xi, ui
fi(xi, x−i, ui, u−i) , xi(T )T
 ci + F∑
j= 1
Wijxj(T )
+
∫ T
0
 xi(t)
ui(t)

T 
 pi(t)
qi(t)
+ F∑
j= 1
 Pij Qij
Rij Sij

 xj(t)
uj(t)

 dt
subject to xi(0) = ξi
x˙i(t) = ai +Aixi(t) +Biui(t)
bi + Cixi(t) +Diui(t) ≥ 0
 for almost all t ∈ [ 0, T ] ,
(5.1)
where ξi ∈ Rni is a given initial state, ci ∈ Rni , Wij ∈ Rni×nj , Pij ∈ Rni×nj , Qij ∈ Rni×mj ,
Rij ∈ Rmi×nj , Sij ∈ Rmi×mj , Ai ∈ Rni×ni , Bi ∈ Rni×mi , ai ∈ Rni , bi ∈ R`i , Ci ∈ R`i×ni ,
Di ∈ R`i×mi , pi : [ 0, T ] → Rni , and qi : [ 0, T ] → Rmi . The matrices Wii, Pii, and Sii
are symmetric for all players i. A feasible solution of (5.1) is a pair (xi, ui) such that
xi is absolutely continuous, ui is integrable, and the constraints of (5.1) are satisfied as
stated. A noteworthy feature of the problem (5.1) is the mixed state-control constraint
bi + Cixi(t) + Diui(t) ≥ 0. Throughout this work, the matrix Ci is permitted to be zero
(i.e., pure control constraints), but a key condition for problem solvability yields a special
relation among the matrices (Ai, Bi, Ci, Di) (see Assumption (Ei) in Section 5.2.2). An
aggregated pair (x∗, u∗) is a Nash equilibrium (NE) of the above game if and only if for
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each i = 1, · · · ,F ,
(x∗i , u
∗
i ) ∈ argmin
xi, ui
fi(xi, x
∗
−i, ui, u
∗
−i)
subject to (xi, ui) feasible to (5.1).
(5.2)
5.2.1 A review of past research
The importance of many-player, nonzero-sum differential games has led to a considerable
body of academic research in the field (e.g., [36, 70, 115, 142, 204, 216, 220]). Unfortunately,
many of the examined problems are simplistic and the previously derived results are not
applicable to the current setting due to the absence of mixed state-control constraints.
Despite this deficiency in the literature, it is important to recall the traditional formulation
and solution methodologies for nonzero-sum differential games so that the advantages of
the current methodology can be fully appreciated.
If players do not face any constraints on state or control, the game can be expressed as

minimize
x1, u1
f1(x, u)
...
minimize
xF , uF
fF (x, u)

subject to x˙(t) = g(t, x(t), u(t)) and x(0) = ξ. (5.3)
One of the first theoretical developments for many-player, nonzero-sum differential games
was presented in [36] where it was proven that the derived partial differential equation
system for (5.3) was a generalization of Isaac’s equations [115]. The proof technique uti-
lized value functions and the necessity of the partial differential equations at a solution
was demonstrated. For a special form of the game, it was also proven that the derived
partial differential equations were sufficient for optimality. When specialized to a simple
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linear-quadratic differential game without constraints, the game was shown to be normal
and a system of ordinary differential equations was found to be sufficient for a solution
to the game’s partial differential equations. Despite this simplification, the ordinary dif-
ferential equations could only be explicitly solved for a subinterval of time. This solution
shortcoming was echoed in several later papers.
In 1971, [142] discussed the idea of playability for linear-quadratic nonzero-sum differen-
tial Nash games without algebraic constraints. The framework followed the formulation
of (5.3), and each player minimized a quadratic objective function based on control de-
cisions and a target state vector. Assuming open-loop controls, it was stated that the
invertibility of a given linear operator is sufficient for game playability (i.e., the presence of
a unique Nash equilibrium for the game) and several different sufficient conditions for the
stated invertibility were derived. If the given operator was not invertible, the game was said
to be not playable. However, this terminology is misleading as invertibility is sufficient for
solution existence but is not necessary. This incorrect interpretation was addressed in [70]
where a generalized [but still unconstrained] version of the problem from [142] was studied;
the main result established that either every starting point has a unique equilibrium or
the space of starting points is separated into a proper hyperplane possessing nonunique
equilibria and its complement possessing no equilibria. In a different [unconstrained] gen-
eralization of the problem from [142], [220] proved the existence of an upper bound T0 for
the terminal time such that a Nash equilibrium exists if T < T0 for general convex player
objective functions.
Different theoretical tools must be employed when constraints are present in player optimal
control problems. In an extension of [142] and [220], [216] examined a linear-quadratic
differential game with constraints restricting player i’s controls to lie within a unit ball
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in Euclidean space Rmi for all i. A penalty function method was utilized to establish the
existence of a unique open-loop Nash equilibrium for the penalized game, and convergence
to an open-loop Nash equilibrium of the original game was established for a subsequence
of penalization parameters. However, this existence result, like that in [220], only applies
for a sufficiently small time interval (0, T ).
A significant drawback of the results of [36, Chapter 4], [220], and [216] is that existence
was only proven for sufficiently small time intervals (0, T ). This problem was resolved
in [204] for linear-quadratic differential games with player i’s controls constrained to lie in
a compact, convex subset of Rmi for all i using weak topology properties and a fixed-point
theorem of Tikhonov.
None of this previous research has dealt with the difficulties that arise from mixed state-
control constraints (other than [95] which only examines a “one-player” game). Further-
more, specific equilibrium computation methods were not developed in these papers. Both
of these issues are addressed in this chapter.
5.2.2 Properties of (5.1): A synopsis
For player i, suppose (5.2) holds for an arbitrary pair (x−i, u−i). Let (xi, ui) be a feasible
pair to (5.1) and let (xτi , u
τ
i ) , (x∗i , u∗i ) + τ(xi − x∗i , ui − u∗i ) for τ ∈ [0, 1]. Since (xτi , uτi )
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is also feasible to (5.1), it holds that
0 ≤ fi(xτi , x−i, uτi , u−i)− fi(x∗i , x−i, u∗i , u−i)
= τ (xi(T )− x∗i (T ))
ci + 2Wiix∗i (T ) +∑
j 6= i
Wijxj(T )

+ τ2 (xi(T )− x∗i (T ))T Wii (xi(T )− x∗i (T )) + τ
∫ T
0
xi(t)− x∗i (t)
ui(t)− u∗i (t)

T 
pi(t)
qi(t)

+ 2
 Pii 12
(
Qii +R
T
ii
)
1
2
(
QTii +Rii
)
Sii

x∗i (t)
u∗i (t)
+∑
j 6= i
 Pij Qij
Rij Sij

xj(t)
uj(t)

 dt
+ τ2
∫ T
0
xi(t)− x∗i (t)
ui(t)− u∗i (t)

T  Pii 12
(
Qii +R
T
ii
)
1
2
(
QTii +Rii
)
Sii

xi(t)− x∗i (t)
ui(t)− u∗i (t)
 dt.
Consequently, a necessary condition for (5.2) to hold with an arbitrary pair (x−i, u−i) is
that
(xi(T )− x∗i (T ))T
ci + 2Wiix∗i (T ) +∑
j 6= i
Wijxj(T )

+
∫ T
0
xi(t)− x∗i (t)
ui(t)− u∗i (t)

T 
pi(t)
qi(t)
+∑
j 6= i
 Pij Qij
Rij Sij

xj(t)
uj(t)

+ 2
 Pii 12
(
Qii +R
T
ii
)
1
2
(
QTii +Rii
)
Sii

x∗i (t)
u∗i (t)

 dt ≥ 0
(5.4)
for all pairs (xi, ui) feasible to (5.1), which is a variational principle for optimality to this
optimal control problem.
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For notational convenience, let
Ξij ,

2
 Pii 12
(
Qii +R
T
ii
)
1
2
(
QTii +Rii
)
Sii
 if i = j
 Pij Qij
Rij Sij
 if i 6= j.
In general, Ξij 6= ΞTji for i 6= j, reflecting the asymmetric impact of the strategy of player
j on player i’s objective function and vice versa. The case where symmetry between these
matrices holds (i.e., Ξij = Ξ
T
ji for i 6= j) is addressed in Section 5.3.
In [95], a set of postulates was introduced under which an LQ optimal control problem such
as (5.1) is shown to have a solution; this solution is obtained as the limit of a sequence
of piecewise trajectories formed by interpolating the discrete-time iterates computed from
a time-stepping procedure. Except for Assumption (Ei), the other assumptions provided
in the reference are fairly mild. In what follows, these results are summarized for the
problem (5.1) by starting with the assumptions of [95]:
(Ai) the matrices Wii and Ξii are symmetric positive semidefinite;
(Bi) the functions pi(t) and qi(t) are Lipschitz continuous on [ 0, T ];
(Ci) a continuously differentiable function x̂
fs
i with x̂
fs
i (0) = ξi and a continuous function
û fsi exist such that for all t ∈ [ 0, T ]: dx̂ fsi (t)/dt = ai + Aix̂ fsi (t) + Biû fsi (t) and
û fsi (t) ∈ Ui
(
x̂ fsi (t)
)
, where
Ui(xi) , {u ∈ Rmi | bi + Cixi +Diui ≥ 0 };
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(Di) [Siiui = 0, Diui ≥ 0 ] implies ui = 0 (a primal condition);
(Ei) [D
T
i µi = 0, µi ≥ 0 ] implies (CiAkiBi)Tµi = 0 for all integers k = 0, · · · , ni − 1, or
equivalently, for all nonnegative integers k (a dual condition).
Remark 5.1. Assumptions (Ai) and (Bi) can be easily verified. Assumption (Ci) claims
the existence of a continuously differentiable state trajectory and a continuous control
trajectory that are feasible to (5.1), a slightly more abstract but demonstrable property.
The algebraic implications of Assumptions (Di) and (Ei) can be proven directly or can be
claimed based on matrix properties. For instance, if the symmetric matrix Sii is positive
definite, Assumption (Di) holds; Assumption (Ei) holds if Di has full row rank or is entry-
wise positive. A more detailed discussion of the meaning and consequences of Assumption
(Ei) can be found in [95, Section 3.2]. 
To derive the necessary and sufficient optimality conditions for the LQ optimal control
problem (5.1), start with the definition of the Hamiltonian function [t is removed for
notational convenience] Hi(x, u, λi):
 xi
ui

T 
 pi
qi
+ F∑
j= 1
 Pij Qij
Rij Sij

 xj
uj

+ λTi ( ai +Aixi +Biui ) ,
where λi is the vector of costate (also called adjoint) variables of the ordinary differential
equation x˙i = ai +Aixi +Biu. The Lagrangian function for the optimal control problem
is therefore
Li(x, u, λi, µi) , Hi(x, u, λi)− µTi ( bi + Cixi +Diui ) ,
where µi is the vector of Lagrange multipliers for bi + Cixi + Diui ≥ 0. The [boundary-
value] differential affine variational inequality (DAVI) associated with the LQ problem (5.1)
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is
 λ˙i(t)
x˙i(t)
 =
 −pi(t)−
∑
j 6= i
(Pijxj(t) +Qijuj(t) )
ai
+
 −ATi −2Pii
0 Ai

 λi(t)
xi(t)
+
−
[
Qii +R
T
ii
]
Bi
ui(t) +
C Ti
0
µi(t)

0 = qi(t) +
∑
j 6= i
(Rijxj(t) + Sijuj(t) ) +
[
QTii +Rii
]
xi(t)
+2Siiui(t) +B
T
i λi(t)−DTi µi(t)
0 ≤ µi(t) ⊥ bi + Cixi(t) +Diui(t) ≥ 0
 the two bracketed conditions imply that
ui(t) ∈ argmin
ui ∈Ui(xi(t))
Hi(x(t), ui, u−i(t), λi(t))

xi(0) = ξi and λi(T ) = ci + 2Wiixi(T ) +
∑
j 6= i
Wijxj(T ).
(5.5)
Remark 5.2. The formulation of (5.5) follows from Pontryagin’s minimum principle. The
differential equations are given by λ˙i =
−∂Li
∂xi
and x˙i =
∂Li
∂λi
, respectively, the bracketed
equation arises from
∂Li
∂ui
= 0, the bracketed complementarity condition enforces comple-
mentary slackness, and λi(T ) equals the partial derivative of the objective function cost
associated with terminal time T with respect to xi(T ). 
As a parameterized DAVI with (xi, λi) as the pair of differential variables, (ui, µi) as the
pair of algebraic variables, and (x−i, u−i) as parameters, the tuple (xi, ui, λi, µi) is a weak
solution of (5.5) in the sense of Carathe´odory if (a) (xi, λi) is absolutely continuous and
(ui, µi) is square-integrable on [ 0, T ], (b) the differential equations and the two algebraic
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conditions hold for almost all t ∈ ( 0, T ), and (c) the initial and boundary conditions are
satisfied.
With detailed proofs given in [95], Theorem 5.1 below summarizes the main properties of
the optimal control problem (5.1), the DAVI (5.5), and their relationship. The theorem
starts with the Assumptions (Ai)–(Ei), under which part (I) asserts the existence of a weak
solution of the DAVI (5.5) via a constructive argument. Part (II) of Theorem 5.1 states
that any weak solution of the DAVI (5.5) is an optimal solution of (5.1), thus proving
sufficiency of the Pontryagin optimality principle (see, e.g., [26, 43, 88, 144, 190]). Part
(III) asserts several properties of an optimal solution of (5.1); this part is analogous to
well-known results for a finite-dimensional convex quadratic programming. From these
properties, part (IV) proves the reverse implication between solutions of optimal control
problem (5.1) and DAVI (5.5), namely that any optimal solution of (5.1) must be a weak
solution of the DAVI (5.5). An alternative characterization of optimality in terms of the
variational inequality (5.4) is stated in part (V). Since this property was not derived in [95],
a proof is provided. Finally, part (VI) asserts solution uniqueness from part (I) under the
positive definiteness of the matrix Sii.
Theorem 5.1. Under Assumptions (Ai)–(Ei), the following statements (I)–(VI) hold for
arbitrary integrable pair (x−i, u−i).
(I: Solvability of the DAVI) The DAVI (5.5) has a weak solution (x∗i , u
∗
i , λ
∗
i , µ
∗
i ), pro-
vided that the pair (x−i, u−i) is Lipschitz continuous.
(II: Sufficiency of Pontryagin) If (x∗i , u
∗
i , λ
∗
i , µ
∗
i ) is any weak solution of (5.5), then
the pair (x∗i , u
∗
i ) is an optimal solution of the problem (5.1).
(III: Gradient characterization of optimal solutions) If (x̂i, ûi) and (x˜i, u˜i) are any
two optimal solutions of (5.1), then the following three properties hold:
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(a) for almost all t ∈ [ 0, T ],
 Pii 12
(
Qii +R
T
ii
)
1
2
(
QTii +Rii
)
Sii

 x̂i(t)− x˜i(t)
ûi(t)− u˜i(t)
 = 0 ;
(b) Wiix̂i(T ) = Wiix˜i(T ) ;
(c) 0 = (x̂i(T )− x˜i(T ))T
ci +∑
j 6= i
Wijxj(T )
+
∫
T
0
 x̂i(t)− x˜i(t)
ûi(t)− u˜i(t)

T 
 pi(t)
qi(t)
+∑
j 6= i
 Pij Qij
Rij Sij

 xj(t)
uj(t)

 dt.
Given any optimal solution (x̂, û) of (5.1), a feasible tuple (x˜, u˜) of (5.1) is optimal
if and only if conditions (a), (b), and (c) hold.
(IV: Necessity of Pontryagin) Let (x∗i , u
∗
i , λ
∗
i , µ
∗
i ) be the tuple obtained from part (I).
A feasible tuple (x˜i, u˜i) of (5.1) is optimal if and only if (x˜i, u˜i, λ
∗
i , µ
∗
i ) is a weak
solution of (5.5).
(V: Variational characterization of optimality) The satisfaction of the variational
principle (5.4) for all pairs (xi, ui) feasible to (5.1) is necessary and sufficient for an
optimal solution (x∗i , u
∗
i ) of (5.1).
(VI: Uniqueness under positive definiteness) If Sii is positive definite and the pair
(x−i, u−i) is Lipschitz continuous, then (5.1) has a unique optimal solution ( x̂i, ûi )
such that x̂i is continuously differentiable and ûi is Lipschitz continuous on [ 0, T ];
moreover, for any optimal λ̂i and all t ∈ [ 0, T ],
ûi(t) ∈ argmin
ui ∈Ui(x̂i(t))
Hi(x̂i(t), x−i(t), ui, u−i(t), λ̂i(t)).
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Proof. For (V), the derivation of (5.4) has proven necessity. The sufficiency follows easily
from the positive semidefinitess Assumption (Ai). Incidentally, the validity of this part
only requires Assumption (Ai). 
5.3 The symmetric case
Theorem 5.1 pertains only to the individual players’ optimal control problems and says
nothing about the game as a whole. In what follows, under an additional symmetry
condition, it is shown that this inequality constrained differential LQ game is equivalent
to a single concatenated optimal control problem that is under the scope of applicability
of Theorem 5.1. Define aggregate vector c , (ci)Fi= 1 with similar definitions holding for p
and q and aggregate matrix W ,
[
[Wij ]
F
i, j= 1 + diag(Wii)
F
i= 1
]
with similar definitions for
 P Q
R S
 ,
 [Pij ]
F
i, j= 1 + diag(Pii)
F
i= 1 [Qij ]
F
i, j= 1 + diag(Qii)
F
i= 1
[Rij ]
F
i, j= 1 + diag(Rii)
F
i= 1 [Sij ]
F
i, j= 1 + diag(Sii)
F
i= 1
 .
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Furthermore, define Ξ , [Ξij ]Fi, j= 1. Using this notation, define the aggregated LQ optimal
control problem in the variables (x, u):
minimize
x, u
x(T )T ( c + 12 Wx(T ) )+∫ T
0
 x(t)
u(t)

T 
 p(t)
q(t)
+ 12
 P Q
R S

 x(t)
u(t)

 dt
subject to, for all i ∈ { 1, · · · ,F},
xi(0) = ξi
x˙i(t) = ai +Aixi(t) +Biui(t)
bi + Cixi(t) +Diui(t) ≥ 0
 for almost all t ∈ [ 0, T ].
(5.6)
Note that the matrix
 P Q
R S
 in the objective function is a principal rearrangement of
Ξ, thereby implying that properties of Ξ such as symmetry and positive semidefiniteness
will hold for
 P Q
R S
.
Aggregate the Assumptions (Ai)–(Ei) to obtain a set of conditions pertaining to the above
single LQ optimal control problem.
(A) the matrices W and Ξ are symmetric positive semidefinite;
(B) Assumption (Bi) holds for all i = 1, · · · ,F ;
(C) Assumption (Ci) holds for all i = 1, · · · ,F ;
(D) [ Su = 0 and Diui ≥ 0 for all i = 1, · · · ,F ] implies [ui = 0 for all i = 1, · · · ,F ];
(E) Assumption (Ei) holds for all i = 1, · · · ,F .
Under the above conditions, the following equivalence for the “symmetric” differential LQ
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game can be derived.
Theorem 5.2. Under Assumption (A), the following statements hold.
(I: Equivalence) A pair (x∗, u∗) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if (x∗, u∗) is an optimal
solution of (5.6).
(II: Existence) Under the additional Assumptions (B)–(E), a Nash equilibrium exists
such that x∗ is absolutely continuous and u∗ is square-integrable on [ 0, T ].
(III: Uniqueness) If S is positive definite in addition to (A)–(E), then (x∗, u∗) is the
unique Nash equilibrium such that x∗ is continuously differentiable and u∗ is Lipschitz
continuous on [ 0, T ].
Proof. This result follows from two observations under Assumption (A): (a) the pair
(x∗, u∗) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if the following variational property (an aggrega-
tion of (5.4)) holds for all pairs (x, u) feasible to (5.6):
F∑
i= 1
(xi(T )− x∗i (T ))T
ci + 2Wiix∗i (T ) +∑
j 6= i
Wijx
∗
j (T )
+
F∑
i= 1
∫ T
0
xi(t)− x∗i (t)
ui(t)− u∗i (t)

T 
pi(t)
qi(t)
+∑
j 6= i
 Pij Qij
Rij Sij

x∗j (t)
u∗j (t)

+ 2
 Pii 12
(
Qii +R
T
ii
)
1
2
(
QTii +Rii
)
Sii

x∗i (t)
u∗i (t)

 dt ≥ 0,
(5.7)
and (b) the variational condition (5.7) is necessary and sufficient for the pair (x∗, u∗) to
be optimal for the LQ optimal control problem (5.6). Assertions (II) and (III) follow from
the theory in [95] applied to (5.6) and the equivalence in (I). 
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A consequence of the equivalence between the symmetric differential LQ game and the
single LQ optimal control problem is that the numerical time-stepping method presented
in [95] can be used to solve for Nash equilibria. This method consists of solving con-
vex quadratic subprograms obtained by discretizing (5.6) in time; the convergence of the
method provides a constructive proof for the existence result in part (I) of Theorem 5.2.
Details are omitted and can be found in the cited reference.
5.4 The asymmetric case
Next consider the asymmetric case where the matrix Ξ is not necessarily symmetric. In
this situation, the equivalence proven in Theorem 5.2 does not hold and the computation
method of [95] cannot be applied to (5.6) for equilibrium identification. Instead, the sym-
metry assumption required in Section 5.3 is replaced with a spectral condition on a certain
condensed matrix obtained from Ξ. Under this matrix-theoretic spectral condition, it is
shown that a distributed algorithm will converge to the unique NE of the differential LQ
game. To simplify analysis, Assumption (W) (a diagonal condition, see below) is made,
thereby removing the dependence of the rivals’ terminal states in each player’s objective
function (i.e., the sum
∑
j 6= i
Wijxj(T ) is eliminated). The analysis can be extended to handle
the case where some Wij are nonzero; in this case, the corresponding diagonal block Wii
is required to be positive definite with its smallest eigenvalue “dominating” the sum of the
nonzero off-diagonal blocks, roughly speaking.
The treatment in this section is an extension of that for the static Nash game whose
details can be found in [76]. Unlike the algorithm for the latter game that solves finite-
dimensional optimization problems, the algorithm below solves a sequence of LQ optimal
control problems, which in turn need to be discretized for numerical computation by, for
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example, the time-stepping method described in [95].
In addition to Assumption (W), two more assumptions are needed in this section, (Â) and
(D̂), which are stated below. Assumption (Â) assumes that the diagonal blocks Ξii are
positive definite matrices, albeit not necessarily symmetric. This assumption implies (Ci)
for all i = 1, · · · ,F . Assumption (D̂) yields the uniform boundedness Lemma 5.1 through
a proof similar to that of Gronwall’s lemma.
(Â) For all i = 1, · · · ,F , the matrices Ξii are positive definite with minimum eigenvalues
σΞi > 0; the matrices Wii remain (symmetric) positive semidefinite;
(D̂) For all i = 1, · · · ,F , the following implication holds: Diui ≥ 0 ⇒ ui = 0.
(W) For all i = 1, · · · ,F , the matrices Wij = 0 for all j 6= i.
Lemma 5.1. Under Assumption (D̂), there exists a constant ζ > 0 such that for all
i = 1, · · · ,F ,
sup
t∈ [ 0,T ]
‖xi(t) ‖ ≤ ζ and ess sup
t∈ [ 0,T ]
‖ui(t) ‖ ≤ ζ
for any trajectory (xi, ui) feasible to (5.1).
Proof. Given (D̂) and the constraint bi + Cixi(t) + Diui(t) ≥ 0 holding for almost all
t ∈ [ 0, T ], there exist positive αi and α̂i such that for all feasible (xi, ui),
‖ui(t)‖ ≤ αi‖bi + Cixi(t)‖ ≤ α̂i(1 + ‖xi(t)‖) (5.8)
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holds when ui(t) is well-defined. Now consider that for all t ∈ [ 0, T ] with x˙i(t) well-defined,
d
dt
‖xi(t)‖ ≤ ‖x˙i(t)‖ = ‖ai + Aixi(t) + Biui(t)‖
≤ ‖ai‖ + ‖Ai‖‖xi(t)‖ + ‖Bi‖α̂i(1 + ‖xi(t)‖)
≤ βi(1 + ‖xi(t)‖)
where βi > 0. With manipulations similar to the proof of Gronwall’s lemma,
−βi‖xi(t)‖ + d
dt
‖xi(t)‖ ≤ βi, implying
d
dt
(
e−βit‖xi(t)‖
)
≤ βie−βit;
thus, ‖xi(t)‖ ≤ eβit
(
‖ξi‖ +
∫ t
0
βie
−βisds
)
.
It follows that a constant ζ ′ > 0 exists such that ‖xi(t)‖ ≤ ζ ′ for all t ∈ [ 0, T ]. The
existence of the desired constant ζ follows readily from (5.8). 
Consider the following Jacobi-type iterative solution method for the asymmetric differential
LQ game. The analysis of a related Gauss-Seidel version of the algorithm is similar and
omitted.
Jacobi method for asymmetric differential LQ games.
For each i = 1, · · · ,F , let x0i be a continuously differentiable Lipschitz function and u0i
be a Lipschitz continuous function with
(
x0i , u
0
i
)
feasible to (5.1). Let k = 0.
Step 1: If
(
xki , u
k
i
)
solves (5.1) given
(
xk−i, u
k
−i
)
for each i, stop.
Step 2: Let
(
xk+1i , u
k+1
i
)
solve (5.1) given
(
xk−i, u
k
−i
)
for each i.
Step 3: Set k ← k + 1 and return to Step 1.
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Remark 5.3. The presented Jacobi method is a distributed computation scheme for asym-
metric differential LQ games that operates in a manner similar to its namesake, the Jacobi
method for solving a linear system of equations. Like the iterative Tikhonov method pro-
vided in Section 4.2.3, this algorithm can be implemented in parallel with players sharing
only their optimal trajectories at the end of each iteration (i.e., each player solves (5.1)
parametrized by its rivals’ optimal trajectories from the previous iteration). Finding the
[exact] solution of (5.1) in Step 2 requires the use of a separate [inner] algorithm such as the
iterative discretization method of [95]. As a consequence of the [upcoming] convergence of
this computational scheme, every differential Nash game satisfying the stated assumptions
has a unique equilibrium.
Remark 5.4. The Lipschitz continuity of
(
xkj , u
k
j
)
for j 6= i is needed so that Assumption
(Bi) can be satisfied for the computation of the next pair
(
xk+1i , u
k+1
i
)
. In turn, the positive
definiteness of Ξii ensures the preservation of the Lipschitz property of
(
xk+1i , u
k+1
i
)
and
thus the Lipschitz continuity of the entire sequence of iterates. Under Assumptions (Â),
(B), (W), (D̂), and (E), the sequence of iterates {(xk, uk)} is well defined with xk being
continuously differentiable and uk being Lipschitz continuous on [ 0, T ] for all k. 
The convergence of this method in the differential context has not been analyzed before
and is the focus of the rest of the chapter.
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From the variational condition (5.4),
(
xki (T )− xk+1i (T )
)T (
ci + 2Wiix
k+1
i (T )
)
+∫ T
0
 xki (t)− xk+1i (t)
uki (t)− uk+1i (t)

T 
 pi(t)
qi(t)
+∑
j 6= i
 Pij Qij
Rij Sij

 xkj (t)
ukj (t)

+ 2
 Pii 12
(
Qii +R
T
ii
)
1
2
(
QTii +Rii
)
Sii

 xk+1i (t)
uk+1i (t)

 dt ≥ 0
and
(
xk+1i (T )− xki (T )
)T (
ci + 2Wiix
k
i (T )
)
+∫ T
0
 xk+1i (t)− xki (t)
uk+1i (t)− uki (t)

T 
 pi(t)
qi(t)
+∑
j 6= i
 Pij Qij
Rij Sij

 xk−1j (t)
uk−1j (t)

+ 2
 Pii 12
(
Qii +R
T
ii
)
1
2
(
QTii +Rii
)
Sii

 xki (t)
uki (t)

 dt ≥ 0.
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Adding,
0 ≤ 2
(
xki (T )− xk+1i (T )
)T
Wii (x
k+1
i (T )− xki (T ) ) +∫ T
0
 xki (t)− xk+1i (t)
uki (t)− uk+1i (t)

T ∑
j 6= i
 Pij Qij
Rij Sij

 xkj (t)− xk−1j (t)
ukj (t)− uk−1j (t)

+ 2
 Pii 12
(
Qii +R
T
ii
)
1
2
(
QTii +Rii
)
Sii

 xk+1i (t)− xki (t)
uk+1i (t)− uki (t)

 dt
≤
∫ T
0
−σΞi
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
 xki (t)− xk+1i (t)
uki (t)− uk+1i (t)

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
+
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
xki (t)− xk+1i (t)
uki (t)− uk+1i (t)
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
j 6= i
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
 Pij Qij
Rij Sij

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
 xkj (t)− xk−1j (t)
ukj (t)− uk−1j (t)

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
 dt
by leveraging the positive definiteness of Ξii and the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. By the
Cauchy-Schwarz inequality for integrals,
σΞi

∫ T
0
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
 xki (t)− xk+1i (t)
uki (t)− uk+1i (t)

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
dt

1/2
≤
∑
j 6= i
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
 Pij Qij
Rij Sij

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥

∫ T
0
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
 xkj (t)− xk−1j (t)
ukj (t)− uk−1j (t)

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
dt

1/2
.
(5.9)
Defining the difference
eki ,
√
σΞi
√√√√√√
∫ T
0
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
 xki (t)− xk+1i (t)
uki (t)− uk+1i (t)

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
dt ,
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the vector ek ,
(
eki
)F
i= 1
, and the matrix Γ , [Γij ]Fi, j= 1, where
Γij ,

0 if i = j
1√
σΞi σ
Ξ
j
‖Ξij ‖ if i 6= j,
it can be deduced by aggregating the inequalities (5.9) for i = 1, · · · ,F that
ek ≤ Γ ek−1. (5.10)
Thus, if the spectral radius ρ(Γ) < 1, then the sequence {ek} contracts and converges to
zero. In particular, the sequence {(xki (t), uki (t))} converges strongly to a square-integrable,
thus integrable, limit (x∞i (t), u
∞
i (t)) in the space L
2[ 0, T ]:
lim
k→∞
∫ T
0
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
 xki (t)− x∞i (t)
uki (t)− u∞i (t)

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥ dt = 0.
Thus, for an infinite index set κ ⊂ {1, 2, · · · ,∞}, the subsequence of functions {(xki (t), uki (t))}k∈κ
converges pointwise to (x∞i (t), u
∞
i (t)) for almost all t ∈ [ 0, T ] by the Riesz-Fischer Theo-
rem. Hence, bi + Cix
∞
i (t) +Diu
∞
i (t) ≥ 0 for almost all t. Moreover,
lim
k→∞
∫
t
0
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
 xki (τ)− x∞i (τ)
uki (τ)− u∞i (τ)

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥ dτ = 0 for all t ∈ ( 0, T ].
Therefore, for all t ∈ ( 0, T ],
lim
k→∞
∫ t
0
(
ai +Aix
k
i (τ) +Biu
k
i (τ)
)
dτ =
∫ t
0
( ai +Aix
∞
i (τ) +Biu
∞
i (τ) ) dτ.
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At times t where {xki (t)}k∈κ converges to x∞i (t), expressing xki (t) as the integration of x˙ki (τ)
from ( 0, t ] with xki (0) = ξi gives
x∞i (t) = lim
k(∈κ)→∞
xki (t) = ξi + lim
k(∈κ)→∞
∫ t
0
(
ai +Aix
k
i (τ) +Biu
k
i (τ)
)
dτ
= ξi +
∫ t
0
( ai +Aix
∞
i (τ) +Biu
∞
i (τ) ) dτ.
From Lemma 5.1, the sequence {(xki (t), uki (t))}k∈κ is uniformly bounded for t ∈ [ 0, T ];
thus, the limit pair (x∞(t), u∞(t)) is bounded for almost all t ∈ [ 0, T ]. For any two times
t < s in [ 0, T ],
xki (t)− xki (s)
=
∫ s
t
(
ai +Aix
k
i (τ) +Biu
k
i (τ)
)
dτ
=
∫ s
t
( ai +Aix
∞
i (τ) +Biu
∞
i (τ) ) dτ
+
∫ s
t
(
Ai
(
xki (τ)− x∞i (τ)
)
+Bi
(
uki (τ)− u∞i (τ)
))
dτ.
Therefore, the family {xki (t)}k∈κ is equicontinuous; by the well-known Arzela`-Ascoli the-
orem, this sequence has a subsequence that converges uniformly to a continuous function
on t ∈ [ 0, T ]. Without loss of generality, assume that {xki (t)}k∈κ converges uniformly to
x∞i (t) which is continuous. It follows that for all t ∈ [ 0, T ],
x∞i (t) = ξi +
∫ t
0
( ai +Aix
∞
i (τ) +Biu
∞
i (τ) ) dτ.
The pair (x∞i , u
∞
i ) is feasible to (5.1). Moreover, since
lim
k→∞
(
xki (T )− xk+1i (T )
)T
Wii
(
xk+1i (T )− xki (T )
)
= 0
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and Wii is symmetric positive semidefinite, it follows that
lim
k(∈κ)→∞
Wii
(
xk+1i (T )− x∞i (T )
)
= 0
and
lim
k(∈κ)→∞
(
xk+1i (T )− x∞i (T )
)T
Wii
(
xk+1i (T )− x∞i (T )
)
= 0.
To show that the tuple (x∞i , u
∞
i )
F
i= 1 is a Nash equilibrium of the game, it suffices to show
that
(xi(T )− x∞i (T ) )T ( ci + 2Wiix∞i (T ) ) +∫ T
0
 xi(t)− x∞i (t)
ui(t)− u∞i (t)

T 
 pi(t)
qi(t)
+∑
j 6= i
 Pij Qij
Rij Sij

 x∞j (t)
u∞j (t)

+ 2
 Pii 12
(
Qii +R
T
ii
)
1
2
(
QTii +Rii
)
Sii

 x∞i (t)
u∞i (t)

 dt ≥ 0
for every feasible pair (xi, ui) of (5.1) and for all i = 1, · · · ,F . For all k,
(
xi(T )− xk+1i (T )
)T (
ci + 2Wiix
k+1
i (T )
)
+∫ T
0
 xi(t)− xk+1i (t)
ui(t)− uk+1i (t)

T 
 pi(t)
qi(t)
+∑
j 6= i
 Pij Qij
Rij Sij

 xkj (t)
ukj (t)

+ 2
 Pii 12
(
Qii +R
T
ii
)
1
2
(
QTii +Rii
)
Sii

 xk+1i (t)
uk+1i (t)

 dt ≥ 0.
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It holds that
(
xi(T )− xk+1i (T )
)T (
ci + 2Wiix
k+1
i (T )
)
=
(
x∞i (T )− xk+1i (T )
)T (
ci + 2Wiix
k+1
i (T )
)
+ (xi(T )− x∞i (T ))T
(
ci + 2Wiix
k+1
i (T )
)
= 2
(
x∞i (T )− xk+1i (T )
)T
Wii
(
xk+1i (T )− x∞i (T )
)
+
(xi(T )− x∞i (T ))T
(
ci + 2Wiix
k+1
i (T )
)
+
(
x∞i (T )− xk+1i (T )
)T
(ci + 2Wiix
∞
i (T )) .
Therefore,
lim
k(∈κ)→∞
(
xi(T )− xk+1i (T )
)T (
ci + 2Wiix
k+1
i (T )
)
= (xi(T )− x∞i (T ) )T ( ci + 2Wiix∞i (T ) ) .
Similarly,
lim
k→∞
∫ T
0
 xi(t)− xk+1i (t)
ui(t)− uk+1i (t)

T 
 pi(t)
qi(t)

+ 2
 Pii 12
(
Qii +R
T
ii
)
1
2
(
QTii +Rii
)
Sii

xk+1i (t)
uk+1i (t)

 dt
=
∫ T
0
 xi(t)− x∞i (t)
ui(t)− u∞i (t)

T 
 pi(t)
qi(t)

+ 2
 Pii 12
(
Qii +R
T
ii
)
1
2
(
QTii +Rii
)
Sii

 x∞i (t)
u∞i (t)

 dt.
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Finally,∫ T
0
 xi(t)− xk+1i (t)
ui(t)− uk+1i (t)

T  Pij Qij
Rij Sij

 xkj (t)
ukj (t)
 dt
=
∫ T
0
 xi(t)− x∞i (t)
ui(t)− u∞i (t)

T  Pij Qij
Rij Sij

 xkj (t)− x∞j (t)
ukj (t)− u∞j (t)
 dt
+
∫ T
0
 xi(t)− x∞i (t)
ui(t)− u∞i (t)

T  Pij Qij
Rij Sij

 x∞j (t)
u∞j (t)
 dt
+
∫ T
0
 x∞i (t)− xk+1i (t)
u∞i (t)− uk+1i (t)

T  Pij Qij
Rij Sij

 xkj (t)
ukj (t)
 dt,
from which it can be deduced that
lim
k→∞
∫ T
0
 xi(t)− xk+1i (t)
ui(t)− uk+1i (t)

T  Pij Qij
Rij Sij

 xkj (t)
ukj (t)
 dt
=
∫ T
0
 xi(t)− x∞i (t)
ui(t)− u∞i (t)

T  Pij Qij
Rij Sij

 x∞j (t)
u∞j (t)
 dt.
Summarizing the above analysis, the following convergence, existence, and uniqueness re-
sult for the asymmetric differential LQ Nash game that is the counterpart of Theorem 5.2
has been obtained. The condition ρ(Γ) < 1 is a familiar condition for the contraction of
fixed-point iterations for computing static Nash equilibria (e.g., [76, Section 6]).
Theorem 5.3. Under Assumptions (Â), (B), (W), (D̂), (E), the following statements hold
for the sequence {(xki , uki )} generated by the specified Jacobi method.
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(I: Well-definedness) The sequence {(xki , uki )} is well-defined with xki being continuously
differentiable and uki Lipschitz continuous on [ 0, T ] for all k.
(II: Contraction and strong convergence) If ρ(Γ) < 1, the sequence {(xk, uk)} con-
verges strongly to a pair (x∞, u∞) that is the unique Nash equilibrium of the differ-
ential LQ game.
Proof. It remains to be shown that the differential game has a unique Nash equilibrium.
Let (x̂, û) and (x˜, u˜) denote two Nash equilibria. After defining the error vector e ,
(ei)
F
i= 1, where
ei ,
√
σΞi
√√√√√√
∫ T
0
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
 x̂i(t)− x˜i(t)
ûi(t)− u˜i(t)

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
dt,
e ≤ Γe holds. Since ρ(Γ) < 1, e = 0 and the Nash equilibria must be identical. 
5.5 Example problems
Given the abstract framing of the symmetric and asymmetric problems in the previous two
sections, two concrete examples are presented to illustrate that these types of problems
arise naturally in microeconomic games. The first example model is an adaptation of the
well-known Nash-Cournot equilibrium problem while the second is a conjectured supply
function equilibrium problem. Although Nash-Cournot problems are typically studied in
a static setting, some research has been conducted on oligopolistic markets formulated as
differential games (e.g., [38, 44, 62, 166, 212]). There has been little research on differen-
tial conjectured supply function games, but the example formulation represents a natural
extension to the static problem form. Although game generalizations may seem straight-
forward, the presented examples should be treated with caution; the conditions that must
be satisfied should not be haphazardly assumed to hold for similar problems.
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5.5.1 A Nash-Cournot game
In non-cooperative microeconomic equilibrium problems, F players produce and sell a
commodity to maximize profit subject to constraints such as manufacturing capacity and
available budget. For the Nash-Cournot version of this problem, each player believes that
their output affects the commodity price that is represented as a function of total output.
For a two-player, two-node problem, let the production of player i at node ` and time t be
denoted by gi`(t), the sales of player i to node ` at time t be denoted by si`(t), and the
ramp rate (i.e., instantaneous change in production) of player i at node ` and time t be
denoted by ri`(t). Let the linear Cournot pricing function at node ` at time t be given by
P0` −
P0`
Q0`
( F∑
i= 1
si`(t)
)
(P0` and Q
0
` positive for all `) and the quadratic production cost of
player i at node ` and time t be given by c1i`gi`(t) + c
2
i`gi`(t)
2 (c1i` and c
2
i` positive for all
i and `). If each player pays a marginal transportation cost of w(t) at time t for product
movement from node 2 to node 1 , the transportation cost for firm i is (si1(t)− gi1(t))w(t).
Assume that w(t) is a given Lipschitz continuous function on t ∈ [0, T ].
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With this problem description, player 1’s optimal control problem is
minimize
g1, s1, r1
∫
T
0

g11(t)
g12(t)
s11(t)
s12(t)
r11(t)
r12(t)

T 

c111 − w(t)
c112
−P01 + w(t)
−P02
0
0

+

c211
c212
P01
Q01
P02
Q02
0
0


g11(t)
g12(t)
s11(t)
s12(t)
r11(t)
r12(t)

+

0
0
P01
Q01
P02
Q02
0
0


g21(t)
g22(t)
s21(t)
s22(t)
r21(t)
r22(t)


dt
=
∫ T
0
(
2∑
`= 1
(
c11`g1`(t) + c
2
1`g1`(t)
2 −
[
P0` −
P0`
Q0`
(s1`(t) + s2`(t))
]
s1`(t)
)
+(s11(t)− g11(t))w(t)
)
dt
subject to (next page)
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g11(0) = g
0
11, g12(0) = g
0
12, and for almost all t ∈ [ 0, T ] ,
g˙11(t) = r11(t)
g˙12(t) = r12(t)
−r1` + r1`(t) ≥ 0 for ` = 1, 2
r1` − r1`(t) ≥ 0 for ` = 1, 2

⇒
r11 ≤ g˙11(t) ≤ r11
r12 ≤ g˙12(t) ≤ r12
g11(t) + g12(t)− s11(t)− s12(t) ≥ 0
−g11(t)− g12(t) + s11(t) + s12(t) ≥ 0.
The state and control variables of this problem are
{g11, g12} and {s11, s12, r11, r12}, respectively.
The first group of constraints describes ramp rates limits with ri` and ri` being the limiting
ramp rates for player i’s production at node `. The last two constraints equate total
production and total sales.
Player 2’s objective function is easily shown to be identical to that given above except with 1
and 2 interchanged in the player index i. Therefore, it is apparent that Ξ ,
 Ξ11 Ξ12
Ξ21 Ξ22

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is the symmetric matrix

2c211
2c212
2
P01
Q01
P01
Q01
2
P02
Q02
P02
Q02
0
0
2c221
2c222
P01
Q01
2
P01
Q01
P02
Q02
2
P02
Q02
0
0

.
Furthermore, Ξ must be positive semidefinite by row diagonal dominance, thereby fulfilling
Assumption (A). Assumption (B) is obvious by the assumed Lipschitz continuity of w(t).
Assumption (C) follows from setting rij(t) = 0 and sij(t) = gij(t) for i, j = 1, 2 and
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t ∈ [0, T ] to obtain a feasible trajectory with gij(t) = g0ij for t ∈ [ 0, T ]. Since
S ,
 2S11 S12
S21 2S22
 =

2
P01
Q01
P01
Q01
2
P02
Q02
P02
Q02
0
0
P01
Q01
2
P01
Q01
P02
Q02
2
P02
Q02
0
0

and
Di ,

1
1
−1
−1
−1 −1
1 1

for players i = 1, 2, Su = 0 implies that s11 = s12 = s21 = s22 = 0 and Diui ≥ 0
for i = 1, 2 gives r11 =, r12 = r21 = r22 = 0. Hence, (D) holds. It can be seen that[
DTi µi = 0, µi ≥ 0
]
can only hold when µi1 = µi3, µi2 = µi4, and µi5 = µi6. Therefore,
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(
CiA
0
iBi
)T
µi equals


0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
1 1
−1 −1

I
 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1


T 
µi1
µi2
µi3
µi4
µi5
µi6

=

0
0
µi5 − µi6
µi5 − µi6

=

0
0
0
0

.
Since Ai is a zero matrix, A
k
i for every positive integer k is 0. Hence, (E) holds. It has been
established that this differential Nash-Cournot equilibrium problem can be formulated as
an equivalent symmetric optimal control problem satisfying Assumptions (A)–(E). As a
consequence, Theorem 5.1 guarantees the existence of an equilibrium and [95] provides a
convergent iterative method for finding an Nash equilibrium.
5.5.2 A conjectured supply function game
To identify an asymmetric differential game arising from microeconomic Nash equilibrium
problems, consider a conjectured supply function (CSF) problem [55, 111, 112, 213] and
Section 4.2. In the Nash-Cournot problem, symmetry arises from the assumption that each
player uses the same commodity pricing function and that no player anticipates competitor
production/sales changes with respect to price. In a conjectured supply function equilib-
rium problem, players instead use a function to predict how total competitor production
will change based on price. For this example, the presented model will be simplified to in-
clude only one node so that production and sales quantities are equivalent and transmission
is not needed.
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For player i, let the function σi(G−i(t), pi(t), t) represent the relationship between price
and total competitor production in time t:
σi(G−i(t), pi(t), t) , G−i(t) + βi(G−i(t), p∗i (t), t)(pi(t)− p∗i (t)),
where G−i(t) is the total amount of competitor production expected at the specified equi-
librium price p∗i (t) at time t. Notice that players may expect different equilibrium price
trajectories here; this setting generalizes the case in which players use the same equilibrium
price trajectory of p∗i (t) = p
∗(t) for i = 1, 2. It follows that, depending on the specifica-
tion of βi(G−i(t), p∗i (t), t), the conjectured total production from other players will rise or
fall if the realized price pi(t) does not equal the equilibrium price p
∗
i (t). Upon substitution
into the production-pricing relationship
gi(t) + σi(G−i(t), pi(t), t) = Q0 − Q
0
P0
pi(t),
invertibility of
Q0
P0
+ βi(G−i(t), p∗i (t), t) provides an explicit equation for player i’s con-
jectured price pi(t). This invertibility should hold in market settings: βi(G−i(t), p∗i (t), t)
is expected to be nonnegative so that total competitor production is believed to change
in the same direction as price differences (i.e., higher prices than expected at equilibrium
should not decrease conjectured production). In the special case assumed here where
βi(G−i(t), p∗i (t), t) , B−i for some positive constant B−i,
pi(t) =
Q0 −Gi(t) +B−ip∗i (t)
Q0
P0
+B−i
.
Using this conjectured price, formulate player 1’s optimal control problem as a cost min-
imization problem in which the conjectured supply function price is used for determining
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revenue and costs are comprised of a quadratic production cost and a quadratic ramp rate
cost:
minimize
g1, r1∫
T
0
g1(t)
r1(t)

T


c111 −
Q0 +B−1p∗1(t)
Q0
P0
+B−1
0

+

c211 +
1
Q0
P0
+B−1
0
0 c112

g1(t)
r1(t)
+

1
Q0
P0
+B−1
0
0 0

g2(t)
r2(t)

 dt
subject to g1(0) = g
0
1, and for almost all t ∈ [ 0, T ] ,
g˙1(t) = r1(t)
−r1 + r1(t) ≥ 0
r1 − r1(t) ≥ 0

⇒ r1 ≤ g˙1(t) ≤ r1.
Similarly, player 2’s optimal control problem just interchanges 1 and 2 for the player index
i. If the player supply conjectures are not identical (i.e., B−1 6= B−2),
Ξ12 =

1
Q0
P0
+B−1
0
0 0
 6=

1
Q0
P0
+B−2
0
0 0
 = ΞT21.
It follows that a conjectured supply function game in which players have different conjec-
tures is not a symmetric game. With p∗1(t) and p∗2(t) being Lipschitz continuous functions,
it is simple to see that (Â), (B), (W), (D̂), and (E) hold. To prove that ρ(Γ) < 1, con-
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sider the fact that ρ(Γ) ≤ ‖Γk‖ 1k for all natural numbers k. Examining k = 1 with the
Euclidean norm, ‖Γ‖ is the largest eigenvalue of
(
ΓTΓ
) 1
2 =


0
1√
σΞ2 σ
Ξ
1
‖Ξ21‖
1√
σΞ1 σ
Ξ
2
‖Ξ12‖ 0


0
1√
σΞ1 σ
Ξ
2
‖Ξ12‖
1√
σΞ2 σ
Ξ
1
‖Ξ21‖ 0


1
2
=
1√
σΞ1 σ
Ξ
2

‖Ξ12‖ 0
0 ‖Ξ21‖

where, as defined in (Â), σΞi is the minimum eigenvalue of Ξii. For this problem,
σΞ1 , min
c211 + 1Q0
P0
+B−1
, c112
 and σΞ2 , min
c221 + 1Q0
P0
+B−2
, c122
 .
249
Hence, if
‖Ξ12 ‖
‖
1
Q0
P0
+B−1
<
√√√√√√√min
 c211 + 1Q0
P0
+B−1
, c112
 min
 c221 + 1Q0
P0
+B−2
, c122

‖√
σΞ1 σ
Ξ
2
‖
1
Q0
P0
+B−2
<
√√√√√√√min
 c211 + 1Q0
P0
+B−1
, c112
 min
 c221 + 1Q0
P0
+B−2
, c122

‖
‖Ξ21 ‖ ,
then ρ(Γ) < 1. The above condition can clearly be satisfied for a wide variety of parameter
values. Thus, it has been proven that Theorem 5.3 holds for the above CSF problem speci-
fication and the presented Jacobi iterative algorithm will converge to the unique differential
Nash equilibrium.
5.6 Conclusion
In this paper, solution existence of differential LQ Nash games was studied via a construc-
tive approach. Under certain assumptions, the equivalence of a symmetric differential LQ
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game to a single concatenated linear-quadratic optimal control problem was established.
Using this equivalence, the convergent numerical method developed in [95] for solving LQ
optimal control problems can be leveraged to identify differential Nash equilibria. For
asymmetric differential LQ games, a Jacobi-type iterative solution scheme was proven to
converge under certain conditions to a unique differential Nash equilibrium. Examples of
common microeconomic games fulfilling the assumptions for each differential game form
were presented. It is hoped that the results derived in this chapter will pave the way for
further research on differential LQ Nash games with mixed state-control constraints. Ob-
vious future research directions include extending this work to optimal control problems
with pure state constraints and analyzing whether inexact solutions to (5.1) can be used in
the Jacobi-type solution method. Unfortunately, the theoretical foundation for problems
with pure state constraints is not firmly established, thereby decreasing the promise of that
extension.
251
Chapter 6
Conclusion
This dissertation has advanced knowledge in the field of Nash equilibrium problems in
several ways.
In Chapter 2, a general capacity expansion model for multiple markets and risk averse play-
ers was analyzed. Equilibrium existence was proven for two price determination methods
(inverse supply/demand function, uniform price auctions), and consumer surplus maxi-
mization was included to change the traditional fixed-demand auction to an auction in
which demand is price elastic. Unlike previous results, the model in this chapter did not
assume that event probabilities were identical for all players, included exponential risk
aversion, and is not limited to a proof-defined number of markets. A potential direction
for further research in this area involves determining whether other pricing mechanisms can
be incorporated into the model without sacrificing desirable theoretical properties such as
solution existence while retaining the faithfulness of the models with regard to applications.
Chapter 3 provided a detailed analysis of Lemke’s method as applied to linear complemen-
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tarity problems arising from games that include shared constraints. One of the first, and
perhaps most important, results of this work was the very specialized multiplier property
that solutions identified by Lemke’s method must possess. In essence, Lemke’s method
is only capable of identifying a subclass of all potential equilibria. This deficiency was
the focus of the rest of the chapter. New equilibrium concepts such as partial variational
equilibria, coalitional equilibria, and regularization-based equilibria were introduced, and a
simple looping-type modification of Lemke’s method was proposed to identify partial varia-
tional equilibria “on-the-fly.” Sufficient conditions were provided for successful termination
of the modified Lemke’s method. Finally, a unique problem reformulation technique and an
associated solution method were described that allow for an additional array of equilibria
to be identified. Further work in this area may focus on the application of this methodol-
ogy to linearized nonlinear equilibrium problems and additional adaptations for solving an
even wider variety of LCPs.
Chapter 4 developed and studied a unified power market framework that encompasses
several traditional models. At its most basic level, the unified market model combines
the optimization problems of generators (perfectly competitive, Cournot, or conjectured
supply function), an ISO, and market clearing conditions. For the unified model, sufficient
conditions for equilibrium existence, uniqueness, and stability were proven. From a com-
putational perspective, it was shown that several projection- and Newton-based methods
for variational inequalities can be successfully applied to identify a solution of the unified
model. Lastly, three important model extensions somewhat related to the model of Chap-
ter 2 were introduced: consumer surplus maximization, capacity markets, and emission
permit auctions. Equilibrium existence and uniqueness results for these extended models
were proven when possible. Additional research directions arising from this chapter are
plentiful. For instance, unified models that study hierarchical behavior, uncertainty/risk,
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and continuous-time dynamics would all be relevant when analyzing the properties of actual
deregulated electricity markets.
The final chapter of the dissertation moved to continuous-time domain to study differential
Nash equilibrium problems. Starting from a recently developed computational method for
solving a linear-quadratic optimal control problem with mixed state-control constraints,
a differential Nash game comprised of these problems was analyzed. When a symmetry
property was satisfied, it was proven that the differential Nash game was equivalent to a
single concatenated linear-quadratic optimal control problem and the previously mentioned
computational method could be applied. For asymmetric games that satisfy a spectral
radius condition, it was shown that a Jacobi-type iterative method converges to the unique
game equilibrium. Cournot and conjectured supply function games were presented to
illustrate that the required problem assumptions are not overly restrictive. Future research
in this direction could attempt to develop a similar solution method for games in which
pure state constraints are present.
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